Alternative or traditional?: A history of solar and wind energy by McConnell, Nathan S.
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
2004 
Alternative or traditional?: A history of solar and wind energy 
Nathan S. McConnell 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
McConnell, Nathan S., "Alternative or traditional?: A history of solar and wind energy" (2004). Graduate 
Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 8504. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8504 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
Maureen and Mike 
MANSFIELD LIBRARY
The University of
Montana
Permission is granted by the author to reproduce this material in its entirety, 
provided that this material is used for scholarly purposes and is properly cited 
in published works and reports.
**Please check "Yes" or "No" and provide signature
Yes, I grant permission
No, I do not grant permissio
Author’s Signature:
Date:
Any copying for commercial purposes or financial gain may be undertaken 
only with the author’s explicit consent.
8/98
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ALTERNATIVE OR TRADITIONAL?
A HISTORY OF SOLAR AND WIND ENERGY
by
Nathan S. McConnell 
B.A. University o f  New M exico, 1993 
J.D. Southern Illinois University, 1998 
presented in partial fulfillment o f  the requirements 
for the degree o f  
M aster o f  Arts 
The University o f  M ontana 
M ay 2004
ApproVtsdhy:
Flores, Chair
Dean, Graduate School
n .  2-0
Date /  7
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMl Number EP39305
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction Is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, If material had to be removed,
a note will Indicate the deletion.
UMI*
Oisssirtation Ptiblistûng
UMI EP39305
Published by ProQuest LLO (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition ©  ProQuest LLO.
All rights reserved. This work Is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
uest
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Elsenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Abstract
M cConnell, Nathan S. M.A., M ay 2004 History 
Alternative or Traditional? A History o f  Solar and Wind Energy 
Advisor/Director; Dan Flores
As the title suggests, “Alternative or Traditional?” investigates two energy resources 
regarded by contemporary society as belonging to  the future. During the energy crises o f  
the 1970s, many energy experts and policym akers expressed interest in solar and wind 
technologies, some in the United States even promised that the nation would inevitably 
turn to these resources. We still may. My interest in what we now refer to as alternative 
energy began with a successful revenue bond initiative that occurred in Novem ber 2001. 
The VoteSolar Initiative helped formulate Proposition B and put the measure on the 
ballot in San Francisco. Designed to raise one hundred million dollars to fund solar, 
wind, and energy conservation improvements on city-owned buildings, the initiative 
passed easily. From a modern perspective, it seemed as though the promise o f  renewable 
energy technologies had finally met with success. As I groped around for a thesis topic 
that would hold my interest, I decided to investigate the two resources that m ost appealed 
to voters, solar and wind energy. I was surprised by the findings. Solar and wind energy 
have a long and inadequately publicized history with humanity. This thesis attem pts to 
alleviate this dearth o f  knowledge by encapsulating passive solar, active solar, and wind 
energy within the context o f  major social energy transitions. In the first chapter, I set out 
the energy transition stories o f ancient China, early modem Britain, and the industrial 
United States. The next three chapters trace the long history o f  passive solar, active solar, 
and wind energy technologies, and the final chapter analyzes recent trends in the US.
Two major arguments hold the work together. Solar and wind energy have long held the 
interest o f human societies, and the world will someday run out o f fossil fuels. As the US 
has the ability to alter its energy policy, solar and wind energy remain plausible choices 
for the future.
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Introduction
(H)istorians must turn away from John Muir and 
Aide Leopold and look more closely at E. F. Schumacher, 
Amory Lovins, Murray Bookchin, Stewart Brand, and the 
generation o f  environmentalists who struggled to craft an 
environmental philosophy that recognized humans “were 
gods, and might as well get good at it.”’
This thesis began has its genesis in challenge. Groping around for a 
suitable line o f inquiry early in my second semester o f graduate work, I had still 
not found a topic. Several areas piqued m y interest, yet I could not find a subject 
that promised to hold m y attention enough to produce an acceptable work, 
especially my first as a historian. I needed a challenge, and, thankfully, I had an 
advisor who implicitly understood the nature o f  graduate school, which is to find 
areas o f  interest that can hold a person’s attention well after graduate work is 
finished. Better still, m y advisor assigned an article that struck me as particularly 
interesting. Andrew K irk’s “Appropriating Technology” argues that m odem  
environmentalism has its roots in a philosophy less familiar with the American 
naturalist ethos espoused by John M uir and Aldo Leopold and more in common 
with appropriate technology advocates like Amory Lovins and E. F. Schumacher.^ 
Kirk implicitly challenges environmental historians to bridge the gap 
between the overwrought antim odem ist hero worship and the silence that plagues 
modem countercultural techies. I accept K irk’s call, if  in my own way. This
’ Kirk, “Appropriating Technology,” 376.
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thesis explores global energy transitions, solar and wind technological 
development, and the modern union o f  technology and policy in the United States. 
While other historians have analyzed resource consumption and environm ental 
change generally, none has explained the longue duree view o f  energy transitions 
and alternative energy technologies within the context o f  modern environm ental 
politics. This thesis explores the changing nature o f  solar and wind energy 
technology from their beginnings to  applications in the early twenty-first century. 
While the resources themselves have not changed in the two millennia covered 
here, the ways that humans have harnessed the energy sources has adapted 
considerably, and this metamorphosis came largely due to shifting governm ental 
policies.
I f  any society ever adopts solar and wind energy as primary sources, it 
must first experience an energy transition. Abandoning familiar resources can be 
a difficult task, yet countless societies have adapted their energy consum ption 
patterns. This thesis begins with an overview o f  three energy transition 
experiences that implicitly suggests the enduring character o f  solar and wind 
energy. Ancient China, early m odern Great Britain, and the industrial United 
States all made dramatic shifts in their energy resources. The changes all include 
three common characteristics. First each society had an economic system in place 
that allowed a change to occur w ithout upsetting governm ent’s role as provider 
and protector. Next all three nations had the ability to adapt their technological 
expertise to the demands o f new energy resources. Finally, each country had
 ̂Kirk, “Appropriating Tecluiology,” 376.
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political institutions in place that could balance the need for new energy sources 
with the demands o f  social stability.
The following three chapters explore specific alternative energy 
technologies. Passive solar technology refers to the ways that humanity uses the 
sun’s energy for domestic heating and cooing. Beginning with architectural 
designs, humanity has devised a plethora o f  ways to  harness sunlight. W ithin a 
modern context, passive solar technology’s chief benefit is energy conservation. 
Next I explain how humanity struck upon the idea o f  converting sunshine into 
electricity. Photovoltaics represent a  pinnacle for solar energy developm ent and 
an alluring technology in the modern era. Finally, I analyze wind energy. 
Societies across the globe have long held wind in high regard due to its constant 
nature, but wind technology has changed dramatically since its earliest 
applications. Today, wind energy has the ability to  contribute significantly to  
modern energy production.
I conclude this thesis by analyzing the union between solar and wind 
technology and modern environmental politics. After a brief overview o f  
American energy policy since the 1970s, I examine the causes o f  the 2000-2001 
California electricity crisis. One important effect o f the shortages came in San 
Francisco during the November 2001 election, when the nonprofit group, 
VoteSolar, crafted a revenue bond for public scrutiny. By portraying solar and 
wind energy as antidotes to the constant problems that faced Bay Area residents, 
VoteSolar and other advocacy groups convinced nearly three-quarters o f  San 
Francisco voters to approve a $100 million project that would retrofit city-owned
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
buildings with passive solar energy saving measures, purchase electricity 
generated by wind turbines, and, m ost significantly, install photovoltaic solar 
panels on city-owned rooftops.
VoteSolar’s efforts have had a positive impact on national energy policy. 
Several states have adopted rigorous renewable energy portfolio standards (RPS) 
and other localities have promised to install solar- and wind-friendly measures. I 
conclude my thesis by considering w hether the promises made by the U nited 
States government after the 1973 O PEC oil embargo finally have merit. During 
the seventies, particularly during the C arter Administration, the federal 
government undertook major efforts to  demonstrate solar and wind energy 
technologies to citizens across the nation, yet by the end o f  R eagan’s first term in 
office, it was clear to most alternative energy advocates that pro-solar policies had 
no friends in the White House. The solar and wind industries managed to adapt, 
much as the technologies changed throughout their histories, so that by the early 
twenty-first century, people could realistically depend on the sun and wind for 
power.
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Chapter 1
From Ox M ountain to OPEC: E nergy Transitions in World H istory
Energy Policy Redux
It took nature over 500 million years to 
store in the ground these stockpiles o f  
‘fossil fuels’ which civilization is now 
consuming in a flash o f geologic time.
President’s Materials Policy Commission, 1952
For Americans living through it, the 1973 oil embargo was a monumental 
occasion. The Arabian contingent o f  the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
made good on its promise to cut petroleum production, an act with serious consequences 
for the United States. Long lines at gas stations, exorbitant home heating costs, and an 
uneasy dependence on foreign resources all forced Americans to consider the sources o f  
their energy. The consequences o f unchecked energy consumption had already caused 
the US to pass a number o f  environmentally protective regulations.’ The 1970s also saw 
citizen movements like E.F. Schumacher’s “appropriate technology” and Amory Lovins’ 
“soft energy path” that alerted people to the possibilities o f alternatives.^ In the 1970s, 
the United States seemed on the verge o f  changing how it got its energy.
As with other movements in the United States, the pressure to shift energy policy 
had historical precedent. Policy scholars had concerns about energy supply since the 
immediate post-W orld W ar II era, when tight resources threatened economic growth.
' Three prominent ones, the National Environmental Policy Act o f 1969 (NEPA), 42 USC 4321 et seq., the 
Clean Air Act o f 1970 (CAA), 42 USC 7401 et seq., and the Clean Water Act o f 1972 (CWA), 33 USC 
1251 et seq., all became law well before the OPEC embargo of 1973.
 ̂See Andrew Kirk, “Appropriating Technology: The Whole Earth Catalog and Counterculture 
Environmental Politics,” Environmental History (6:3, July 2001), 374-94.
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itself closely linked to expanding energy use. In late 1951, with the pressures o f  the 
Korean conflict stressing domestic energy supplies. President Harry S. Truman 
commissioned an executive study to  propose a comprehensive overhaul o f  national 
energy policy. The President’s M aterials Policy Commission, better known as the Paley 
Commission after chairman William S. Paley, considered the hodge-podge, pragmatic 
policies o f  the past, analyzed policy options, and suggested alternatives. Foreshadowing 
the problems that would arise some twenty years later, the report portended that “the time 
will com e...and perhaps well beyond 1975, when civilization’s energy needs will outrun 
nature’s declining store o f fossil fuels available for economic use.” Rather than w ait for 
depletion, the report recommended that the government find ways “to  harness 
economically such unconventional resources as solar and atomic energy
Flash forward twenty years to the N ixon administration. The United States had 
grown woefully dependent on foreign, particularly Middle Eastern, sources o f  oil for use 
in everything from gas-guzzling “muscle” cars to electricity-producing pow er plants.
Even before the devastating OPEC oil em bargo in autumn o f  1973, President Nixon 
addressed some problems o f  depending on the global market. In late June o f  that year, 
Nixon announced “Project Independence,” which called on the United States to “meet 
Am erica’s own energy needs from A m erica’s own energy resources” by the end o f  the 
decade.'* Perhaps unwittingly, Nixon echoed the sentiments o f  the Paley Commission, 
which warned that “the Free W orld .. .cannot be allowed to become over dependent (sic)
 ̂President s Materials Policy Commission, volume 1, Resources fo r  Freedom: Foundations fo r  Growth 
and Security ONaslûttg^oa DC: Government Printing Office, 1952), 104, 106, quoted in Craufurd D. 
Goodwin, ed„ Energy Policy in Perspective: Today's Problems, Yesterday's Solutions (Wasliington, DC: 
The Brookings Institution, 1981), 53-4.
" Executive Energy Documents, printed at Uie request of Henry M. Jackson, Chair, Comimttee on Energy 
and Natural Resources (Washington, DC: US Govermnent Printing Office, July 1978), 86.
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on Middle East oil. .. In other words, insightful policy wonks foresaw trouble ahead, 
yet American leaders failed to take action.
Like the US in the 1970s, many societies have had difficulty adjusting to resource 
scarcity. In terms o f  human energy use, a pattern emerges in which a society finds a 
valuable resource, uses it until it is gone, then struggles to find suitable replacements.
This chapter analyzes two such situations, in ancient China and in early m odern Great 
Britain. In certain rare occasions, societies have changed their energy resources before 
having depleted previously valuable ones. I cover one such occasion here, the industrial 
United States. Rather than run out o f  resources, as happened in China and Britain, the 
industrial United States embraced the paradigm shift because o f  the nation’s abundance. 
These three historical instances reveal the factors that influence major societies’ energy 
resource transitions. W hile other historians have studied particular resource consumption 
and change generally, none has considered the historical role o f  energy transitions within 
the context o f  solar and wind energy resources.
Ancient China, early modem Great Britain, and industrial America all exhibited 
three indispensable characteristics. First, all the nations had an economic system that 
could adapt to a new energy resource. Next, each society demonstrated technological 
adroitness; and finally, all o f  them had the political institutions in place that m ade change 
possible. For nations that have undergone energy transitions, or major changes in the 
resource(s) upon which a society primarily depends, those societies must possess some 
combination o f economic openness, technological expertise, and political responsiveness.
The emergence o f  the Paley Commission in the 1950s, and later Project 
Independence in the early 1970s, indicate that policymakers can anticipate the need to
 ̂Goodwin, quoting Resources fo r  Freedom, in Energy Policy, 55.
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change energy resources. Each also indicates that the US will continue to  change its 
pattern o f energy production and consum ption. America’s dependence on fossil fuels, 
particularly petroleum, has placed the nation in a  precarious situation, particularly in the 
context o f  historical energy transitions. The 1970s represent a tim e in which the United 
States confronted energy shortages nationwide for the first time. I include the period 
during and after the 1973 OPEC oil em bargo to  illustrate a premise central to my thesis: 
in the early twenty-first century, the United States appears on the brink o f changing the 
energy resources it uses.
The American reaction to the 1970s energy crisis indicates what direction the 
country might take when (and if) the need to  choose a new energy path arises. Although 
I discuss the technological and resource possibilities in greater detail in subsequent 
chapters, the US response to the crisis years o f  the seventies provides necessary 
background for discussion o f  more recent developments, which indicate that American 
economics, technology, and policy can support a major shift in the nation’s energy 
resources. Whichever direction the US ultim ately chooses, the examples from ancient 
China, early modern Britain, and the industrializing United States all make clear that 
American society will change dramatically from  its experience with energy transition.^
Ancient China
Tliere was a time when tlie trees were luxuriant on Ox 
Mountain. As it is on tJie outskirts o f a great metropolis, 
tlie trees are constantly lopped by axes. Is it any wonder 
tliat tliey are no longer fine?. . . A man's letting go o f liis 
true heart is like the case of tlie trees and the axes.
When tlie trees are lopped day after day, is it any wonder 
tliat tliey are no longer fine?
® I recognize tlie possibility tliat tecluiolo©^ may allow us to continue burning fossil fuels at current levels, 
but I set tliis potential reality aside for the moment.
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Mencius, fourtli century BC
China’s energy situation did not m uch im prove between the time M encius opined 
at the diminishing forests o f  Ox M ountain and the nation’s first political unification a 
century later. Timber played an important role in the development o f  Chinese 
civilization, and the depletion o f  the resource forced the nation to adapt. Nature offered 
several potential options, but the two with the most to  offer were coal and water. 
W eighing the merits o f  each resource, Chinese leadership opted to encourage w hat 
historian Karl Wittfogel described as a “hydraulic society,” one based on irrigation and 
farming.^
At the time o f  China’s first political unification, in 221 BCE, policymakers ruled 
over the most technologically advanced nation on the planet. M ost societies depended on 
timber for fuel in the years before the common era, yet Chinese engineers developed iron 
and steel tools centuries before others did. Such expertise gave Chinese farmers an 
advantage over their contemporaries in other parts o f  the world, and after political 
leadership became a relative constant in the early common era, a pattern emerged in 
China that others would repeat later: tools forged with the high temperatures o f  charcoal, 
a wood product, helped farmers clear fields o f  trees; the act also produced fuel for 
metalworkers to ply their trade. In tandem, the process created an unsustainable pattern 
that would eventually force Chinese leaders to adapt to  new energy sources.
The struggle to turn forests into farmland shows but one side o f  the multi­
dimensional relationship between China’s people and natural resources. Resource 
depletion proved a constant problem in East Asia, and throughout its early development.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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China coped with shortages by applying technological solutions. By turning to an 
abundant natural resource, coal, China’s northern region helped stem the tide o f  
deforestation, while laying the groundwork for future technological developments. 
Ultimately, Chinese policies dealt with an agricultural economy that steered the nation 
away from industrial innovation.
Political stability gave China an essential advantage in the nation’s ability to 
develop technology and to adapt to resource scarcity. China’s political story begins with 
the nation’s first unification in the third century, BC. In 221 BC, Qin Shi Huangdi 
managed to consolidate the vast lands o f  eastern Asia into a single political entity.
China’s founding marks the beginning o f  a successful and enduring national tradition, 
and the advent o f  a relatively stable political structure allowed technological advances 
that influenced much o f  the world. Although Chinese metalworkers preferred to use 
charcoal to power their furnaces, coal becam e an important fuel, particularly in the 
timber-starved northern provinces. Coal’s higher tem peratures allowed smelting 
techniques that could produce sturdier farming implements and stronger weaponry. Q in’s 
achievement created a centralized bureaucracy that attempted to merge the needs o f  a 
growing population with China’s already legendary technological reputation, and despite 
numerous political crises, the Chinese governm ent continued to encourage innovation 
into the fourteenth century AD.
Agriculture lay at the heart o f  Chinese unification. A massive increase in 
population meant that farmers endured increasing pressure to expand into forested areas. 
Agricultural and domestic needs formed the root causes o f  massive deforestation inflicted
’ Donald Worster, Rivers o f  Empire: Water. Aridity, and the Growth o f  the American West (New York; 
Pantlieon Books, 1985), 27-8.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
on the Chinese landscape. Timber proved a  functional barrier to expansion because after 
clearing tress to develop farmland, wood provided structural support for homes, fuel to 
heat them, and the charcoal to smelter farm ing implements. W ood thus marked a barrier 
and a catalyst for change, and the resource helped m eet the needs o f  an expanding 
population. Arthur Cotterell estimates that Chinese population reached fifty-eight million 
by 23 AD.* Clive Ponting figures that China’s population remained stable, around fifty 
million, by 200 AD, while European numbers stood at around thirty-five million.® The 
rising population meant that timber became increasingly valuable, which provided the 
backdrop for technological innovation.
In China, the swelling population encroached on forested landscapes. W hile 
timber and its by-product, charcoal, remained highly prized for metal workers, coal 
provided metallurgists with the opportunity to create vastly improved products. Jean- 
Claude Debeir estimates that the lack o f  w ood in the loess, or steppe, regions o f  northern 
China helped spur the early use o f  coal there.’® Forges produced cast iron tools by 500 
BC, and Chinese metalworkers produced steel through various practices. Valclav Smils 
identifies two ways in which early steel m akers could ply their trade; by carburizing 
wrought iron or decarburating cast iron ”  The fusing process mastered by Chinese 
metallurgists bears a striking resemblance to  the Siemens-Martin technique, a steel-
® Artliur Cotterell, China: A Cultural History, (New York: Meridian, 1988), 112,
 ̂Clive Ponting, A Green History o f  the World: The Environment and the Collapse o f  Great Civilizations 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 92.
*** Jean-CIaude Debeir, Jean-Paul Deleage, and Daniel Heinery, In the Servitude o f  Power: Energy and 
Civilization Through the Ages (London: Zed Books, 1991), 55.
" Valclav Smils, fwergy/n (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1994), 151-2.
Carburizing means prolonged heating o f wrought iron so that carbon gradually diffuses inwardly; 
decarburization requires the smelter to stir molten cast iron to expel carbon. See also, Debeir, et al. In the 
Servitude o f  Power, 55.
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making method introduced in the U.S. in 1868, although no direct link exists betw een 
them.*^
The Chinese people developed a system for creating technologies that m ost found 
difficult to change. M etalworking innovations led to  better farming implements, which 
helped accelerate deforestation. Chinese agriculture spread thanks to sturdier, more 
efficient tools fired in coal furnaces. The moldboard plow, made with coal’s high heat, 
greatly reduced the amount o f  energy required from a farmer who previously tilled the 
soil with hand implements. Yet even with the growth o f fossil-born technology, Chinese 
society expressed a reluctance to change. W hile anthracite coal allowed engineers to 
create cast iron, and to a far less extent steel production, Chinese m etalworkers preferred 
to  work with charcoal-powered furnaces. Jean-CIaude Debeir assigns three factors to the 
transition from a wood-based to a coal-fueled one: fuel requirements o f  the burgeoning 
population; metalworking products for farm ers and soldiers; and the massive 
deforestation o f Chinese timberlands.*^ The shift from trees to fossils in East Asia bears 
a resemblance to transitions that occur in other places where energy sources change.
China’s shift from wood to coal was neither complete nor permanent. Chinese 
smelting continued to rely on coal, but mechanical applications never fully caught on. 
Although metal workers used water mills to drive hammers and bellows, an advance 
made in China by the first century AD, hydraulic machines having metalworking value 
tended to lose out to the use o f  water for agricultural concerns. Continued population 
growth meant that political leaders had to m ake a decision regarding the direction o f  
Chinese innovation. Agricultural production remained at the heart o f  policy, and the
Martin V. Melosi, Coping with Abundance: Energy and Environment in Industrial America, (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 31.
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mechanical developments centering on w aterw heels lost out to irrigation concerns. Just 
as centralized bureaucracy aided in the specialization o f coal in the northern provinces, 
made most apparent by the Grand Canal’s construction, the national governm ent called 
for concentrated efforts toward rice cultivation. The water-powered mills that cropped up 
throughout Europe in the early Middle Ages stem m ed from the need to grind w heat for 
bread, but East Asians relied on rice, whose processing doesn’t require milling. The 
political decision to dismantle water mills seem ed eminently practical considering the 
effective applications metalworkers made w ith coal. By the eighth century, Chinese 
authorities banned waterwheel construction, and in 778 AD the government dismantled 
eighty mills.*”* While timber depletion allowed certain technological innovations, a 
continued reliance on an agricultural economy helped prevent a complete energy resource 
transition.
The shift in Chinese energy use lies in its overall effects. Smelting operations 
continued to  use coal well into the modern era; at the same time agricultural demands 
stunted a shift to a full-blown fossil-powered society. Rice grew easily in Chinese fields, 
and developments in wet farming based in the  south spread northward. W aterways that 
had the potential to spur mechanized advances becam e more important as irrigation and 
transportation avenues. Chinese dependence on and overconsumption o f wood meant 
recurring timber shortages; coal became indispensable as a source for domestic, for 
heating and cooking, and manufacturing, for smelting applications. Chinese energy 
transition was more merger than linear; instead o f  moving from wood to coal, China’s 
resources formed a partnership. This cooperative effort was not unique, but its utility
' ̂  Debeir, In the Servitude o f  Power, 51 -6. 
'"Ib id, 58.
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helps explain why no industrial revolution occurred in China. Clim ate and geography 
also played major roles; the need to  use naturally flowing w ater for irrigation in a semi- 
arid landscape subverted potential developm ent o f  hydraulic machinery Such was not 
the problem in Great Britain.
Early Modern Great Britain
Even now tlie devastation is begun.
And lialf tlie business o f destruction done;
Even now, inetliinks, as pondering here I stand,
I see tlie rural Virtues leave tlie land.
Oliver Goldsmith, “Tlie Deserted Village,” 1766
The “Virtues” that English poet Oliver Goldsmith refers to  in “The Deserted 
Village” clearly represent the values lost during the shift from an agrarian economy to  an 
industrial one. From the Glorious Revolution in 1688 until N apoleon’s defeat at 
W aterloo in 1815, British society transform ed from an agrarian nation into one based on 
the open market. This early modern period included Goldsmith’s empty village, itself a 
byproduct o f  Britain’s industrialization. The agricultural system that had helped Britain 
endure the calamitous Middle Ages included the commons, land held by farming tenants 
in common ownership that was used primarily for raising crops. Parliam ent’s efforts to 
“close,” or privatize, the publicly-owned fields signals the need for workers in crowded, 
dirty factory towns that became vital to  Great Britain’s emergence as a leader in the 
global market economy o f  the nineteenth century.
The technology that spurred the Industrial Revolution, the shift from a muscle- 
and water-based energy sources to a system based on steam power and fossil fuels, 
stemmed from factors also seen in ancient China. In both China and Britain, technology
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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had an impact on resource depletion. British engineers mastered the steam engine, which 
pushed the demand for timber fuel beyond sustainable levels. Economically, Great 
Britain had to deal with the problems o f  an agricultural system that functioned within a 
growing capitalistic economy. Yet unlike their Asian predecessors whose geography 
forced the government to construct massive public works for agricultural reasons,
Britain 's fertile land allowed leaders to encourage the nation’s traditional affinity for the 
open market. Despite the different paths that each nation chose, the same three factors -  
technology, economics, and policy -  all had a  profound influence on resolving the 
direction o f  energy transition.
Agriculture was the driving force behind Britain’s technological innovation.
Even before the early modern era, machines dotted the British landscape. As with their 
continental counterparts, British farmers raised grains that required processing beyond 
harvesting. To produce an edible form o f  wheat, for example, farmworkers needed to 
grind the grain into a powder form (flour), a  tim e-consuming task. European farm ers had 
long known the advantages o f  using milling technology, which used muscle o r water, and 
in a few rare occasions, wind energy, as a fiiel.*^ Such machines increased in complexity 
with time, and people eventually adapted mechanical concepts to other sectors o f  society. 
Although British machines had a role in displacing farmer peasants, technology also 
provided an outlet: by the eighteenth century, several industries (most prominently 
textiles and transportation) adapted mechanical energy into an efficient, powerful steam- 
powered idea that could be run by people.*^
Smils, Energy in World History, 66-9. 
Ibid.. 161.
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Agriculture influenced British technology by encouraging farm ers to  create better 
implements, as well. By the eighteenth century, metalworkers produced iron tools that 
could clear forests and others that could plow  fields. M etallurgists faced a barrier to 
developing iron implements, though, and the  problem centered on the high tem peratures 
needed to work with iron. Charcoal was a reliable fuel, but the demand for tim ber 
eventually overtook Britain’s supply. B lacksm iths learned that coal produced enough 
heat to work with iron, and forges across Britain began working with the fossil fuel to 
create sturdy implements.
In itself, using coal as a fuel was not significant. As noted above, ancient Chinese 
workers used coal centuries prior to British blacksmiths. Yet the demand for coal 
triggered two developments important to B ritain’s technological development. First, 
metallurgists began to experiment with metals at coal’s high temperatures, which resulted 
in sturdier products.*^ More importantly, coal offered an alternative to the rapidly 
diminishing timber that resulted from the rapid population growth after the Black Death. 
While Britain suffered plagues as late as 1665, when a major outbreak occurred in 
London, the nation’s population began to grow  after 1500.** As the number o f  people 
increased, so did the pressure on natural resources, and the demand on tim ber and food 
spurred geographic expansion. Forests succumbed to farmland, and eventually Britain 
experienced severe wood shortages. Coal-based technology relieved some o f  the 
pressure on timber demand by offering a reliable, and in some cases superior, alternative 
to charcoal. Another solution was the literal expansion o f Great Britain’s economic 
system.
P.J. Marshall, ed.. The Oxford History o f  the British Empire, Volume II: The Eighteenth Century (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 59.
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Britain’s agricultural system set the foundation for unprecedented econom ic 
expansion. By the eighteenth century, fertile fields and advanced technology reduced the 
need for farm labor, and a rising textile industry soon emerged to absorb those workers 
that once occupied the commons.*^ M anufacturing grew in economic im portance 
throughout the early modern period, and by the nineteenth century, steam -powered 
factories concentrated in several British cities.
Merchants seized the advantage by developing a complex system o f  com m erce 
and credit that led to empire. After the governm ent halted its strict oversight o f  private 
enterprise, publicly-backed corporations reorganized into more venturesome private 
associations. British historian Patrick O ’Brien argues that the British m erchant class 
became the driving force o f the nation’s economy. Daring ventures and huge returns on 
investments created wealth unparalleled in Europe, as British merchants built the 
complicated system o f  credit that formed the roots o f  modern lending rules and 
institutions. Credit also played a vital role for private business and public activities alike. 
British armies saw action throughout the eighteenth century, most o f  it financed with 
public debt.^* Mercantile confidence in lending stayed high due to the governm ent’s 
faithful repayments, even though they cam e at taxpayer expense.
Throughout Britain’s meteoric rise to  global empire, government policy alternated 
between laissez-faire and protectionist principles. As the political system grew  more 
open to the rising merchant class in the eighteenth century, regulations on internal 
production remained lax. Labor remained cheap thanks to a system that offered few
Ponting, >1 Green History, 92, 229.
Marsliall, The Oxford History o f  the British Empire, 56.
20 Ibid., 60.
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protections for those at the bottom o f  the econom ic pyramid. Parliam ent’s hands-off 
approach also applied to the commons. Betw een 1750 and 1810, twenty percent o f  the 
total acreage in England and Wales fell under private enclosure acts, wherein individuals 
took legal actions to exert ownership rights. Historian Paul Langford argues that the 
“flexible farming” inherent in private ownership dispensed with the need to use arable 
land for subsistence, opening it for profitable c r o p s . A l t h o u g h  the enclosure movement 
affected much o f  British society, the process existed solely in the private realm.
The most important public act o f  the early modern era reflected the will o f  a 
powerful merchant class. In 1660, Parliament passed the first o f  several Navigation Acts 
that strictly controlled trade among the colonies to the benefit o f  existing businesses and 
nascent ventures. Not only did the law require all colonial trade from Europe to pass 
through Britain, which kept capital inside the nation while effectively taxing imports, all 
such transportation had to use British or colonial s h i p s . S u c h  policies allowed British 
merchants both an incentive to extract natural resources from colonies, since taxes on 
shipbuilding items like New England white pine trees stayed low, as well as providing 
new markets for British-made goods, particularly textiles.
Despite the complexities o f  British technology, economics, and policy, the transition to  
coal was vital to Britain’s empire. When forests disappeared, room opened for vital arable land, 
even though Britain lost a vital energy resource. Coal provided a suitable alternative. Even 
before the beginning o f  the early modern era, Britons burned coal as heat for food and comfort.
Ibid., 64. O ’Brien notes tliat Britain liad a debt more tlian twice tlie national income...astonisliing even 
by tlie standards of profligate borrowing displayed by many governments o f the late twentietli century.”
Paul Langford, A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727-1783 {Oxford; Oxford University Press,
1989), 435.
Ibid., 436. Langford offers no opinion as to whether tliis represents tlie roots of mono-crop farming, but 
tlie parallels seem apparent.
Marsliall, British Empire, 10-1.
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Industry used coal to make everything from beer to  glass, and everyone from shippers to builders 
tapped into coal’s strength. Coal even acted as a nursery for B ritain’s sailors who navigated 
coal-bearing ships alongside coastlines, on rivers, and through canals to  deliver the resource 
from its mining origins to  urban and m anufacturing centers in London, Bristol, and M anchester. 
Such experience proved vital during tim es o f  war. According to Patrick O ’Brien, coal was at 
least as important as agriculture, for the fuel spurred population, urbanization, trade, and 
industrialization - all o f  which would have a  vital impact on the American colonies.
Industrial United States
Tlie vast forests o f the United States and 
Canada cannot long resist the improvident 
liabits of tlie backwoodsman and tlie increased 
demand for lumber.
George Perkins Marsli, A/<a« and Nature (1864)
By the middle o f  the nineteenth century, George Perkins M arsh noticed a 
disturbing trend in his country. Americans pushed their forests to the brink o f  extinction 
due to an insatiable demand for timber. At issue for conservationists was whether the 
country could adapt to dwindling supplies by replacing timber with some other resource.
M arsh proposed two solutions that reflect both the idealism and pragmatism o f  the young 
nation. Marsh thought that Americans needed to develop “enlightened self-interest,” the 
vague notion that resources should be used only when society deemed them necessary.
M arsh also called for industry to find alternatives, reasoning that “‘a crisis will become
”  Ibid., 78-80. 
Ibid., 59.
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terrible unless the discovery o f.. .pit coal or anthracite’” e m e r g e d . T r u e  to  M arsh’s 
vision, the United States expanded its resource base to include coal. In 1850, coal 
accounted for only nine percent o f  American energy consumption; yet, a ha lf century 
later, the fossil fuel made up nearly three-quarters.^*
The energy resource transition that occurred in the United States occurred over 
several decades, from the mid-nineteenth to  the early twentieth centuries. As with the 
changes highlighted in China and Great Britain, Am erica’s energy transition depended on 
technology, economics, and policy. The United States experience differed in a major 
way, though. Although George Perkins M arsh sensed a pattern o f  overconsumption in 
the New England forests, the United States changed its major energy resources without 
first depleting those on which society had previously depended. Rather than change 
technology, economics, and policy in an attem pt to compensate for a lost resource,
America used these three forces proactively to modernize its society. This capacity to 
change without first running out o f  an energy source serves as a valuable lesson for the 
twenty-first century.
Before Europeans began settling in N orth America, the energy story here echoed 
that o f civilizations elsewhere. Native Americans and Europeans each relied primarily on 
renewable energy, such as timber and muscle. As the impact o f  white settlement pushed 
Indians aside, though, consumption patterns changed. Timber meant money to  early 
colonists, and those emigrating from the British Isles harvested varieties o f New  England
^  George Perkins Marsh, A/an and Nature, Or, Physical Geography as M odified by Human Action  
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, reprinted, 1965), 255-9.
“  Joseph A. Pratt, “Tlie Ascent o f Oil,” in Lewis J. Perehnan, August W. Giebelliaus, and Michael D. 
Yokell, . Energy Transitions: Long-Term Perspectives (AAAS Selected Symposium 48, Boulder; 
Westview Press, 1981), 10.
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hardwoods in order to participate in Britain’s imperial market e c o n o m y . W h i l e  young 
industries used wood, mostly as charcoal, to  produce iron and glass, depletion o f  
timberlands began at an unprecedented rate in N orth America. Historian M artin M elosi 
figures that to produce one thousand tons o f  iron, people had to use six thousand cords o f  
wood; with American forests shrinking, society struggled to  find new sources o f  precious 
timber. The United States saw wood as the key to its early success, lending credence to 
the notion that timber was “the fuel o f  civilization.”
A major difference between energy transitions in United States and those o f  
ancient China and early modern Britain lay in the constant availability o f  alternative 
resources in America. As George Perkins M arsh indicates, forests in the eastern United 
States suffered rapid over-harvesting, leaving the region depleted by the middle o f  the 
nineteenth century. East o f  the Mississippi R iver, timber seiyed as a useful barrier to 
westward expansion in the U.S., as settlers used the wood cleared for farming in 
construction, heating, and for cooking. This traditional demand coupled with the 
development o f  the steam engine to  accelerate the demand for timber in Am erica’s 
industrial era. Steam-driven engines initially relied on timber as a power source, 
especially in terms o f water and rail transport. Yet the industrializing process caused a 
major shift in the American landscape as urban centers exploded with factories and 
workers, a scene already playing out in Britain. Martin Melosi concludes that the 
transition from wood to coal mirrors the rush from agricultural fields to urban industrial 
centers.^*
See William Cronon, Changes in the Land, (New York: Hill & Wang, 1983), 9, and 19-33, and Ponting, 
A Green History, 279. Harvests mostly centered on white pines, which were perfect for sliipmaking. 
Melosi, Coping with Abundance, 18 and 22.
Ibid., 17.
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Even as Americans consumed tim ber at an unsustainable rate, the U nited States 
did not change its energy resources after com plete depletion. Melosi and others argue 
that economic incentive and technological capability explain America’s shift from  tim ber 
to coal. Historian Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. com pared the American and European 
experiences. Instead o f  a total lack o f  tim ber production, which was a central concern in 
Europe, American industry heeded the call o f  consumer demand. Abundant sources o f  
coal allowed American metal workers to m ake wrought and cast iron more cheaply than 
charcoal-fired furnaces, causing a shift to the fossil fuel in the 1830s and 1840s.^^
The spike in coal consumption began a trend in America that would put the 
nation’s coal consumption on par with the industrial power Great Britain by the last 
decade o f  the nineteenth century. In 1850, the comparison between the two hardly 
merited attention, as the North American nation barely exceeded one-seventh o f  B ritain’s 
56.3 million tons o f  coal consumption.^^ B y the 1890s, the US nearly equaled British 
consumption, and at century’s end, America surpassed the former industrial leader, 
outconsuming Britain by 262.8 million tons to 180.6 million tons.^** The United States 
completed its transition from timber to coal by 1900.
The explanation for America’s resource change has little to do with depletion. 
Although the country experienced several shortages in its early history, the 1812 
Philadelphia wood shortages most prominent among them, problems remained isolated.
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., “Antliracite Coal and the Beginnings of flie Industrial Revolution in the United 
SO Atsr Business History Review, vol. 46 (Summer 1972), 142.
R.P. Rotliwel The Mineral Industry, Its Statistics, Technology, and Trade, Volume II (New York: 
Scientific Publishing Co., 1892), 221; W. S. levons. The Coal Question, rev. ed. (New York; MacMillan & 
Co., 1906), 139; and H. S. Fleming, 4  Report to the Bituminous Coal Trade Association on the Present and 
Future o f  the Bituminous Coal Trade (New York; Bituminous Coal Trade Association, 1908), 139; quoted 
in Sam H. Schurr and Bruce C. Netschert, eds.. Energy in the American Economy, I850-I975: An 
Economic Study o f  its History and Prospects (Baltimore; The Joluis Hopkins Press, 1960), 70 
Ibid., 70.
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Localized responses like the Mutual Assistance Coal Company in Philadelphia had little 
impact on the changing national consumption p a tte rn s .In d u s tr ia l  development 
provides a better explanation for the change.
For all its benefits to  home and industry, coal’s arrival on the American energy 
scene was anything but smooth. The major problem with the transition from w ood to 
coal was logistical: producers had a tough tim e getting the product to manufacturing 
centers, which had previously emerged near m ajor water ways. Early American coal 
fields lay mostly in northwestern Pennsylvania and in West Virginia’s Appalachian 
region, far away from industrial factories o f  the Northeast. Ironically, the solution to  the 
transportation riddle lay in transportation. Throughout the mid-eighteenth century, 
railroads relied on wood burning engines, which engineers could transform into coal 
consumers without major e f f o r t . B y  the 1870s, railroad companies invested in coal 
mines and the race for economic power took off. Steam-powered water and rail 
transportation gave coal a stable market, and provided a steady supply for fuel-hungry 
factories. Soon coal expanded to  compete w ith tim ber and kerosene for the home heating 
market.
Coal’s widespread use allowed the U.S. to compete with European nations for 
industrial power, but economic success had its share o f problems. Urban centers across 
industrialized America belched out debilitating pollution, and people living near factories 
began to  take notice. By 1900, various groups, many founded by women, formed to  fight 
for cleaner air, yet most Americans held to the notion that smoke was a sign o f
Melosi, Coping with Abundance, 26-7, 
Ibid., 24, 27-8.
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p r o s p e r i t y . A  rise in nuisance complaints followed the switch from relatively clean- 
burning anthracite to smoky, toxic bitum inous coal. Technological advances and 
logistical convenience marked the shift to dirtier urban centers.
By the twentieth century, America transitioned from a wood-based, agricultural 
society to an industrial, coal-consuming power. Although the US never fully ended its 
use o f  timber for domestic heating and other purposes, the nation has not returned to pre- 
industrial levels o f wood consumption either. The notion that a given society does not 
completely abandon a resource might seem an irrelevant assertion, but the competition 
that drives one energy source to prominent use also tends to deplete that source. Those 
societies that maintain a more diverse resource base have the best chance o f  adapting to 
new sources when they run out.^*
As the United States entered the twentieth century, a new resource competed with 
coal for dominance. The last half o f  the nineteenth century saw a shift in dom estic fuel 
demand; people typically depended on costly whale oil or inefficient beeswax or tallow 
candles for lighting. But just as whales becam e scarce, people in western Pennsylvania 
noticed a mysterious black substance oozing from the ground and into streams. Locals 
dipped rags into the water to  collect their contents for a wide range o f  uses, including 
indoor illumination.^^ Word spread about the mystery fuel, then known as “coal oil,” and 
before the start o f  the Civil War, prospectors set up camp in Titusville, Pennsylvania. 
America in the mid-nineteenth century contained a growing population, abundant 
resources, and increasing economic wealth, ideal conditions for an energy transition.
W ith the cost o f  whale oil on the rise and a paucity o f  sufficient alternatives, scientific
’̂Ibid., 32-3.
I argue tliat wind energy tecluiology is one such example in Chapter 4, below.
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experimentation combined with business acum en to  create a market for petroleum. O il’s 
first major contribution to American energy cam e as the refined product kerosene.
Refined petroleum produced a fuel that burned cleanly and efficiently, but more 
importantly, America had abundant supplies that kept prices low.
Oil’s utility extended beyond illumination. Laboratories produced a plethora o f  
uses, and petroleum products gained markets in domestic heating and industrial machine 
lubrication. Still, by 1900, oil was not the nation’s dominant fuel source. At the turn o f  
the century, the United States produced a total o f  one billion barrels o f  oil; however, by 
1920, America produced over a billion barrels every year."*” While home lighting and 
heating provided an early market, companies like J. D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil 
Company consolidated the petroleum market by buying businesses engaged in all levels 
o f  oil production, from drilling to refining to  retail. No small producer, refiner, or retailer 
had enough capital to assure market stability until Standard Oil Company achieved near 
total dominance o f  the market.'** Two additional discoveries o f  petroleum’s utility 
cemented oil as a major player in the American energy story: electricity and the internal 
combustion engine. Before the age o f  oil could take o ff in the United States, though, the 
nation had to deal with the problems posed by global conflict.
The Great War placed serious dem ands on the American infrastructure, and 
industry grew to supply the burgeoning military market. The period helped spur a 
transition from coal to  petroleum, although the shift was hardly total: oil accounted for
Daniel Yergiii, The Prize, 22.
Melosi, Coping with Abundance, 39.
For an overview o f Standard O il’s rise to prominence, see Daniel Yergin, The Prize, previously cited; for 
tlie postmodernist perspective, see Roger M. and Diana Davids Olien, Oil & Ideology: The Cultural 
Creation o f  the American Petroleum Industry, (Chapel Hill and London: The University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 2000).
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about twelve percent o f  national energy consum ption in 1920, while coal production 
peaked in that year, providing over three quarters o f  the nation’s energy/^ 
Transportation, mostly automobiles, provided much o f  the market for petroleum, but 
burgeoning manufacturing plants used the resource as well, as many American factories 
began the switch from coal to oil.
The transition from “King Coal” to petroleum  represents the abundant nature o f  
Am erica’s energy transition experience. T he shift occurred largely as a product o f  a 
competitive commercial economic system and abundant resources. A central feature o f  
America’s growing petroleum consumption lay in the industry’s experience with 
kerosene, which was a popular illuminant in the last half o f  the nineteenth century. 
Standard Oil consolidated refining centers and developed a sophisticated delivery system 
that allowed the company to transport crude oil efficiently from the fields in western 
Pennsylvania and from the Lima field in Indiana and Ohio. New strikes in the San 
Joaquin Valley o f  California and in Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma flooded the regions, 
and subsequently the nation, in oil."*̂  Thus, at the time the automobile began m aking a 
contribution to  transportation, the petroleum industry was able to supply the increasing 
demand. Ironically, prior to the auto’s creation in America, refineries had no use for a 
by-product o f  heating fuel, gasoline.'*'* Econom ic demand coupled with sophisticated 
technology and an abundant new resource to  spur an energy transition.
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department o f Commerce, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States 
(Waslungton, D C , 1968), 702.
Yergin, The Prize, 82-95. Yergin reports tlmt California production increased from 470,000 barrels in 
1893 to 24 million barrels ten years later. Petroleum and natural gas also stunted use o f solar energy as a 
resource in California.
Ibid., 80.
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W hile economic incentive and technological advancement spurred a shift from 
timber to  coal and petroleum, fossil fuels drew the attention o f US policy. Throughout 
the last half o f  the nineteenth century, the American governm ent stayed out o f  industrial 
affairs, much as Great Britain had done during the early modern period. With the rise o f  
big business and a growing concern for labor and pollution problems, the US governm ent 
began to  address energy issues by the early twentieth century. W hile “Gilded Age” 
laissez faire policies tended to ignore industrialism ’s side effects, public health concerns 
actually led government to support increased use o f  oil and natural gas in urban areas
The United States also dramatically changed its official position towards 
monopolies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The antitrust sentiment 
led to a reorganization o f  the iconic Standard Oil Company in the 1890s, while concern 
for private utilities spurred growth o f  publicly owned power plants thirty years later."^^ 
Government played an expanding role within the energy sector o f  the economy during 
the Progressive Era. By the end o f  WWI, public utilities competed with private 
businesses for energy customers, a development that signaled a mercurial relationship 
between government and business.
The control over petroleum that began with the W ilson Administration would 
have a lasting effect on the industry. To encourage wartime production, the federal 
government increased the oil depletion allowance in 1918 , which gave the petroleum 
industry a decided advantage in the competition to provide energy in the U.S."*  ̂ The tax 
break began in 1913 and originally gave oil and gas producers a five percent deduction as
Scott Hamilton Dewey, D o n ’t Breathe the Air: A ir  Pollution and U.S. Environmental Politics, 1945-1970  
(College Station; Texas A&M University Press, 2000).
Melosi, Coping with Abundance, 89-90. See also, Richard Rudolph and Scott Ridley, Power Struggle: 
The Hundred-Year War Over Electricity (New York: Harper and Row, 1986).
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a way to calm the volatile market.'** The decision to  provide tax relief for oil and gas 
production originally resulted from lobbying efforts by the industry in 1913, but the need 
for oil in the war solidified the allowance in the tax code.
The coal industry saw things quite differently in the 1920s, as industry leaders 
called on W ashington to help preserve the industry. Throughout the decade, demand 
for oil soared and signaled a change from the production-focused war years. New  
industries began to  develop around the growing popularity for electricity from both coal- 
and oil-powered sources, while the autom obile boom took petroleum consumption to  new 
heights.
Although the transition from tim ber to fossil fuels was largely complete by the 
end o f the 1920s, the Great Depression m arks a vital period in the development o f 
American electricity plants.^® The era marks an important shift from smaller, 
independent deployment systems to larger, regional networks o f electricity generation 
and fossil fuel consumption. The transition to centralized utilities also underscores the 
abundance o f  resources, technological innovation, and economic pressures, all elements 
o f  America’s energy transition story. W hen Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933, 
domestic utility companies concentrated their energies on the twenty percent o f American 
households already having electric pow er Roosevelt’s agenda sought to expand 
domestic electricity use by extending power to the eighty percent o f homes lacking
Melosi, Coping with Abundance, 100-1.
Ibid., 100. In 2003, tlie deduction stood at fifteen percent, see 
warrenresourcesinc.coin/drilling_prograins.cfin.
Craufurd D. Goodwin, ed.. Energy Policy in Perspective, 138-9.
Most o f my thesis involves energy used for electricity production, as opposed to transportation resources.
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pow er/^ Household modernization was a central feature o f  the New  Deal, and several 
legislative acts carried out this agenda.
Historian Ronald Tobey likens FD R ’s domestic electrification efforts to a modem 
“political enclosure movement” that, served to centralize electricity production and 
transmission.^^ Measures like the National Housing Act, the Rural Electrification Act, 
and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) served as catalysts for modernization and a 
direct role for the federal government in energy use. The haphazard collection o f  power 
grids during the 1920s soon gave way to a m ore systematic approach The m ost lasting 
effect o f  the New Deal on American energy policies related to production, seen 
particularly in new dam construction for hydroelectricity and the massive TVA, and 
regulation, especially over utility companies doing business across state lines.
The policy to modernize American hom es also affected the coal industry, which 
provided most o f the fuel used in power plants. The relationship between governm ent 
and energy became closer during Roosevelt’s presidency, especially given the erratic coal 
industry. Labor problems affected prices, but FDR built a policy around electrification so 
that to  Allfill his promise o f  a better way o f life, Roosevelt had to rein in costs. The 
National Industrial Recovery Act o f  1933 set prices for coal in the hopes o f  stabilizing 
the industry and expanding the reach o f  pow er plants. The Roosevelt Administration 
sought to offset problems o f  abundance and labor strife by intervening with the market.^'^ 
Later, the Bituminous Coal Act o f 1937 made coal production a profitable business by
Ronald C. Tobey, Technology as Freedom: The New D eal and the Electrical Modernization o f  the 
American Home (Berkeley: University o f Califoniia Press, 19%), 95.
Ibid., 93.
M elosi, Coping with Abundance, 126-7,
Goodwin, Energy Policy in Perspective, 1.
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setting costs artificially high; as a result, an industry that constantly found itself in debt 
was finally able to turn a profit by 1940/^
Overproduction remained a problem for the coal industry throughout the 
Depression, but the same affliction carried different results for oil. Intervention by the 
federal government came as a result o f  oil shortages caused by wasteful competition. 
Briefly during the late 1930s, an old Progressive ethic re-emerged: conservation. Gifford 
Pinchot, a public servant since Theodore Roosevelt’s administration, continued to 
influence policy by serving in the Interior Departm ent in both the Franklin Roosevelt and 
Harry Truman administrations. Pinchot and Harold Ickes became so concerned about the 
possibility o f  running out o f  oil that the two proposed a World Conservation Conference 
to discuss energy. The Conference, renamed the Scientific Conference on the 
Conservation and Utilization o f  Resources, w as held in late summer 1949 at Lake 
Success, NY, and advocated a “(m)ore effective utilization o f solar energy.” ^̂
Aside from conservation, the oil industry asked for government help in stabilizing 
the volatile market; the government responded by continuing favorable tax breaks and to 
delve into the realm o f  interstate regulation. The hodge-podge laws that governed oil 
production varied from state to state until the Conally Hot Oil Act passed in 1935, which 
merely transferred the practice o f  inconsistent policies from the state to the federal level. 
The legislation gave the federal government the power to enforce state quotas on oil 
production and effectively stemmed the tide o f  cut-throat competition.^^ Still crude 
production nearly doubled from 1930 to 1945, and the industry found a major boost in the
”  Ibid., 139.
Ibid., 25-6. Indeed solar was aji altenialive, but cheap, abundant fossil resources, coupled with tlie 
promise of atomic energy, effectively squelched solar’s development.
Ibid., 63-4.
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American West. In California, coal remained an expensive resource, but the petroleum 
industry established itself as a primary energy supplier. James W illiams reports that 
California relied first on hydro-power for electricity throughout the Depression; after 
1945, steam power, and with it oil, surpassed hydroelectricity as the chief supplier in the 
s t a t e .Na t i ona l l y ,  coal remained a vital source for electricity generation, but other 
sources continued their march to energy parity.
Natural gas emerged from the fuel-hungry Depression era as a major factor in 
American electricity generation. The National Gas Act o f  1938 legitimized the resource 
by calling for its regulation by the federal governm ent. Thanks to  advances in 
transmission technology, gas companies could ship their product from the fields, located 
mostly in the Southern Plains, to refineries, which used the resource to generate 
electricity.^^ Inefficiencies continued to mark natural gas’s marketability; in the thirties, 
engineers did not fully understand how to transport natural gas effectively, but by the end 
o f  the Second World War, the resource played a prominent role in American energy. 
Natural gas made up only twelve percent o f  US energy consumption in 1940, but by 
1960, that number rose to one-third.^‘ As w ith other resources, natural gas depended on 
abundant supplies, economically efficient transport, and a ready market.
America’s energy transition dem onstrated characteristics found in ancient China 
and early modern Britain. Technologically, the US borrowed from its European forbears 
to institute an industrialized society in North America, while the market economy spurred
James C. Williams, Energy and the Making o f  M odern California, (Akron, Tlie University o f  Akron 
Press, 1997), 146-7.
ArlonR. Tussing and Connie C. Barlow, The Natural Gas Industry: Evolution, Structure, and Economics 
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984), 24.
^  M elosi, Coping with Abundance, 154-7.
U.S. Department o f Commerce, Statistical A bstract o f  the United States, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1968), 702.
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resource production into previously untapped reserves. Government policy vacillated 
between the British laissez faire model and one based on the public interest. The result o f  
America’s shift from timber to fossil fuels stands as a testament to hum anity’s awesom e 
capacity for productivity and growth. As the energy crises o f  the 1970s demonstrate, 
such profligate resource consumption comes at a cost.
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Chapter 2
Lessons from Chaco: Passive Solar Technology and Humanity
Ancient China, early m odem  Great Britain, and the industrial United States 
changed their energy resources without a plan. The particular geographies offered each 
society a range o f options, and they all drew from available resources for sim ilar reasons. 
As outlined in the preceding chapter, a com bination o f  economics, technology, and 
politics worked together to form a broad energy resource policy, yet the patterns o f  
consumption settled upon by the respective societies came after each considered, and in 
some cases tested, other options. For virtually every nation, no single source proved to 
be a panacea for energy crises, but societies chose resources based upon compatibility. 
Economics, technology, and politics all played a role. Availability and familiarity were 
also important.
Humanity has long held solar energy in high regard. In ancient China, Greece, 
and Rome, among others, people have used an option still considered viable today. 
Generally defined, passive solar energy refers to the practice o f  using the sun’s energy for 
domestic heating and cooling.' M ost o f hum anity’s efforts to use passive solar energy 
involves architecture, and today experts continue to illustrate energy savings as the 
resource’s central benefit. Industrial, commercial, and domestic (household) energy 
consumption makes up nearly three-quarters o f the American total, mostly in the form o f
' This is the modem definition, at least. See the Sustainable Building Sourcebook’s “Passive Solar Design” 
website ate www.greenbuilder.com/sourcebook/PassiveSol.html.
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electricity.^ Passive solar technology reduces the need for electricity production and the 
environmentally harmful byproducts related to  certain methods o f making electricity, 
such as burning coal This chapter traces the technological development o f  passive solar 
technology from ancient societies to  the m odern era in order to show that energy 
conservation and passive solar energy are closely linked. Such a connection 
demonstrates that energy policies o f  the early twenty-first century should not consider 
solar resources either new or difficult to  understand.
Far from being a recent discovery, passive solar technology has evolved over 
millennia. In this chapter, I divide the story into three parts. Ancient China, Greece, and 
Rome all turned to solar architecture when other more conventional resources became 
scarce. The legacy that developed in Europe throughout the middle and early modern 
period makes up my second section. I end w ith a discussion o f modern passive solar 
technology in all its forms by looking at the era in two parts: the industrial US and 
America in the post-1973 era. I end this chapter with an observation on how Americans 
viewed solar energy on the cusp o f  the twenty-first century.
At first glance, such an extensive scope might seem impossible in one mere 
chapter, yet my methodology makes such an effort reasonable. Using secondary accounts 
o f  the ancient and middle eras, I present a synopsis o f solar technology. As the story 
moves into the modern era, my analysis becom es both more concentrated, in terms o f  
historical sources, and broad, in terms o f  technologies. The number o f  passive solar 
technologies far surpasses the room I have here, so I concentrate on those I believe best 
represent hum anity's attempts to reduce the use o f  fossil fuels and those that best
 ̂Energy Information Aûnùmsimioïu Annual Energy Review 2002, “End-Use Sector Shares of Total 
Consumption, 2002,” available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec2_2.pdf.
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represent the latest technology. M y point in taking on such a methodology centers on the 
role I see passive solar technology playing in the future. Like the other alternative energy 
resources in this thesis, passive solar technology has the ability to offset fuels that pose 
serious problems for modern society. As w ith active solar and wind energy, 
developments in passive solar technology m ake the resource a viable alternative to  those 
fuels Americans most depend upon at the beginning o f  the twenty-first century. Yet 
today’s alternatives were often among the first choices for bygone societies.
Ancient Societies
Ancient societies in China, Greece, and Rome all embraced the benefits o f  passive 
solar technology. In most cases, the turn to  solar energy came as a necessary step to 
warding o ff threats to the social order caused by fuel shortages. At other points, solar 
architecture allowed people to enjoy some degree o f  independence and even decadence.
In all cases, passive solar technology allowed people to adapt to their environment, 
leaving time for other important developments.
Chinese political unification finally brought peace to East Asia in the third 
century BC. The widespread violence that racked the region threatened to return during 
the nation’s fragile early years, in part due to  tim ber shortages. W ood was essential to 
ancient Chinese life, as construction material and fuel. The disappearing forests even 
sounded spiritual chords, as the iconic poet M encius sang saturnine dirges to  the 
vanishing timberlands o f  mythical Ox Mountain.
Geography tended to dictate the terms o f  countering wood shortages. In China’s 
northern loess region, vast coal fields allowed citizens there an alternative source o f
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domestic fuel. Solar architecture provided another solution. Northern China continues to 
struggle with a recurring problem: a constant demand for timber prevents the natural 
recovery o f  forest lands and allows a foothold for encroaching deserts.^ In ancient China, 
one effective measure was to build underground homes. These structures used less wood: 
structural support came from the ground itself. The earth covering also provided good 
insulation, which offset part o f the demand for household fuels. Some am bitious farmers 
even raised crops on their sod-laden roofs."^
Urban planners in other Chinese regions used different methods to preserve 
valuable timber. An intricate knowledge o f  seasonal variances allowed architects to build 
cities amenable to solar energy. Urban plans took on a grid-like quality: builders set 
houses on an east-west axis to take advantage o f  low winter sunlight. By contrast, 
overhangs and silk or rice paper window coverings diffused the sun’s heat in the summer 
months.^ These construction methods helped preserve timber for the burgeoning Chinese 
population, which accounted for a quarter o f  the w orld’s people at the start o f  the first 
millennium.^
The demand for timber plagued ancient Greece as well. Just as M encius wistfully 
noted the disappearing forests in China, Plato described the metaphorical “ ‘sick man ” o f 
Attica.^ The ancient city did not literally turn into a diseased person, o f  course; instead 
the description referred to an emerging environmental problem in Europe’s classical era.
 ̂ See www.worldwatch.org.
Richard G, Stein, Architecture and Energy (Ginden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1977), 35-6; 
Clive Ponting,^ Green History o f  the World: The Environment and the Collapse o f  Great Civilizations 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 75-8; J. Donald Hughes, Environmental History o f  the World 
(London & New York: Routledge, 2001), 59-66.
® Ken Butti and Jolui Perlin, A Golden Thread: 2500 Years o f  Solar Architecture and Technology (Palo 
Alto, CA: Chesliire Books, 1980), 12-3.
* Ponting, Green History, 92.
’ Plato’s Critias, quoted in ibid., 76.
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Mediterraneanization. Farmers deforested large stands o f  cedar, oak, and pine, then used 
the timber for fuel and the ground for grazing. The process forever altered the bounty 
and function o f  the landscape, while having an ironically helpful impact on solar 
architecture.*
As timber resources slowly vanished, south-facing homes became m ore widely 
used. To offset wood shortages, Greeks built hom es oriented to the south to take full 
advantage o f the warming winter sun. Even Aristotle noted the genius o f  such a building 
plan, which allowed sunlight in and kept the cold north winds out.^
Solar architecture had other benefits, too. In an effort to fend o ff the growing 
military threat from Athens, one determined Greek community turned to the rugged cliffs 
along the Aegean Sea. Olynthus was home to  people who bristled under the Athenian 
economic and political yoke. O lynthus’ physical geography contained few resources, 
except rugged limestone walls that dropped precipitously into the sea. Such a defensible 
position had its drawbacks, though, as fuel w as scarce. To survive, these independent- 
minded people designed solar buildings in a  city planned on an east-west axis. N ot only 
did citizens benefit from warming winter sunshine, they built overhangs to ward off 
intense summer heat. Construction materials added another benefit: the heat-collecting 
limestone dissipated daytime warmth slowly over time, keeping residents comfortable in 
the cool night air.
Romans relied less on solar architecture for military success, but Roman society 
did adopt practices developed by Greeks. Like their Mediterranean neighbors, Romans 
built south-facing homes using materials that collected daytime heat and dispersed it at
* Ibid., 75-8 and Hughes, Àn Environmental History^ 59-66. 
 ̂Butti and Perlin. A Golden Thread, 5.
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night.^“ Horticulturists also contributed to the growing body o f solar architecture by 
creating innovations in raising food. Roman expansion created a sensation am ong the 
Empire’s elite; exotic fruits and vegetables becam e signs o f  power in Rome. Desperate 
to provide leaders like Tiberius Caesar with these new-found favorites, such as 
cucumbers, gardeners built glass-covered heat traps and the prototype o f  the m odem  
greenhouse came into being."
The link between solar power and social elites also became apparent in the 
Roman Empire. While wealthy citizens competed to produce exotic fruits and 
vegetables, they also turned to the sun for other luxuries. Transparent glass came into the 
picture to aid the nascent greenhouse industry by the first century AD, and clear 
coverings soon made their way into expensive Roman housing designs. W hen tim ber 
shortages plagued the imperial city, w ealthier citizens fled to their country estates, not for 
fuel, which was as scarce there as in the city, but for their passive solar homes. Pliny the 
Elder noted that the “heliocamus,” which means solar furnace, was his favorite room in 
his country home.^^ The taste for heat-trapping rooms, like saunas o f  today, proved 
contagious; the idea spilled back into the city, where Roman bath houses used glass to 
create steamy conditions Enough wealthy lawmakers frequented these evanescent 
haunts to inspire solar access laws. The Justinian Code, written in the sixth century, 
codified Romans’s unimpeded rights to the sun; initially, the law stated that no one could 
build a structure that blocked the popular public baths from the sunshine. Later Romans 
expanded the rule to protect the rights o f  private homes to a clear view o f the sun.'^
Ibid., 15. 
" Ibid., 19. 
"'Ibid., 19. 
Ibid., 27.
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In ancient societies, solar architecture provided a measure o f  relief w hen fuel 
shortages struck. While ideas passed freely am ong neighboring cultures, the global reach 
o f  passive solar techniques indicates their base appeal. Chinese designs resem bled those 
practiced in Rome at about the same time, even though the two societies scarcely even 
knew about each other. In Asia and Europe, the turn to solar architecture usually came as 
a response to other resource scarcity. In both China and Rome, solar buildings cam e onto 
the scene when fuel wood supplies ran short, but in the American Southwest, Anasazis 
built a society in a region that already had few  resources.
Anasazis slowly crept into Chaco Canyon around 800 AD, where they found few 
allies in the natural world. W ater and tim ber remained precious commodities in the 
Chaco River Valley by the time the region experienced full-blown settlement tw o 
centuries later. Lured by an increasingly dependable, if not abundant, rainy season, 
Anasazis came to the area for its farming potential. *'* A slow trickle o f  immigrants came 
from the cliffed regions o f  southwestern Colorado and southeastern Utah, and within two 
centuries the humans who settled in Chaco Canyon had created a society teem ing with 
energy.
The social structure that held farming and rituals together formed the basis o f 
Anasazi cosmology, which in turn created Pueblo Benito. The structure’s building plan 
included strict attention to seasonal patterns. The curved section o f  the D-shaped 
building acted as a courtyard that opened to the  southwest.*^ Engineers used complex 
designs that emulated seasonal rhythms. Anasazis considered seasonal variations, as 
well; archeological evidence reveals that certain rooms within several structures all
David E. Stuart, Anasazi America: Seventeen Centuries on the Road from  Center Place, (Albuquerque: 
University o f  New Mexico Press, 2000), 65.
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focused sunlight onto important spiritual icons on the solstice. In Pueblo Bonito, the 
largest structure in Chaco Canyon (and the largest structure in North America until the 
late nineteenth century), modem scholars term ed the solstice room the “sun dagger.” *̂
The building that stood at the center o f  Anasazi culture, and the cosm ology that 
produced it, was powerless to  stop the clim ate change that drove people out o f  Chaco 
Canyon. The contract between spiritual leaders and farmers was irrevocably breached as 
a result o f  a series o f  droughts that began sporadically in the late eleventh century became 
routine by the thirteenth.*^ The powerful Anasazis, who once controlled a land area the 
size o f  modem West Virginia, succumbed to  the dry conditions o f  the Medieval warm 
period.
Early Modern Europe
In Europe, the faith o f millions would be put to the test during the M iddle Ages. 
Shifting climate had less effect on people than disease, as the Black Death decimated 
populations from the mid-fourteenth century until the early eighteenth and seemed to 
ignore fluctuating weather patterns.** Cathedrals sprouted up throughout the continent, 
as people prayed for deliverance from the ravages o f  disease. Glass, which was a 
mainstay in Venice since the Roman era, began to play an important part in European 
spirituality. An abundant, naturally occurring salt compound, soda, allowed the 
Mediterranean glass working trade to flourish. Northern Europe held no such bounty. 
Driven by demand for stained glass, artisans turned to potash Unfortunately, workers
Ibid., 92-3. Stuart notes that the courtyard o f Pueblo Bonito wasn’t walled in until tlie 1100s. 
Ibid., 80.
Ponting, yf Green History, 99-100.
Ibid., 229-30.
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could only produce potash by burning wood, and as cathedrals took on increasing 
importance, the once-abundant timberlands suffered.
As Europeans turned heavenward for salvation from the plague’s onslaught, 
diminishing resources spurred overseas expansion. Historian Clive Ponting thinks that 
the dwindling timberlands, which produced E urope’s most widely used resource, pushed 
nations in new directions to search for vital energy supplies. Despite continued 
réintroduction o f  plague conditions, Europeans developed natural immunities, thus 
stabilizing population numbers and spurring demand for natural resources. Climate also 
played a role, as the Little Ice Age tightened its chilly grip by the mid-sixteenth century, 
driving demand for timber (and food) to untenable levels.
Aside from the conquest o f new lands, Europeans turned to two resources to 
offset the shortages in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: coal and sunshine. Prior 
to the early modern era, wealthy people viewed coal with a certain amount o f  contempt -  
only poor people burned the smoky black rocks. Yet during the Middle Ages, people 
made important technological improvements; some historians suspect these events 
amounted to a “Medieval Industrial Revolution,” which these scholars define as the start 
o f  a mechanical tradition that would later spark the invention o f the steam engine.^®
W hile several elites tinkered with the energy potential coal offered, others turned to 
ancient texts for hints on how to offset the cool temperatures.
Passive solar technology enjoyed a rebirth in the northern regions o f  early modern 
Europe. W ealthy farmers began to use heat-collecting construction materials as a way to
Ibid., 97-102.
“  James Burke, Connections (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978); Lynn Wliite, Jr., M edieval Technology and 
Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962); Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism,
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ripen crops in short growing seasons. South-facing walls found use in France, Holland, 
and Great Britain, where planters buried seeds alongside heat-absorbing brick walls to 
give crops a better chance to develop. The “fruit wall” idea was originally used in 
ancient Rome, but the concept was well-suited for the cold climate o f  Northern Europe. 
English horticulturists even nailed branches to the walls in hopes o f  staving o ff killer 
frosts before harvest time.^* In France, Fatio de Duillier perfected a fruit wall that 
tracked the sun’s path during the day, which effectively doubled the plants’ exposure to 
sunlight. Duillier’s contributions to solar technology exist today in the modern solar 
collectors engineered with the same concept in mind.^^
Other technological developments stemmed from a combination o f  other 
knowledge. In Rutland, the duke developed the first known greenhouse in 1700. The 
design utilized the slanted angle idea seen in fruit walls, as well as the heat-trap principles 
perfected by ancient R o m a n s . D u t c h  engineers expanded on these ideas and created the 
double-paned glass concept, a vital part o f  passive solar design today. Even on cloudy 
days, greenhouses with angled, double-paned glass plates could maintain high 
temperatures.^'* In England the conservatory idea impacted high society. Aristocrats 
began attaching greenhouses to their homes, and the conjoining rooms, called 
conservatories, would benefit from the solar heat that poured in. Other designs called for 
air-tight convection tubes that led from conservatories into homes, supplying heat and 
mitigating the demand for fuel wood. These concepts fell out o f favor when the climate
Century, volume 1, Structures o f  Everyday Life: The Limits o f  the Possible (New York; Harper & 
Row, 1979).
Butti and Perlin, 4̂ Golden Thread, 41-3.
Ibid., 46.
Ibid., 47.
Ibid., 49.
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again warmed. By W orld W ar I, aesthetics took  over function, and conservatories 
became fuel consumers. Tight resource supplies spelled doom for these passive solar 
structures after WWI.^^
Industrial United States
Across the Atlantic, Americans took their first steps on a journey to  electrification 
by the mid-nineteenth century. The power lines that obstructed my view at Chaco 
Canyon came into being thanks to a collective modernizing push in the United States. 
Throughout the early industrial era, Americans developed a passion for things 
mechanical. In many ways electricity had to  come to Chaco — as a sort o f industrial 
manifest destiny — based on consumption patterns that mimicked early modern Europe. 
Ever the jealous cousins, Americans would try  to  outdo the European industrial example. 
Progress in this curious way seems to  follow the United States wherever its technological 
path leads.
A burgeoning country accustomed to abundance grew into a fully modernized 
society by the late nineteenth century, and the demand for fossil-based goods and services 
began to take hold. The nation was awash not just in forests but in coal, natural gas, and 
petroleum, too. Am erica’s mechanical tradition extended beyond the use o f  fossils: even 
solar power benefited from the new industrial era. Paradoxically, a society marked by 
innovation still yearned for resources that would provide consistency, and by the mid­
twentieth century, passive solar designs could no longer meet such demands.
Even as an era o f  industrial expansion took hold in the United States, passive 
solar engineers made significant gains. In 1891 Baltimorean Clarence Kemp started a
“ Ibid.. 52-3.
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tiny passive solar water heating company. K em p’s brainchild, the Climax w ater heater, 
was simplicity defined. The rooftop system operated on the heat trap principle; the 
Climax ran domestic water pipes through four cylindrical tanks that rested inside 
rectangular wooden boxes. Sheet glass covered the tanks and the system was painted 
black to  maximize heat absorption.
Climate spurred Kem p’s unique design and it later drove the Climax creator to  a 
warmer region. The freezing Baltimore w inters prevented the water heater from working 
year-round, so Kemp moved his company to  Pasadena, California. The allure o f  
Southern California was twofold; first, the sun shone steadily throughout the year; next, 
competition, which appeared most ominously in the form o f  electricity, had not m ade its 
way there yet. By 1895, Kemp sold the rights to manufacture and sell his solar water 
heaters to a pair o f Pasadena businessmen, w hile retaining control over the company 
i t s e l f . A  lack o f timber, coal, and natural gas caused sales o f  the heaters to take off.
The traditional resources that most Americans used to  heat their water simply did not 
exist in Southern California, and expense o f  the Climax more than offset yearly 
expenditures on such items. The price sold a number o f customers on new water 
heaters, which cost about twenty-five dollars; the cumulative total o f  coal (three-quarters 
o f  a ton annually) and wood (about a cord per year) purchased by households amounted 
to about nine dollars per home every year.^^
While the Climax had advantages over traditional heating methods, success was 
hard to come by. A skeptical public ignored solar heaters until Frank W alker made some
Butti and Perlin, A Golden Thread, 117-8.
Ibid., 120.
James C. Williams, Energy and the Making o f  M odern California, (Akron: University o f Akron Press, 
1997), 86-7.
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important technical adjustments that improved the C lim ax’s efficiency. Until W alker tied 
the Climax to the domestic heating system, people had to heat their w ater where they 
used it (ie; in the bathroom or kitchen) when the Climax w asn’t operating (at night, eg). 
The centrality o f  heating increased convenience and sales took off in California, where a 
sixty-five dollar system could provide a house’s w ater heating needs for all but a hundred 
days in 1913. Economic savings was only one side o f  the coin, though: historian James 
W illiams estimates that domestic fuel consum ption fell as much as seventy-five percent 
thanks to passive water heaters.^® Eventually, electricity and natural gas drove the 
Climax and its progeny out o f favor. Solar’s  cost-effectiveness diminished in the face o f  
competition from fossil fuel companies, but in California, solar energy later reemerge.
While natural gas drove passive solar w ater heaters out o f  business in Southern 
California, the reverse was true in South Florida after 1918. Miami experienced a post­
war population boom, and newcomers wanted all the comforts a modern society could 
offer, included hot water when they wanted it. Electricity could supply the energy 
needed to heat domestic water, but these systems were erratic and unsafe.^* Sunshine 
offered a more reliable alternative. Passive solar heaters kept pace with the booming 
housing market, and by the mid-twenties, M iami was awash with water heated by the 
sun. Like the stock market, the construction bubble burst by the end o f  the decade, and 
the solar heating industry faced some difficult days ahead in the thirties.
The building downturn could have ended solar water heaters in Florida, but two 
events staved o ff disaster. Innovation provided the first solution. M iam i’s dominant 
Solar W ater Heating Company turned from its traditional role as hot water heating
Ibid., 87. 
Ibid., 88.
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supplier for new homes into retrofitting specialists. The com pany’s owner, Charles 
Ewald, could have followed his partner into retirement, yet Ewald couldn’t resist a 
challenge. Figuring that the housing boom included only a percentage o f M iam i’s 
residences, Ewald began selling his heaters to existing homes that needed w ater heating 
systems. Technologically, the design improved to compete with a more m odem  
electricity system. The Solar W ater Heating Com pany began using hum idity-resistant 
metal boxes instead o f wooden ones; efficient soft copper replaced steel tubing; and 
granulated cork, a readily available industrial waste product, provided excellent 
insulation between the tubing and the metal shell.
Even with design improvements, people were hard pressed to come up with the 
money to afford Ewald’s heaters. In 1934, the federal government provided a solution 
As part o f FD R ’s New Deal, Congress approved low-interest home mortgages and home 
improvement loans through the Federal H ousing Administration (FHA).^^ The 
availability o f  money for housing jum p-started the Solar W ater Heating Company, which 
could install and service new units for as little as six dollars per m o n t h . F e d e r a l  action 
not only reinvigorated the solar heating industry; W ashington’s presence kept shoddy 
workmanship in check as well. Competition for the solar water heating market produced 
several fly-by-night operations that sought to  capitalize on the demand in South Florida. 
Solar experts Ken Butti and John Berlin figure there were at least ten solar water heating 
companies operating in Florida by 1935.^^ W hen customers complained to the federal
Butti and Perlin, Golden Thread, 143-4.
Ibid., 147-8.
Ronald C. Tobey, Technology as Freedom: The New D eal and the Electrical M odernization o f  the 
American Home (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1996), 117-9.
^  Butti and Perlin, A Golden Thread, 149-51.
”  Ibid., 151.
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government about poor quality heaters purchased with FHA loans, W ashington stepped 
in and ended the corruptive practice.
Innovation and the FHA helped save passive solar water heaters in the short term, 
but the nation’s direction was headed tow ards electrification. The Great Depression 
exposed many Americans to the downside o f  unchecked capitalism. In the 1930s, the US 
had abundant natural resources that held prom ise for a higher standard o f  living than most 
enjoyed; unlocking this potential remained a  problem, though. Despite an era o f  
unprecedented government intrusion into the marketplace, private interests continued to 
dominate the household energy market. Large energy corporations began consolidating 
their power by forming holding companies in the twenties, and despite federal laws 
designed to prevent monopolistic behavior, these private enterprises proved indispensable 
for modernization.
While the government maintained an antagonistic attitude towards utility 
companies, the two entities worked together to provide electricity to  Americans that 
didn’t have it. Through the 1920s, private corporations decided where and when 
electricity would expand, and the companies tended to focus on larger customers. By the 
end o f  the 1920s, three-quarters o f  US factories ran on electric power. The numbers o f  
households with electricity also grew in the twenties, as two-thirds o f  American homes 
enjoyed electric power by 1929, although the wiring supplied to most o f  these houses 
limited the amount o f usable power.^^ Throughout the Great Depression, the government 
sought to bring electricity to homes that lacked it and to improve the quality o f  power for 
those already having it. Congress passed laws to  expand the reach and scope o f the grid:
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the Tennessee Valley Act, the National Housing Act (which established the FHA), and 
the Rural Electrification Act helped establish electricity as a priority to governm ent and 
private corporations alike. Historian Ronald Tobey notes that the utilities concentrated 
on modernizing the homes o f  society’s richest sector, while the Roosevelt Administration 
hoped to provide improved wiring systems — and the power needed to run them  — for 
the vast majority o f homes without such infrastructure.^^
By the second world war, Americans had grown accustomed to abundance, and 
although the war effort necessitated conservation efforts, postwar consumption boomed. 
Passive solar designs played a marginal, even ironic, role during the war. Experim ents at 
the Massachusetts Institute o f  Technology m ade important advances in solar air heating 
designs, but most o f  these developments w ouldn’t find application for years, if  at all.^* 
Commercially successful passive solar w ater heaters succumbed to the demands o f  the 
military, which halted domestic use o f precious copper.^^
The postwar era found Americans generally disinterested in passive solar 
technology, but the same was not true in other nations. In Israel, Levi Yissar researched 
developments made elsewhere — primarily (and ironically) in the US — to develop the 
nation’s first major solar water heating company. Yissar’s tale strikes a familiar tone 
with passive solar’s own story: the technology took o ff when other energy sources were 
scarce. In 1953, the first year o f  Y issar’s Ner-Yah Company, Israelis imported all o f  
their electricity-generating fuels.'*® From 1957 to 1967, Israeli solar water companies
Martin V. Meiosi, Coping with Abundance: Energy and Environment in Industrial Am erica  (New York: 
Alfred Knopf, 1985), 112. Wliile modem conveniences, like wasliing macliines, were available, people 
couldn’t typically use tliein at the same time as some tiling else due to inferior capacity and wiring,
Tobey, Technology as Freedom, 44-5.
Butti and Perlin, A Golden Thread, 202-6.
Ibid , 154.
Ibid., 235. Yissar’s main contribution was adding a de-humidifier inside tlie actual heater.
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sold nearly fifty thousand heaters and exported tens o f  thousands m ore/^ The Six Day 
W ar in mid-1967 allowed Israel to gain oil fields in the Sinai, and the petroleum 
temporarily stunted solar energy. The secret to Israel’s renascent solar w ater heating 
industry in the past several decades centers on the government’s zoning laws: building 
contractors are required to offer passive solar heaters in new homes. The mandate has 
resulted in a healthy industry: nearly fifty thousand heaters are sold each year at an 
inexpensive one thousand American dollars per unit."*  ̂ In Australia, Roger M orse 
developed a government program modeled on the M IT housing experiments undertaken 
during WWII. As in Israel, government mandate proved vital. In the mid-1950s, 
Australia’s government required that homes constructed in “tropical areas” be equipped 
with solar water heating systems.'*^ After resolving design flaws, the solar heating 
industry took off, selling nearly forty thousand units between 1958 and 1973. Japan 
experienced a postwar solar honeymoon as well. Designs that bore a striking 
resemblance to Clarence Kem p’s Climax heater sold extremely well; by 1966, solar water 
heater companies sold a quarter o f a million units per year.'*'* Japan’s turn to the global 
market, particularly OPEC, for petroleum spelled doom for the solar heating industry.
The Age o f Limits
As the crumbling sandstone and adobe bricks lay as testament to Anasazi society, 
dusty government records bear witness to the consumptive excess that followed 
American victory in WWII. Abundant sources o f  coal, oil, and natural gas obviated the
Ibid., 238.
Daniel M. Bennan & Jolin T. O ’Connor, Who Owns the Sun? People, Politics, and the Struggle fo r  a 
Solar Economy, (Wliite River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Pviblislung Co., 1996), 14-5.
Butti & Perlin, A Golden Thread, 239.
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need for energy conservation, passive solar’s ch ief asset. Conserving energy never made 
it into the public debate, as Americans consum ed staggering amounts o f  energy. In 1940, 
households consumed about thirty-eight quadrillion British thermal units (B tus) o f  fossil 
fuel, equal to about seven trillion kilowatts o f  power.^^ By 1965, consumption nearly 
doubled to sixty-eight quadrillion Btus, or about thirteen trillion kilowatts.'*^ In the six 
following years, the annual rate o f  demand fo r energy spiked from three to five percent, 
which equated to an enormous increase considering America’s already gluttonous 
appetite. The increase pushed American resource production to the brink: as early as 
1967, imported petroleum exceeded national reserve capacity; by 1972, the US was 
producing as much as it could.'*^ The stage was thus set for OPEC’s surprising embargo 
the following year.
As a response to the embargo-induced petroleum shortages. President Nixon 
launched Project Independence. Calling on “the spirit o f  Apollo” and the “determination 
o f the Manhattan Project,” Nixon pledged that by 1980 “we shall be able to  meet 
America’s energy needs from America’s own energy resources.”'** As part o f  the effort 
to establish energy independence, Nixon increased federal allocation for solar energy 
research. In his proposed budget for the 1975 fiscal year, Nixon set aside fifty million 
dollars for solar energy, specifically calling for research and development o f  heating and 
cooling technologies — a clear attempt to attack the demand side o f  America’s energy
Ibid., 245-6.
Bureau o f the Census, US Department o f Commerce, Statistical Abstract o f  the United States 
(Wasliington, DC, 1968), 702. One kilowatt equals 3,413 Btus.
Energy Information Administration, US Department o f Energy, Residential Sector Energy Consumption, 
1949-2001, from website http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txt/ptbo2Dlb.html, last visited 7 July 2003.
United States Congress, Executive Energy Documents (Wasliington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office, July 1978), 32.
Ibid., 86.
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problem s/^ The same year Nixon boosted m oney for passive solar projects, Congress 
passed the Solar Energy Research, D evelopm ent, and Demonstration Act, which tried to 
forge a relationship between government research and the private m arket/^
The push to foster a partnership between federal researchers and private industry 
stemmed from policymakers’ affinity tow ards nuclear power. For the previous two 
decades, every president spoke with the highest praise for atomic energy and in the 
language W ashington insiders have grown to  love: appropriations. The attitudes toward 
solar power reflected those heaped upon the nuclear industry, even if  on a smaller scale. 
Indeed, funding for solar research would rem ain a “flea on the back o f  the nuclear 
elephant.”^' Despite its second-class status, solar research and development received 
over ten billion dollars in the first five years that followed the OPEC embargo; yet in 
those five years, most Americans still did not know about, much less adopt, solar 
energy.
Policy under the Nixon and Ford administration centered on increasing domestic 
fuel production, but President Carter tried to  encourage mainstream use o f  solar 
technology. Carter extended a welcoming hand to  alternative energy gurus who emerged 
from the crisis years as champions for what became known as “the soft energy path.”^̂  
Declaring “the moral equivalent o f war” on energy consumption. President Carter and the
Ibid., 139.
^  Ronald W. Larson and Ronald E. West, eds.. Implementation o f  Solar Thermal Technology (Cambridge, 
MA: Tlie MIT Press, 1996), 81-2.
Donald A. Beattie, e d , History and Overview o f  Solar Heat Technologies, ((Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1996), 34.
US Congress, Executive Energy Documents, 163
Carter even met with the “soft energy path” founder, Amory Lovins, in 1977 — going so far as to display 
Lovins’s book prominently on his Wliite House desk. See Daniel M. Bennan and Jolm T. O ’Coiuior, ivho 
Owns the Sun? People, Politics, and the Struggle fo r  a Solar Economy (Wliite River Jiuiction, VT: Chelsea 
Green Publishing Co., 1996).
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95* Congress passed a dizzying number o f  energy-related laws -  thirty-eight in all — 
culminating in the National Energy Act o f  1978.^'*
Three parts o f  the NBA dealt directly with renewable energies. The National 
Energy Conservation Policy Act (NEC?A) provided billions o f  federal dollars to promote 
solar technology. The law included a provision for a one hundred million dollar loan 
program, available to consumers in eight thousand dollar loans to be used for solar 
heating and cooling equipment purchases; another one hundred million dollars went to a 
solar demonstration program for federal b u i ld in g s .M o s t  Americans never felt the 
impact o f  programs like the N EC? A; according to  journalist Ray Reece, corporations 
were the major benefactor o f such governm ent contracts. Reece reports that in one eight 
million dollar disbursement, over half the m oney went to a mere three companies.
Tax credits made up the second part o f  the NE A concerning solar energy. The 
Energy Tax Act gave credits o f  up to fifteen percent toward the purchase o f  solar water 
heaters, which created a boom market within the i n d u s t r y .A  virtual solar craze took off 
in California, where Governor Jerry Brown created a state cabinet-level position to deal 
with energy issues, the Office o f Appropriate Technology (O A T)/^ Brown and the 
California legislature also extended federal tax breaks by allowing an additional fifteen 
percent . Swimming pool heaters made up most o f the market in new solar hot water
*'* US Congress, Energy Initiatives o f  the 95'  ̂Congress (Wasliington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
May 1979), 24.
US Congress, The National Emergy (Wasliington, DC: GPO, January 1979), 5-6.
Ray Reece, The Sun Betrayed: A Report on the Corporate Seizure o f  U.S. Solar Energy Development 
(Boston: Soutli End Press, 1979), 200.
US Congress, The National Energy Act, 521. Tlie 15% figure applied to tlie first $2,000 used in 
“renewable energy source expenditures,” and Congress capped tlie original rebate amoiuit at $300.
^  Williams, Energy and the Making, 321.
Berman & O’Coiuior, Who Owns the Sun?, 29-30.
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heaters. Within two years, state and federal tax breaks produced nearly eighty thousand 
solar installations in California homes, m ost o f  them pool heaters.^^
The boom years were not without trouble, though. Although w ater heaters and 
other passive solar technologies had been around for years, companies new to  the solar 
scene assumed they had to start from scratch. Unfortunately for consumers, solar 
charlatans produced inferior goods — often tim es with design flaws overcome by 
engineers decades prior. The California Energy Commission, itself a spin-off o f  the 
OAT, set up a phone hotline to deal with the flood o f  complaints about poorly designed 
solar equipment.^* The financial incentives that drew  interest in solar pow er ended up 
souring many people on the sun as an energy source, a result that would have long-lasting 
consequences.
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) made up the third 
renewable-friendly section o f  the NEA. By including a section that gives small 
independent energy producers, called qualifying facilities, the chance to participate in 
energy production. President Carter and Congress stumbled onto what would become the 
farthest reaching law o f  the solar generation. Although the tax credits would stunt a 
burgeoning, if inefficient, solar technology market, the mandate for equal access to the 
electrical grid would provide solar and other renewable energy generators an outlet for 
their power. PURPA’s main benefit was forcing utility companies to purchase energy 
from qualifying facilities at a fair price, and the law ’s longevity (and judicial affirmation) 
created a sense o f  stability in a turbulent electricity market.
^  Williams, Energy and the Making, 337. 
Ibid., 336.
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The enthusiasm for solar energy rode a tortuous path during Jimmy C arter’s 
presidency. Amid the giddiness for its new presidential champion, the Solar Lobby — a 
group o f  solar industry lobbyists in W ashington — organized a nation-wide celebration in 
1978. Sun Day marked the high point for solar advocates, and at the W ashington rally, 
the Solar Lobby proclaimed that given a fair choice most Americans would choose solar 
energy over fossil s. Fairness was a major issue confronting passive solar technology.
As Carter’s regulations promoting solar energy took effect, the president took criticism 
from all sides. For big business, interventionist policies went too far. Coal companies 
fought stringent environmental laws, while natural gas producers argued that full federal 
control over prices created disincentives for domestic gas p ro d u c tio n .In d iv id u a ls  also 
complained that the massive government expenditures translated into few usable 
technologies, while Ray Reece argued that C arter’s policies favored corporations rather 
than small businesses and individual inventors.^"^ Former DOE policymaker Donald 
Beattie thinks the tax incentives were a problem. Rather than creating an avenue for 
energy savings through solar energy, federal tax breaks simply rewarded the sales o f  
shoddy technology, like water heaters.^^ M ore importantly to  Beattie, the credits w eren’t 
tied to  any significant societal cost o f  fossil fuel use; rather than rewarding people for 
reducing use o f coal or natural gas, the governm ent provided incentive to purchase a 
technology that wasn't able to fill the demand for energy.
Berman & O’Connor, Who Owns the Sun?, 35.
See Goodwin, Energy Policy in Perspective, 589-96 and Meiosi, Coping with Abundance, 291-3. 
Federal management o f natural gas liad tlie added burden o f inconsistency. Tlie newly-created DOE 
warned against serious natural gas shortages, while a department report leaked to the Wall St. Journal 
reported tliat tlie US was awash in natural gas, giving people the impression tliat the crisis was illusory.
Ray Reece, The Sun Betrayed, 12-3. Reece quotes Barry Coimnoner to illustrate corporate takeover of 
energy, particularly the nuclear, industries.
Beattie, History and Overview, 240.
Ibid., 240.
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W hile Jimmy Carter helped popularize and implement some forms o f  solar 
energy, the steps he took to promote wiser energy use actually helped exacerbate public 
perception problems. Ronald Reagan sw ept into office in 1980 on a powerful anti- 
government tide, a mood created in part by a  sprawling bureaucracy, including the 
Department o f  Energy. Despite lawm akers’s hope that it would act as a streamlining 
agency, the DOE remained a bureaucratic quagm ire for much o f  C arter’s presidency. 
Reagan’s solution for all the red tape was simple: remove it. While he failed in his goal 
to abolish the DOE, Reagan did succeed in starving funds for renewable energies. 
Hostility towards solar power effectively cut budget allocations that centered on research 
and development, but the tax incentives in C arter’s Energy Tax Act would remain in 
place until after Reagan’s first term.^^ W ith no interest in renewing the credits, Reagan 
killed the solar water heating business, hot an insignificant act. Many o f  the heaters 
purchased between 1978 and 1984 contained design flaws and operated inefficiently, yet 
the industry had an impact on the American economy, judging by the nearly seven 
hundred thousand solar heaters people purchased and installed.
Reagan succeeded in killing federal funding for solar energy because, by 1983, 
the economic fallout from the energy crises had subsided. In the early eighties, the US 
Federal Reserve Bank policies called for greater restrictions on federal money lending — 
with the prime rate reaching as high as 21.5%! — and high oil prices cut into the spending 
power o f  most Americans.^^ The foreseeable recession o f  1982 had subsided by 1983, in 
part because oil and gas production from non-OPEC nations shot through the roof. Yet
Clearly solar power wasn’t yet a huge election issue, if  Reagan’s landslide victory in 1984 is any 
indication.
Larson & West, Implementation, 141. Tlie authors figure tliat sales dropped by 90% in 1986.
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increased production only tells part o f  the story. The increased availability o f  fossil fuels 
came at a time when conservation measures had a chance to impact the overall demand 
for such energy. Expert Daniel Yergin explains that not only did oil’s share o f  the energy 
pie shrink as other sources, like nuclear and coal power, rushed to fill the shortage, but 
the entire pie itself shrank. Conservation, w rites Yergin, was “often dismissed or even 
ridiculed,” yet the practice “turned out to have (a) massive impact.” ®̂
Even amid all o f  the political and popular rancor that roiled around the debate 
over alternative energy resources, passive solar technology made some im portant gains in 
the age o f limits. While several solar w ater heating companies existed solely to shear a 
naively sheepish public, some o f the more honest companies confronted recurring design 
flaws. Freezing temperatures and hard w ater topped the list o f  problems confronting 
passive solar water heaters in the 1980s. Adjustm ents to these units, including 
introducing antifreeze into a closed-loop system, have made modem heaters more 
e ffic ie n t.Im p ro v e m e n ts  to other passive solar designs continue to make the technology 
attractive. At his high altitude “ ‘passive-solar banana farm,’” Amory Lovins uses a 
combination o f  high-tech and common sense. His glazed, double-paned windows include 
an infusion o f insulating krypton, a heavy gas, and his insulation is like most others, 
except that Lovins uses twice as much.^^
Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest o f  Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1991), 717.
Ibid., 718.
See Ken Olson, “Solar Hot Water: A Primer,” Northern California .Solar Energy Association Energy 
Resource Guide, September 2002, 10-8.
Amory B. Lovins, “Who Needs a Furnace?,” Orion Afield, vol. 6, no. 3, Summer 2002, 16-8.
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A Modern Perspective
Americans have a love affair with energy. Every year, we spend over two 
hundred billion dollars just to heat, cool, light, and operate our homes and o f f i c e s . O u r  
buildings consumed thirty-six percent o f the total energy used in the US in 1999 and over 
two-thirds o f  all the electricity generated.^'* Transportation, usually viewed as the m ajor 
culprit behind America’s soaring energy consumption, made up only twenty-seven 
percent o f the national total.^^ Popular perception, it seems, has a misleading view o f  our 
energy appetite.
According to the Department o f  Energy, the United States could reduce its energy 
consumption by seventy percent by incorporating efficiency and renewable energy 
measures. M ost o f what the government recom mends deals directly with passive solar 
technology. The trouble is that when it comes to homes and offices, solar energy suffers 
from a public perception problem o f  its own. From both a building and a buying 
perspective the hangover from the solar party o f  the seventies and eighties still lingers. In 
studies undertaken by four major housing groups, ranging from the National Association 
o f  Home Builders to the California Energy Commission, the main findings reveal a 
public that has a blurry view o f  solar water heaters7̂  ̂ Many people didn’t know much 
about the technology, and the few who did saw  it negatively. Various factors contributed 
to the misperception. Competition from natural gas and electricity, the high costs o f
Department o f Energy, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, “Buildings Research,” NREL Facts, 
FS24867, December 1998.
International Energy Administration, “Energy Efficiency Update: United States,” November 2002, 2. 
Ibid., 8.
P. Ghent and C. Keller, “A Comprehensive Review o f Market Research on Solar Water Heaters,” 
Subcontract Report, (Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, October 1999, NREL/SR-550- 
27123).
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heating systems, and unappealing designs all combined to give solar water heaters a bad 
public im aged’ Yet when given the chance to see modem heaters at work, most people 
found them “significantly more appealing;” the homeowners who used new systems 
became “very committed to solar energy.” *̂ M odem  solar technology’s problem lays 
more with a misguided perception than faulty design; if  given the chance, most 
Americans would likely embrace solar technology.
Complacency has allured humanity before. A thousand years ago the priesthood 
in Chaco Canyon seemed settled in its role as spiritual conduit between the rain-granting 
gods and the harvest-yielding farmers. The road leading out o f  Chaco Canyon would 
prove a difficult one for many Anasazis, but the future would not always appear so bleak. 
Spurred from complacency by drought and hunger, Chacoan farmers moved out to  form 
modern-day Pueblo tribes that live within N ew  M exico’s northern Rio Grande Valley.
How can a lesson from such an out o f  the way place hold any importance for 
societies in the twenty-first century? Certainly modern Americans have taken the lesson 
o f  embracing change to heart, given the rapid, alm ost daily, improvements in technology. 
The next chapter explains the second half o f  solar energy’s story, which relies heavily 
upon scientific knowledge and technological advances. Implicit in these developments 
are the lessons from Chaco Canyon: to  survive, you must adapt.
Ibid., 3. 
Ibid.. 5.
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Chapter 3
Voting as i f  it Mattered: VoteSolar 2001 & the Story o f  Solar Electricity
My first up-close experience with m odem  solar energy technology stemmed 
neither from wisdom o f  a bygone era nor a genuine interest in renewable energy. In fact 
the first time I wondered about solar energy, I cursed. After a long day spent winding my 
way down the spine o f the Sangre de Cristo m ountain range from Denver, Colorado, I 
finally made it to my m other’s Taos County, N ew  Mexico home. Well, almost. It was a 
hot summer day, and my brother’s directions to m om ’s new house simply had no basis in 
reality. I was lost. M y supplies o f petroleum  and patience were running on fumes. For 
the umpteenth time I swore that the next turn down an unknown lane would be m y last.
As I came up with new terms to describe Taos County’s high desert terrain, I 
happened upon an elderly gentleman. W hen I asked i f  he knew where the community o f  
“Earth Ships’’ was, he replied, “You m ean those weird houses with solar panels?’’^
W ithin seconds I was speeding past the Rio Grande Gorge Bridge. Pulling into the 
driveway, I gazed in bemused wonder. There, shimmering in the overpowering New 
Mexico sunlight, I saw what appeared to be misplaced siding. Black, quiet, and 
futuristic, five flat-plate solar panels hypnotized my tired, vulnerable mind. Busily 
collecting energy to power everything from light bulbs to the washing machine, these 
strange embodiments o f science fiction m ade m e forget my frustration. More 
importantly, they piqued my interest.
‘ The term “earth ship” refers to off-the-grid homes that use passive and active solar, as well as wind 
energy, recycled construction materials, and a complex water treatment system. Mike Reynolds takes
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Active solar technology achieves a fantastic dream and differs in tw o important 
ways from its passive brethren. By converting sunshine into electricity, modern solar 
equipment goes beyond conserving energy by converting solar energy into usable 
electricity. The other major difference has less to do with the complex technology that 
can accomplish this feat and more in common with the imagination that preceded it.
Even before humans fully understood electricity, thoughtful scientists and backyard 
tinkerers experimented with ways to harness the sun’s incredible power into a 
manageable form. The technology that resulted affects energy decisions in places as 
modern as San Francisco and as isolated as rural Brazil
This chapter explains how solar technology made the leap from energy 
conservation to conversion in three sections. The vast majority o f human experience with 
solar technology occurred before the nineteenth century, before Edmund Becquerel 
discovered that sunlight contains electricity. The first section describes the background 
and nascency o f  solar electricity technology. Next, I turn to post-World W ar Two 
America, where solar technology played a larger role in Cold W ar politics than domestic 
energy policy. The final section analyzes the American government’s attempt to merge 
technology and economics into a cohesive, solar-friendly policy after the 1973 energy 
crisis and until the expiration o f the solar tax credits in 1985. As a postscript I describe 
the impact o f active solar technology on a global scale. Active solar technology was bom 
o f  a dream to convert sunlight into electricity, and the physical result o f  that vision 
manifests itself in some unusual and inspiring ways.
credit for tlie name; still actively involved in the earth ship trade, Reynolds also nms tlie “Greater World 
Eaitlisliip Comimuiity” in Taos that includes mom’s house.
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Photoelectricity
Solar technology advanced beyond architectural designs by the eighteenth 
century. The hot box designs built upon the heat trap principle inspired more than a 
burgeoning solar water heating enterprise. O ther European scientists applied the idea in 
different ways. European scientist Horace de Saussure built a complex miniature 
greenhouse with glass plates The box design, a sort o f solar Russian doll, had five 
square glass walls that fit inside each other w ith a small gap in between them.^ De 
Saussure used his hot boxes to grow fruits and vegetables, but the idea had other 
applications as well. Other scientists improved upon de Saussure's design by adding 
better insulation for higher temperatures and piping systems to heat water.^
Solar engineers experimented with m achines into the nineteenth century. In 1839, 
French scientist Edmund Becquerel discovered that sunlight contained electricity. 
Becquerel experimented with selenium to produce a low current, solar powered charge, 
the first o f  its kind. Electricity was still a relatively unknown entity in the early 
nineteenth century, and few scientists investigated the possibilities o f  producing solar 
electric technology. The incentive for developing sun-powered machines came from a 
lack o f  resources in France. The social and economic transformation that occurred with 
advances in industry depended on creating steam efficiently and most factories relied on 
coal. In France, the fossil fuel was not abundant, so the French government invested in 
scientific ventures that promised to create industrial power without coal. In 1860 a 
French mathematics professor, Augustin M ouchot, noted that industry would eventually
 ̂Ken Butti and Jolm Perlin, Golden Thread: 2500 Years o f  Solar Architecture and Technology (Palo 
Alto: Cheshire Books, 1980), 55-6.
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deplete all native resources, placing the nation into a  disadvantaged position. Rather than 
import coal from nations like Britain, M ouchot recommended that France “(r)eap the rays 
o f  the sun.”'*
Such an impossible dream motivated M ouchot to develop the first solar powered 
engine. Using advances in heat traps and m irror technology, which M ouchot used to 
concentrate sun rays, the scientist attempted to build a steam engine powered by the sun. 
Mouchot eventually struck upon the idea o f  using parabolic trough mirrors that 
concentrated sunlight onto copper tubes that held water. To produce steam, M ouchot 
designed a tank that fit atop these tubes where a small engine ran on solar power. This 
1866 design combined several principles o f solar engineering and marks a major advance 
in solar technology, yet the engine M ouchot created was far too small to be considered 
useful. To create a bigger, more useful machine, M ouchot had to think big. Using funds 
from Napoleon I l l ’s nationalistic government, Mouchot built a huge solar powered steam 
engine. Measuring twenty feet by twenty feet, the “Tours motor” used sunlight as fuel 
and powered a motor with one-half horsepower. Unfortunately for M ouchot’s dreams o f 
creating a useful solar industrial engine, most o f  the coal-fired engines produced one 
hundred horsepower. For M ouchot’s machine to be useful to  industry, he would need 
nearly 100,000 square feet,^
At the same time he created a steam-driven solar motor, Augustin M ouchot 
experimented with the effects o f concentrating sunshine onto a variety o f  metals. 
Disregarding Edmund Becquerel’s element o f  choice, selenium, Mouchot tried to 
produce electric current with other metals to  no effect. European scientists o f  the late
 ̂Ibid., 58-9.
Quoted in ibid., 63.
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nineteenth century distrusted claims that solar energy contained electricity, and by the 
turn o f  the century, no European had conclusively proved that sunlight held such 
properties. In the United States, a group o f  inventors made some important discoveries in 
the 1880s. As he bemoaned the paucity o f  ways to  power his telegraph cable testing 
apparatus, solar pioneer Willoughby Smith experimented with selenium. Smith and his 
team o f  inventors, employed by a telegraph company, found that selenium reacted to 
light. After Smith’s late-nineteenth century discoveries, other scientists tested selenium ’s 
limits. Dr. William Adams and his assistant, Richard Day, tinkered with flames and 
batteries, and they concluded that light caused selenium to produce an electric charge. A 
New York scientist, Charles Fritts, outfitted the world’s first solar panels, using selenium, 
in 1885.^ While his colleagues properly congratulated Fritts on his achievement, no one 
could satisfactorily explain how selenium cells generated electricity just from exposure to 
sunshine.
About twenty years after Fritts constructed his inefficient and cumbersome 
panels, in 1904, Albert Einstein published his famous paper on the theory o f  relativity.^ 
Importantly for solar electricity’s development, Einstein proved that light exists in waves 
that contain packets o f energy called photons. Einstein further demonstrated that the 
amount o f  force contained in light is relative to its wavelength: the shorter the wave, the 
more power it has. Why is this important? Because short light waves contain photons 
that generate electricity. Scientists discovered that electricity forms once a substance can 
absorb the packets o f  power. After sunlight gets trapped, its energy transfers to the
* Ibid., 67-70.
 ̂Jolut Perlin, From Space to Earth: The Story o f  Solar Electricity (Ann Arbor: AATEC Publications, 
1999), 17-18.
’ Ibid., 20.
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electrons within the trapping substance. Harnessing those electrically charged electrons 
is the basis o f  photovoltaic technology. Two elements contain nuclei with poorly rooted 
electrons. Selenium is just such a substance. Silicon is another.
After Einstein’s discoveries earned him the Nobel Prize in 1921, the scientific 
community began to test and experiment with principles. Not only did empirical data 
confirm Einstein’s findings, scientists also came up with the term used today to describe 
photoelectricity: photovoltaics. The telecom munications industry emerged as a leader in 
PV technology for the next several decades. M ost discoveries in the early twentieth 
century centered on the rare and inefficient element, selenium. The high costs o f  
selenium and the low efficiency o f  the metal m ade investment in solar electricity cost 
prohibitive during through the Great Depression and WWII era.
The Space Race
The marriage between PV technology and economics grew happier after the war. 
A Bell Laboratories team, headed by PV pioneer Russell Ohls, discovered the utility o f  
silicon as a conductor in 1954; nevertheless, photovoltaics remained in its infancy due to 
its inefficient transfer o f  energy into electricity, known as the efficiency rate. The higher 
the rate that an electricity-producing technology transfers energy into electricity, the more 
efficient it is. New coal-fueled power plants in the early twenty-first century operate at 
about forty-five percent, while older plants generally attain roughly twenty-five to thirty- 
three percent.* To put the technology into perspective, the breakthrough efficiency rate 
demonstrated by Ohls and his Bell Labs colleagues was only six percent, which was an
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improvement at fifteen times more efficient than previous ra te s /  In the 1950s, m ost 
electricity came from coal-fired plants that operated at thirty-six percent efficiency, 
making solar electricity a non-participant in American electricity generation/®
Ohls’ breakthrough signaled an important change in the resource used in 
photovoltaic cells. Rather than focus on the abysmal efficiency rate, solar scientists 
turned their attention to the world’s second-m ost abundant element on the earth’s surface: 
silicon. Unfortunately, PV technology in the 1950s required silicon in incredibly pure 
form -  not that sandy silicon on the beach. So, aside from an encouraging project in 
Georgia that allowed Bell Telephone to install solar panels to power telephone lines,"  
industry leaders could not justify PV ’s exorbitant expense - $600 per watt o f  pow er by 
the m id-1950s."
By the time the Soviets launched Sputnik in 1957, photovoltaic technology 
experienced a lull. The few gains scientists made translated into fewer profits, and the 
opportunity for advancement in the PV  realm seemed to slip from America’s collective 
grasp. The upside o f  early Soviet superiority in space flight was a rekindled interest in 
solar technology. The Vanguard I satellite, N A SA ’s second response to  Sputnik, came 
equipped with a chemical battery designed to  power the radio that beamed messages back 
to ground control." When the battery failed, the backup system began to work, and 
photovoltaic technology scored its first real victory. Finally the solar industry found a
* Heinz Termuelilen and Werner Emsperger, Clean and Efficient Coal-Fired Power Plants: Development 
Toward Advanced Technologies, (Fairfield, NJ: American Society o f  Mechanical Engineers Press, 2003). 
Tliis figure includes loss o f power that inevitably occurs during transmission.
 ̂Martin A. Green, “Crystalline- and Polycrystalline-Silicon Solar Cells,” in Tlioinas Johansson, et al., eds., 
Renewable Energy: Sources fo r  Fuels and Electricity  (Wasliington, DC: Island Press, 1993), p. 338. 
Cliristopher Flavin and Nicholas Lenssen, Power Surge: Guide to the Coming Energy Revolution (New
York & London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1994), 41. 
" Perlin, From Space to Earth, 36,
Flavin and Lenssen, Power Surge, 154.
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partner with nearly unlimited funds, which allowed leaders o f  the solar cell industry to 
experiment with greater confidence knowing that achievements would find practical and 
profitable applications.
Solar electricity panels convert sunlight directly into electricity. The futuristic 
cells I found dancing in the New M exico sun operated smoothly, quietly, and w ith no 
moving parts or exhaust. To understand how  a panel transforms sunshine into electricity, 
we have to go back to Einstein’s quantum theory. All the fuss generated by the brilliant 
Dr. Einstein focused on his contention that light exists in waves (which scientists already 
knew) and that those waves contain packets o f  energy, which he called light quanta. 
Einstein theorized that the shorter the wave, the more powerful its quanta. His colleagues 
rushed to test his theories, and within a couple o f  decades scientists proved many o f  
Einstein’s i d e a s . T e s t s  showed that only “absorbed” photons can generate electricity.
The photon’s energy, once captured by a substance like silicon, transfers its pow er to 
electrons that are charged with energy. These charged electrons then escape their orbits 
around the nuclei and form an electrical current. W hen an electron leaves its flight path 
around a nucleus, it leaves a gap. Photovoltaic wafers allow an electrical field to form as 
a result o f  the empty spaces; a current results when solar cells absorb sunlight, which 
energizes loose electrons. For an electric field to be effective, semiconductors must 
operate efficiently. Solar scientists made an important advance when they discovered an 
efficient way o f manipulating silicon sheets that contain different numbers o f  electrons.
A silicon sheet that houses a “p” layer has m ore holes than electrons, and an “n” layer has 
more electrons than holes. The meeting point between the two sheets is called the p-n
Green, “Crystalline-and Poiycrystalline-Silicou Solar Cells,” 338.
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junction, and this area generates an electric flow.
PV panels consist o f  two layers o f silicon placed together, with a layer o f  another 
material that manufacturers affix either behind or between them. These secondary 
substances help the silicon absorb or conduct the electricity.^^ When electricity forms in 
solar panels, they form a direct current, DC. Since most electric outlets are set up on an 
alternating current, or AC, the electricity from the solar panel has to go through an 
inverter that switches the power from a direct current to an alternating current. From that 
point, depending on where you are and what you set up the panels for, you have a source 
o f  electricity to  power your television or com puter or electric blanket.
One concern about PV technology centers on manufacturing the silicon cells and 
other materials necessary for smooth, pollution-free operation. Two substances attract 
the attention o f  the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Companies that make solar 
panels containing copper indium and/or cadmium have to use caution when handling 
these materials. While each may help increase efficiency, they are both potentially 
dangerous heavy metals. EPA officially designates them as toxic, and concern arises as 
to what happens to these harmful substances when panels no longer work. In most places 
where technological infrastructure exists, people can return their PV cells to the 
companies that sold them. Where such recycling facilities do not exist, the danger that 
harmful chemicals will enter the environment increases. A similar concern exists for the 
batteries that store excess power from PV cells.
Photovoltaic technology lagged behind energy consumption from fossil fuels for
Einstein published liis paper in 1904, received the Nobel Prize for it in 1921, and liis colleagues caught 
up to him by tlie mid-Twenties.
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half a century. By the time OPEC imposed its embargo in 1973, PV cells appeared 
almost exclusively on satellites. The space program , locked in competition w ith the 
Soviets, had a different agenda regarding cost and efficiency o f  silicon-based solar 
electricity. When developed nations finally figured out that they should investigate 
practical applications o f PV cells, efficiency rates, the percent o f  energy usable after 
generation, hovered around the unimpressive six percent mark achieved in the mid- 
1950s. As an alternative to fossil fuels, PV  needed to improve its rate o f  conversion if  
it was to be a viable option. Thanks in part to  an increase in federal spending, American 
scientists improved on the silicon idea. Up until the mid-1970s, PV technology relied on 
flat-plate cells, made up o f  a substance called crystalline silicon. The crystalline silicon 
cells made in the 1970s and 1980s required a  thickness and purity level that made them 
too expensive to  compete effectively with traditional energy sources.
Some ingenious scientists came up with alternatives that can compete with 
traditional power sources. Options to traditional flat-plate cells include the catchall 
category called thin-film crystalline silicon, which most o f  us have seen powering 
calculators and wristwatches. Since it costs less to produce solar panels that contain less 
silicon, scientists focused most o f their attention on increasing the efficiency o f  thin-film 
c e l l s . T o d a y ,  several conductors compete in the PV  market.
Most o f  these materials help make pajiels tliin and include amorphous silicon, copper indium diselenide, 
cadmium telluride, and gallium arsenide. Tliese substances factor into enviromnental concerns in 
manufacturing. See the Department o f Energy’s web site at www.nrel.gov for an excellent overview.
Green, “Crystalline-and Polycrystalline-Silicon Solar Cells,” 338.
”  It costs less because the industry can utilize mass production teclmiques, like spraying silicon onto 
sheets. SttV txlux, From Space to Earth, 163-183.
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Photovoltaics in Crisis
The technology that emerged from the space race in the Sixties rem ained above 
the clouds into the following decade. The popular rise o f  environmentalism influenced 
American policy and funding regarding solar electricity. The first celebration o f  Earth 
Day occurred in 1970, and the push for non-polluting energy sources began in earnest. 
Amidst the haze spewed from exhaust pipes o f  muscle cars^ tree hugging took a central 
role in American energy policy. Even President Nixon jum ped on the bandwagon, 
calling for a comprehensive clean energy program as early as June, 1971.
Americans called for cleaner air, water, and land in the early 1970s, but solar 
electricity continued to  play a minor role in national energy policy. W hile no single 
event can claim credit for PV ’s terrestrial application, a series o f  events jolted 
industrialized nations out o f  their fossil fuel-induced stupor. As a response to continued 
support for Israel, in October, 1973, the Organization o f Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) enacted a crippling policy that restricted the sale o f  petroleum to many western 
nations, particularly the United States. The ensuing oil embargo m eant a  dedicated effort 
to apply the American space program ’s impressive use o f PV technology to  everyday life. 
Prior to actions by OPEC, European and Japanese companies led the way in terms o f  
government spending on solar electricity, but the United States increased its allocation o f  
federal funds, too. The demand for domestically-produced energy rose during the 1970s, 
and alternative energy technology research and development received millions o f dollars 
in federal funding, with private industry following suit. Tax dollars earmarked 
specifically for solar cell research barely deserve mention prior to 1971, but thanks to  an
Donald A. Beattie, “The Early Years o f Federal Solar Energy Programs” in Beattie, et al., eds.. History 
and Overview o f  Solar Heat Technologies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 27.
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earnest effort to reshape American energy policy by Jimmy Carter, the US governm ent 
set aside $260 million for photovoltaics by 198l /^
Spurred by this interest, research and developm ent o f PV technology took o ff  
W hile the solar dreams o f many believers failed to  materialize, practical applications 
cropped up everywhere. Silicon technology, also spurred by the well-established 
telecommunications and the emerging com puter markets, gave rise to solar cells on 
everything from wristwatches to maritime buoys. Even though the Reagan 
administration quietly abandoned investm ents in solar electricity, efficiency improved to 
such an extent that the photovoltaic industry attracted the attention o f  nonrenewable 
energy companies on a global scale. In the 1980s, M arkus Real demonstrated P V ’s 
potency by successfully placing solar panels on 333 rooftops in Zurich. By the 1990s, 
the technology established itself worldwide. Today, a PV system that can pow er the 
average American household is about seventy percent cheaper than it was in 1980.^°
The most popular silicon cells, crystalline, typically cost far less than their 
alternatives. This kind o f solar cell operates at about a fourteen percent efficiency rate, 
depending upon several factors like time o f  year and amount o f  cloud cover. Within the 
crystalline cell branch o f  PV technology, some interesting advances have been made. 
Solar panel manufacturers continue to  improve upon the popular wafer design. Recent 
estimates show this style can achieve efficiencies o f  up to twenty percent The biggest 
knock against wafer cells is that they cost too much to manufacture. Finding cheap 
silicon w asn’t much o f  a problem well into the 1990s because PV producers could
Beattie, “Tlie Early Years o f the Federal Solar Energy Programs,” 29; 1981 budget figure from Flavin 
and Lenssen, Power Surge, 170, imposes 1993 dollars.
Arlie Hochschild, Hooray for the Red, Wliite, Blue and Green,” LA Times, November 11, 2001.
Tliis figure comes from a number of sources, and it is generally the accepted standard.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
purchase unused stocks from computer companies at a cut-rate price. However, the 
computer industry boom meant that PV companies had to find alternative sources for 
their silicon. Market forces thus spurred investigation into more cost-effective ways to 
produce the precious silicon.
A Global Movement
Technological advances by the PV industry impact energy use throughout the 
world. In Brazil, solar cells help people achieve goals otherwise inconceivable. In 1992, 
an ambitious program headed by the US Departm ent o f Energy (DOE) and Centro de 
Pesquisas de Energia Electrica (CEPEL) aimed at powering half million homes, schools, 
and clinics. The project, influenced by the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro the same year, projected 
an infusion o f  technological and financial resources from renewable energy industry 
leaders. While some analysts hoped that involving companies like Siemens Solar and 
Solarex would increase production -  and lower the costs -  o f  alternative energy paths, 
Brazilians in places like Sertao de Sao Francisco hoped to gain access to electric power 
for the first time.
In 1997, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) estimated that 
twenty million Brazilians went without electricity.^^ In order to get coal-fueled power to 
rural inhabitants, utility companies expect exorbitant costs; most o f this expense stems 
from removing physical barriers. Rather than resort to destroying Brazil’s already 
rapidly-depleting ecosystems, projects such as the NREL/CEPEL cooperative allow
Roger Taylor, “Joint US/Braziliaii Renewable Energy Rural Electrification Project,” Renewables fo r  
Sustainable Village Power (Golden, CO: NREL FS-510-24195, 1997), p. 2.
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people to  plug into a better life without resorting to ecological sabotage. Financially, 
alternatives make sense, too. NREL estimates that funding PV cells, including 
installation, batteries, and training, costs half as m uch as extending existing pow er lines. 
How do people with newly found access to electricity use that power? In Sertao de Sao 
Francisco, the NREL/CEPEL project allowed people in four hundred dwellings to  plug in 
old television sets and radios. These modem inventions let folks know about the 
vaccinations being housed at the PV-powered health clinic o r about the new computers 
hooked up at the school.
South Africa’s rural areas also prove difficult to supply with electricity. Like 
areas in Brazil, rural outposts in South Africa see no hope for electric power from 
traditional sources. Doug Arent figures that about one in every five citizens shouldn’t 
expect electricity for at least a score o f years. The World Bank considers South Africa 
a likely candidate to achieve its national goal o f  providing PV cells to two thousand 
clinics and over sixteen thousand s c h o o l s . T h e  same study estimates that one kilowatt 
per hour (kWh), the amount o f energy needed to  keep ten 100-watt light bulbs lit for an 
hour, o f  solar electricity will cost between eight and ten cents ($0.08 - $0,10).^^ Fossil 
fuel-powered plants typically do not exist in rural areas o f  developing nations, and the 
costs for constructing large energy-producing plants outweigh renewable alternatives. 
Thandizwe Frank Gwala, leader o f the Kwazulu Natal tribe in the town o f Maphephethe, 
expressed his hope that the solar panels serving his village’s twelve thousand members
Ibid., 1
24 Doug Arent, "Rural Electrification in South Africa,” Renewables fo r  Sustainable Village Power (Golden, 
CO: NREL FS-520-24633, 1998), p. 1.
Edward M. Petrie, H. Lee Willis, and Masaki Takalialu, "Distributed Generation in Developing 
Countries,” from the Dept of Energy web site, www. rsvp.nrel. gov, 6.
“  Petrie, et al., p. 4.
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will “give people independence.”^̂  Not only do the PV cells power lights at 
M aphephethe’s schools, electricity means that people can begin to  earn their livings 
closer to  home.
The answer to the question, “Can solar electricity really make a 
difference?” then, is yes. The world houses tw o billion people that lack electricity.^* 
Setting up non-polluting electricity sources will help keep carbon emissions from getting 
out o f control, but photovoltaics can do more than help reduce climate-altering carbon 
dioxide emissions. Robert Foster, head o f  the Southwest Technology Developm ent 
Institute, thinks there is something subversively appealing about solar electricity;
Tlie unique aspect o f PV is that it is a ‘radical' or ‘disruptive’ type 
o f  teclmology as compared to conventional power generation teclmologies.
PV is a teclmology tliat does not build from the old teclmology base, 
but rather replaces tliat base from tlie bottom up. PV allows people the 
opportunity to ignore traditional electrical power supply structures 
and meet tlieir own power needs locally."^
The independent streak Foster expresses also parallels the sentiments o f 
Thandizwe Frank Gwala. The promise o f  tom orrow  must depend on our willingness to 
share what we know with other people; equally important is our ability to adapt to a 
changing world. By learning what we can from each other and pushing for sustainable 
energy paths other American communities can replicate San Francisco’s success.
Quote in Siemens Review, “A Zulu Village Looks to the Sim: An Interview with Thandizwe Frank 
Gwala,” 3-4/96, p. 25.
^  Petrie, et al., p. 1.
Robert Foster, “Photovoltaic Markets and Applications” from the El Paso Solar Energy Association’s 
web site at w w w .epsea.org/pv.html.
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Chapter 4
Son o f Wind, Ready~to-Give: Wind Energy and the Lesson o f  Constancy
My son, I am your father. I am one o f  the gods and 
I stand in the north. My name is Ready-to-Give.
When the people are hungry for buffalo, I blow  my 
breath upon the land. My breath drives the buffalo 
to the people, and they slaughter many.
Yellow-Bird, Chaui (Pawnee) leader, “The Son o f  Wind, Ready-To-Give”
With the wind comes the buffalo. L ike m any o f  its neighbors on the prairie, the 
buffalo meant more to the Chaui Pawnees than an animal to hunt. It was a way o f  life. 
The sustenance provided by this icon o f  the Am erican Great Plains meant that several 
tribes imparted a spiritual aspect to the anim al. For the Chaui, wind played a vital role.
In the tale related by Yellow-Bird, the wind figure appeared from the north during times 
o f want and “send the people something to eat.” ' The ritual that called forth the wind 
spirit, known as Ready-to-Give, became a vital part o f  Chaui life.
From an early point in its history, hum anity has given thoughtful consideration to 
wind. In different places around the world, people have developed technologies designed 
to harness the power in gales and breezes alike. Part o f  w ind’s allure centers on the 
metaphorical qualities celebrated by Yellow-Bird, that o f constancy. When the sun 
shines on our planet’s surface, it warms air as well as land; when warm air rises, cooler 
air rushes in to fill the void, creating breezes. This chapter tells the story o f  humanity and 
wind, while also revealing w ind’s dependable nature.
Humans first became interested in harnessing w ind’s power thanks to its
' George A. Dorsey, The Pawnee: Mythology (Part I) (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution o f  
Washington, 1906), 94.
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regularity. This chapter begins with a b rief overview o f  wind technology in the ancient 
world. Next, I cover wind energy in the European M iddle Ages. Technological 
developments and social implications m erged across the continent as wind energy gained 
increased attention and importance prior to E urope’s quest for empire in the W estern 
Hemisphere. Finally I analyze wind in the m odern era. I turn my attention to wind 
energy in the industrialized world, particularly the United States. As in the M iddle Ages, 
wind technology gained utility in nineteenth century America, yet reliance on other fuels 
eventually stunted wind energy development. Paradoxically, wind today can thank its 
present usefulness to  the centralized power structure that initiated the resource’s early 
demise.^ I analyze this apparent contradiction by tracing w ind’s transformation from an 
individualistic power source into one that m akes use o f  the same centralized electrical 
grid used by other, more environmentally caustic, fuels.
Within the context o f this thesis, wind energy might inspire comparison to  the 
passive solar technological realm. People have long used wind as an energy source, and 
although we in the twenty-first century often refer to wind as an alternative, the practice 
o f  harnessing wind’s power far precedes the  use o f  fossil fuels. Like passive (and later 
active) solar designs, wind energy technology has adapted to reflect the needs o f  societies 
using it. Exhibiting characteristics more closely associated with active solar and hydro 
technology, modern applications o f wind pow er produce electricity. For all the 
characteristics it shares with its renewable kin, wind energy has a story all its own. This 
chapter relates that tale and emphasizes w ind’s most compelling trait; constancy.
Wasliington, 1906), 94.
 ̂Centralized power means electricity generated at a single point then distributed tlirough power lines to 
end users.
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Wind and People — A Long Relationship
Early development o f  wind energy technology relied, strangely enough, on water. 
When Egyptians hoisted their first square sails in 5000 BC, they demonstrated a pattern 
o f  technological development repeated around the globe from Egypt to China and 
beyond.^ Some experts think that as early 5000 BC ancient Egyptians used linen or 
papyrus sails to navigate the Nile River."^ The concept at play in these ancient sailing 
ships is known today as lift, and the design o f  the wind-catching sails did not change 
significantly for several cen turies/ This does not mean that such sails were particularly 
efficient. Energy expert Valclav Smils estim ates that the Mediterranean square sail, 
attached to a mast and set at right angles across the ship’s axis, did not operate very 
smoothly. Thus began a long struggle between engineers and the mercurial tem peram ent 
o f  the wind. In Smils’ estimation, engineers from different parts o f  the world came up 
with unique solutions to the problem o f  how best to  capture the wind energy efficiently.® 
At first glance these developments seem to  have little to do with earth-bound 
wind power as we know it today. Yet, capturing the wind for sailing purposes had a 
dramatic impact on land-based wind technology. Like their sea-born counterparts, early 
grounded windmills related to water; unlike wind sails, these small windmills found their 
nascency in the arid fields o f Persia, far from their ocean brethren. Needful o f  efficient 
ways to pump water and grind grain, the Persians developed the “carousel” style
 ̂Polynesians, too, acquired a vast store o f knowledge about the winds even though tliey probably didn’t 
use sails. See Robert Righter, Wind Energy in America: A History (Nonnan: University o f  Oklahoma 
Press, 1996), 6.
■* See “History o f Wind Power” at http://www.ews.uiuc.edu/~enation/History.html. Robert Rigliter puts tlie 
date at 3100 BC; see Robert Righter, Wind Energy in Am erica, 6.
 ̂Darrel M. Dodge, “Illustrated History o f Wind Power Development,” from website 
http://www.telosnet.com/wiiid/iiidex.html.
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windmill by 500 A D / Engineers constructed wind scoops made o f  reeds o r wood then 
attached the bundles to a vertical shaft. When the wind caught the bundles, they spun on 
a  horizontal plane, much like the horses o f  a  modern carousel, and turned a vertical shaft 
that created mechanical energy.*
In Europe, wind and water parted ways during the classical Greek and Roman 
eras. Used primarily as power for milling grain, flowing w ater exhibited a characteristic 
not as readily found in wind: consistency. As early as the first century BC, a 
Thessalonian, Antipater, wrote o f a simple m achine driven by water power.^ Later, 
ancient Roman solar architect Vitruvius reported a design for waterwheels found 
throughout the Mediterranean world. W hile technological innovation benefited 
waterwheels in the Roman world, no European society invested much time tinkering with 
windmills.** With a large population and widespread slavery, Rome had little incentive 
to develop labor-saving machines.
Middle Ages Europe: The Ascendancy o f Mechanical Energy
In the centuries following the breakup o f  the Roman Empire, several powers 
sought to establish themselves as legitimate successors. An Arabian presence filled the 
void in the eastern and southern M editerranean world, and in these regions, wind power 
continued as an important energy source. Yet in Europe, wind technology development 
all but ceased. Political turmoil constantly threatened public order; warfare became
 ̂Valclav Smils, Energy in World History (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 137.
’ Ibid., 108; see also, Rigliter, Wind Energy in America, 7,
® Dodge, “Illustrated History o f Wind Power Development,” I. We don’t really know what tliese macliines 
looked like, as scribes only mentioned them in writing and didn’t draw tliem. Dodge’s website has a 
speculative illustration.
 ̂ Smils, Energy in World History, 103.
Ibid., 103.
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common for much o f  the continent; famine sickened many; and those who survived had 
to deal with disease. Population dwindled, leaving few hands to  undertake the burden o f  
harvesting crops and grinding grain.
As Europe moved into the post-Rom an era, the economic structure centered on 
agriculture. The manorial economy that would develop centered on hierarchical 
allegiances, with the monarch at the top and peasants at the bottom. Nobles, clerics, and 
other middlemen all benefited from the system because they owned the land used by 
peasants to raise crops. Agriculture, labor intensive as it was, formed the foundation 
upon which Europe built its society in the M iddle Ages. Low populations m eant less 
available muscle power and a greater demand for alternative forms o f  energy. W hile 
Rom e’s huge population offset the demand for labor-saving technologies like wind, the 
sparsely populated nations in the M iddle Ages bore such burdens more heavily.
In response to labor shortages, European nations developed two important 
renewable resources: wind and water. Prior to the Middle Ages, Europeans generally 
used wind as a way to control water, either by sailing over it or by pumping the resource 
from the ground. By 1000 AD, the relationship had changed. W ater power emerged as a 
leading energy source in the first millennium thanks to  the vertical waterwheel. A 
departure from its inefficient horizontal brethren, the vertical wheel, also known as the 
post-mill, was a simple design. Rather than spinning around horizontally, engineers 
flipped the wheel to an upright position, moving the power-producing axle to  a horizontal 
station.*^ This seemingly insignificant shift made a huge difference in the power
" Rigliter, Wind Energy in Am erica,!.
Also known as the Greek or Norse wheel, these macliines spim horizontally, along witli the rusliiiig 
water, and generated just enough energy to power a millstone. See Smils, Energy in World History, 103; 
Braudel, The Structures o f  Everyday Life, 354-5.
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waterwheels could generate. An undershot machine, whose paddles gathered w ater at the 
surface o f a flowing stream, could boost the w aterflow ’s energy output eightfold and 
greatly reduce the amount o f  people required to accomplish basic tasks, like grinding 
grain.
Despite an increase in energy capacity, vertical waterwheels had little impact on 
Middle Ages Europe, where windmill technology materialized slowly. In what historians 
term the “Medieval Industrial Revolution,” a  slow series o f  technological innovations 
occurred over three centuries. W ater technology was the catalyst. The Domesday 
Book o f  1086 reported 5,624 watermills in England, where the manorial econom y had 
taken root.*^ The waterwheels that powered the self-sufficient manors o f  M iddle Ages 
Europe created a problem when nobility began asserting ownership rights over flowing 
streams. Resolution o f this conflict provided a boost to windmill technology.
In the twelfth century, the papacy m andated that nobles and clerics held the rights 
to flowing water. The decree bestowed watermill rights as well, and owners could 
depend upon steady income from a certain market and perpetual control over lower 
classes. Rivers provided the central feature o f  towns during the M iddle Ages, and the 
agrarian community, the bulk o f  European society at this time, depended on waterwheels 
to mill grain. Manorial control over towns began to suffer challenges from an emerging 
middle class that grew tired o f  a stagnant class system.
Across Europe, wind energy became a popular form o f  economic and social
Smils, Energy in World History, 103. Such macliines existed in Rome.
Braudel, The Structures o f  Everyday Life, 353; Righter, Wind Energy in America, 8. Braudel reports tliat 
water had other applications, as well, including tidal power in the Islamic and European worlds; see 
Braudel, 354; Righter reports tliat William the Conqiierer’s invading hordes saw tliem in tlie Nonnan 
Invasion o f 1066, Righter, 8.
Smils, Energy in World History, 103; Braudel, Structures, 356.
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protest. Small farm owners built w ind-powered postmills to  avoid costly m illing fees. 
W indmills saved money by milling grain w ithout fliel or time costs, and people could 
build them cheaply. Northern Europe’s environm ent also had an impact. In 
communities that relied on smaller streams fo r their energy supply, cold w inter weather 
could disrupt productivity. People alert to the dangers o f freezing could prevent such an 
interruption o f  power by building windmills that were less likely to succumb to  cold 
temperatures.
M onetary concerns helped develop European wind technology, but w ind’s 
ubiquitous character also reflected independence in the people who embraced it. At a 
time when the daily lives o f  most people w ere controlled by a rigid power structure, wind 
provided an outlet for self-sufficiency. Even though they were cheap to build, windmills 
entailed a considerable gamble. Raising such machines risked upsetting waterwheel 
owners, generally the same people responsible for the daily governance o f  the 
community. These town rulers held power by rights granted by infallible monarchs and 
popes. Pope Celestine III, who ruled in the late twelfth century, issued a decree ordering 
windmill operators to pay tithes, or fees to the church.** Hence, the people who dared 
challenge the local authorities also ran the risk o f  upsetting the center o f  European 
society. As wind energy expert Robert Righter asserts, "(a) tiny ruling class, which 
thrived on monopoly and privilege, began to  lose out to rural entrepreneurs and a 
growing urban middle class” that saw the technology as a way to better their lives. *̂  The 
growing appeal o f  windmills also hints at a shifting society. Lynn White, Jr., explains
Debeir, et al.. In the Servitude o f  Power, 78.
”  Lynn Wliite, it.. M edieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 88 
'* Ibid., 88.
'^Rigliter, Wind Energy, 13.
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that technologies such as post-mills led to complex cultures founded more on individual 
freedom than forced l a b o r . T h e  success o f  w ater and wind power changed European 
society by freeing its citizens to pursue other ambitions.
In Holland, wind technology became a national icon. The same tower windmills 
that drained water from the encroaching North Sea also served as symbols o f  public 
sentiment. Windmills drained low-lying land, known as polders, and served as living 
quarters for millers and their families, which often christened their homes with proper 
names.^* Improved blade designs made the machines more efficient and made public 
displays more prominent. On somber occasions, millers stopped the four blades in a way 
that reflected a Christian cross. When celebration was in the air, the locals adorned the 
sails with colorful banners. Holland thrived as a global power on the cusp o f  the 
modern era; in the golden era o f the seventeenth century, windmills played a vital role for 
the nation. The preindustrial motor had staying power, dominating Holland’s power 
market well into the industrial era. Wind accounted for roughly ninety percent o f  the 
country’s energy in 1850.^^
Wind Energy in the Industrial World
By the mid-nineteenth century, wind technology could not compete physically or 
financially with the fossil-powered industry. A century before, several European nations 
began their evolution from a patchwork o f self-sufficient manorial societies into nations 
competing for resources across the globe. The political structure also saw a shift, as strict
^  Lyim Wliite, Jr., M edieval Religion and Technology {Berkeley; University o f California Press, 1978), 
223.
Rigliter, Wind Energy in America, 14.
^  Smils, Energy in World History, 109; Righter, Wind Energy in America, 15.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
regimes o f the sixteenth century slowly gave way to more enlightened, secular rulers in 
the eighteenth. This change led to a new era o f  European intellectual and technological 
achievement, and the gradual gains made during the repressive M iddle Ages gave way to 
accelerated development in the modern age.
In the United States, the transition to  steam power came more slowly. Much o f  
the nation still depended on water and w ood for power in the antebellum period, but after 
the Civil War, industry demanded fossil resources. In the American Midwest, coal had 
an early influence over industry, but wind technology held the attention o f  individuals 
determined to survive on the Great Plains. Connecticut native Daniel Halladay perfected 
his multi-bladed farm windmill by 1857, and moved his company, the Halladay Wind 
Mill Company, to Batavia, Illinois shortly a f t e r . S o o n ,  the farm windmill would head 
across the Mississippi River and earn a reputation as a symbol o f  American 
independence.
The windmill’s introduction to the Great Plains came alongside coal-powered 
railroads. Industry in the East sought the natural abundance and new markets o f  the 
American West, and the transcontinental rail line provided a vital link between them.
The steamships that journeyed through the G reat American Desert constantly threatened 
engines with overheating, and railroad companies searched for ways to supply cooling 
w ater for the boilers. The Halladay windmill proved the perfect solution because it 
operated without human assistance, and the water-pumping machines could keep railroad 
station water towers well stocked. The unique design o f the Halladay also adapted to the 
gusty conditions o f  the Great Plains. Unlike the sturdy four-bladed Dutch tower mill, the
23 Paul Gipe, Wind Energy Comes o f  Age, (New York: Jolui Wiley & Sons, 1995), 122.
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American farm windmill had numerous, feathered blades connected to a central hub that 
powered the water pump. The spindly, futuristic design allowed the sections to furl 
inward during heavy winds.
Windmills may inspire romantic notions as we look back on them today, but in 
the late nineteenth century people depended on them for survival. In his classic work. 
The G reat P lains, Walter Prescott Webb argues that three things made white settlement 
o f  the American West possible. The first two, barbed wire and the Colt .45, kept some 
semblance o f  order out past the reach o f  the law. The third, the windmill, played a far 
more important role. Webb notes that the fam iliar, multi-bladed machines allowed 
farmers to pump water for thirsty crops and ranchers to water livestock in the good years. 
When drought hit the Plains in the late 1890s, windmills took on even greater 
significance because they “enabled the hom esteader to hold on when all others had to 
leave. . .(windmills) made the difference betw een starvation and livelihood.” ^̂
Even as homesteaders on the Great Plains turned to the farm windmill for 
survival, innovators back East pushed the technology in new directions. In northern 
Ohio, a thousand miles from the arid farms o f  the West a millionaire industrialist 
experimented with wind energy. Charles Brush made his fortune by creating the famous 
Brush arc light in the 1870s, but the inventor’s pioneering spirit was far from satisfied. 
The next decade. Brush began experimenting with electricity. The nation had taken to 
this exciting new phenomenon, as people all over the nation lined up at shop windows to
Gipe, Wind Energy Comes o f  Age, 124 and Righter, Wind Energy in America, 24. Halladay moved his 
company to Batavia, where he changed its name to the US Engine and Power Company,
Rigliter, Wind Energy in America, 24-5. The machines faced away from the wind.
Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (New York; Grosset & Dunlap, 1931) 320 
Ibid., 346.
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bask in the glow o f  electric light.^* During the winter o f 1887-88, Brush invented the 
first electricity-generating windmill in the w o r l d . T h e  colossal “Brush windm ill” stood 
sixty feet and weighed 80,000 pounds. The Brush windmill had a gear ratio o f  fifty to  
one: for every revolution o f  the tightly-packed blades, the electricity-generating dynamo 
would turn fifty times, generating about 12 kilowatt hours (kWh).^°
While small electricity-generating stations operated in major American cities by 
the turn o f  the century, a major development in Chicago proved a catalyst for what would 
become the nation’s electric grid system. In 1903 Samuel Insull funded installation o f  a 
five megawatt (MW) turbine generator that produced electricity in alternating current 
(AC). Until that time, electricity production came in two inefficient forms. Direct 
current (DC) was a direct byproduct o f late nineteenth century generators. Although easy 
to produce, the DC current was nearly impossible to transport over distances o f  more than 
a couple o f miles.^* Until 1903, the other alternative was to produce AC power with an 
inefficient reciprocating steam engine that cost over twice as much per watt than rotating 
steam t u r b i n e s . F i r s t  produced in 1884 by Englishman Charles Parsons, the rotating 
steam turbine could create electricity cheaply and in the more readily transportable AC 
form. Soon a grid system emerged that included a central electricity-producing station 
and transmission, or power, lines that transported electricity to end users, much like 
today’s distributed electricity system.
Mindful o f  America’s growing dependence on the centralized grid system.
^  See David E. Nye, Electrifying America: Social M eanings o f  a  New Technology (Cambridge, MA: Tlie 
MIT Press, 1990).
^  Rigliter, Wind Energy in America, 43.
Ibid, 43-5.
Richard Rudolph and Scott Ridley, Power Struggle: The Hundred-Year War Over Electricity  (New  
York: Harper & Row, 1986), 26-8.
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Charles Brush turned his considerable energies away from wind-generated electricity. 
Tying into the grid simply didn’t make econom ic sense for windmills, and sinking the 
necessary capital into such an enterprise was a risk Brush was not willing to take. As 
Brush explored other possibilities, Dane Poul LeCour set about proving that wind energy 
could contribute to the electricity supply. Backed by the Danish federal governm ent, 
LeCour designed and built 40 electricity-generating windmills in 1906.^^ L eC our’s 
accomplishments set European wind energy on a different course than Am erica’s. The 
Danish government understood wind’s potential, and funded studies to  determine the best 
areas for windmills, called siting. Interest in wind energy spilled beyond D enm ark’s 
borders, as Germany and Great Britain invested scientific capital in the potential 
electricity provider.^'*
While Brush’s achievements made w ind a viable, if  impractical, energy source, at 
the time o f  his death in 1929 the nation as a w hole wasn’t ready to embrace the breezes as 
a source o f  electricity Demonstrated successfully by Samuel Insull in Chicago, 
championed by corporate leaders, and powered by fossil fuels, the centralized grid system 
emerged as the main energy providers in Am erican cities.
On the Plains, a significant number o f  farmers continued to use windmills to  
pump water, and in some cases, power low voltage batteries. Mail-order catalogs enticed 
farmers with electric gadgets, and many sold kits that allowed farmers to retrofit their 
windmills with a generator and a battery. The company that cornered the market,
Jeff Hein, “ 1896 to 1928; Eleciric Industry Evolves,” Closed Circuit (vol. 25, no. 20, September 26,
2003), reproduced at website www.wapa.gov/niedja/cct/2003/sept26/25no206.htin last visited May 8, 2004.
Rigliter, Wind Energy in A merica, 61.
Ibid., 61-5. Part of tlie explanation for Europe’s lead might be tliat electricity on tlie continent comes to 
consumers as direct current (DC), an easier form to generate with renewables like wind and solar, ratlier 
tlian tlie alternating current (AC) that came into use in the US. See Nye, Electrifying America and Ridley, 
Pow er Struggle.
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however, didn’t need mass marketing. The legendary Jacobs Wind Electric Company 
began in 1927, and despite a distaste for advertising, sales numbered in the hundreds o f  
thousands through the thirties and forties.^^ The reliable, affordable windmills earned a 
reputation for reliability, and the company stubbornly remained in business until 1956. 
The Jacobs model changed the look o f  rural wind machines (and, later, modern turbines) 
by using only three blades. The design powered a 32-volt battery for modest home 
appliances.
Country windmills retrofitted with electricity-providing generators and batteries 
couldn’t quench the thirst for modern power. As the Great Depression descended upon 
the nation, a progressive government took pow er in Washington, DC. The economic 
squeeze that began on the farm in the twenties, brought on by overproduction, got worse 
in the thirties, and FDR vowed to lift country folk out o f their miserable conditions. The 
Rural Electrification Act o f  1936 created the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) 
and promised to ease the suffering on American farms by extending the high line out into 
the countryside. The aim was to allow the people there the same quality o f  life afforded 
to those in the cities. As the federal governm ent promised to preserve local control, the 
effect o f  hooking farms up to the centralized grid had the opposite effect.
President Roosevelt tapped former Tennessee Valley Authority head Morris 
Cooke to head the newly formed REA. Cooke quickly learned the prohibitive financial 
cost o f extending electric power, known as the high line, to the countryside. W isconsin 
Power and Light assessed the cost o f  setting up electricity wires at $1,405 per mile, and
Ibid., 99. 
Ibid., 90-9.
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utility boss Samuel Insull figured a range betw een $800 and $2,400 per mile.^^ C ooke’s 
REA encouraged farmers to form cooperatives, apply for federal loans, and string the 
wires themselves.^* Co-ops proved effective in hooking rural America up to centralized 
power, but cheap electricity also transformed the American farm. With grid-powered 
tools, “electricity helped make much o f  the farm population superfluous.”^̂
The REA unwittingly brought big business to the farm and sounded the death 
knell for wind energy. FDR had hoped that extending power to farmers would save the 
independent family farm. Even as farmer-led cooperatives provided some semblance o f  
local control, the centralized grid fell under the direction o f  a powerful federal agency 
that was unwilling to adopt variations to its them e o f  supplying electricity to  country 
folks. Wind advocates appealed to administrative and legislative officials for some role 
for wind energy within the REA to no effect.'*® Savior o f the late nineteenth century 
homesteaders, the windmill fell out o f  favor in the 1930s.
Wind energy could not compete with fossil fuels in the Great Depression. The 
windmill created by Charles Brush generated electricity in direct current (DC) form, 
which required either immediate use or an efficient storage system. Utilities could not 
distribute DC electricity more than a few m iles without losing potency, so rather than 
build dams or power plants in the center o f town, utilities started generating alternating 
current (AC) electricity and sending it over insulated wires to  customers. Until Samuel
Ibid., 108-9.
Ibid., 113. Tlie REA received legislative blessing in 1936 by Congress when it signed tlie Rural 
Electrification Act; a sticking point for utilities was tlie danger o f the REA acting without congressional 
assent, tlius potentially falling into dangerous constitutional waters.
David Nye, Electrij^ing America, 328.
Robert Righter describes tlie plight of wind advocate R.F. Weiiiig and Itis testimony before Congress in 
1945. Weinig pushed for an amendment to legislation amending REA tliat would allow for individually 
operated energy plants. To Congress, though, windmills belonged to the liistoiy books. See Righter, Wind 
Energy in America, 121-5.
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Insull consolidated power plants into large, capital-intensive corporations in the 1910s, 
cities had several power plants that supplied pow er to a small number o f  customers. The 
centralized grid was well established in Am erican cities after 1910, and by W orld W ar II, 
electricity had transformed the American f a rm / '
Wind advocates tried to create machines that generated alternating current. In 
1944, on Grandpa’s Knob, Vermont, Palmer Putnam tried to provide the answer. Putnam 
addressed two, interrelated issues: converting wind energy into AC and doing so 
affordably. With its huge size, the Smith-Putnam wind turbine looked like a descendant 
o f  the Brush windmill, itself the product o f  a unique partnering effort between academia 
and private interests, was an enormous machine. Its diameter stretched 175 feet; even at 
16 tons, the rotor weighed a fraction o f  a single blade.'*^ Putnam operated on the 
economy o f  scale principle that had previously directed utility companies, like Samuel 
Insull’s General Electric. For Putnam, Insull, and others, the object was to find a way to 
generate electricity cheaply, which usually m eant making it in large quantities. The idea 
worked for Insull, but not for Putnam. W hile the Smith-Putnam managed to operate for 
about sixteen months, it could not live up to  its fiscal promise.'*^ A blade came loose in 
early 1945, tumbling into the Vermont woods. The wind plant already cost its financial 
backers one million dollars, and the bill for fixing such a mammoth problem was 
$300,000 and exposed a weakness o f relying on the economy of scale theory. The 
project had failed, but it did set a precedent.
Nye, Electrifying America, 382. The reluctance to build power plants in urban areas probably had more 
to do with transportation issues than healtlr, allliough tlrat’s only an educated guess (tlie power plant near 
my hometown lay right on tlie rail line).
Darrell M. Dodge, “Illustrated History of Wind Energy,” 4.
“Economy of scale” refers to large-scale projects with inputs o f capital large enough to bring the 
consumer cost o f such teclmology down.
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For wind energy to compete with other fuels, advocates had to draw upon a 
familiar characteristic, reliability. Technologically, engineers had to solve the problem o f 
generating AC electricity, which requires rigid speed regulation. The wind blows at 
different speeds, but alternating current generators need a steady energy input. For all its 
shortcomings, the Smith-Putnam turbine managed to break through this engineering 
barrier. Federal Power Commission officer Percy Thomas thought he could improve 
Putnam’s design. Thomas proposed linking windm ills to hydro plants to ensure steady 
fuel input; when the breezes stopped blowing, w ater would take over the job o f  feeding 
the grid. When the dams weren’t generating electricity, they would store w ater until it 
was needed. The American West was best suited for such a relationship, Thomas 
thought, because o f its abundant wind and limited water supply .'*'* Federal funding for 
research and development took a different turn in the post-World W ar II years, however, 
as success with atomic weapons spurred scientists and engineers to apply nuclear power 
more peacefully.
The story was different in Europe, where tenacious Danish farmers did their best 
to offset the oppressive German regime during WWII. Tapping into knowledge gained 
over several centuries, common people turned to wind power when Nazi administrators 
cut citizen access to the centralized grid, building over 90 electricity-generating 
t u r b i n e s . F o s s i l  fuel remained sparse in the immediate postwar years, but by the 1973 
OPEC oil embargo, Denmark had embraced the global market, importing over ninety 
percent o f  its energy.'*^ In the early seventies, the nation’s long history o f using wind 
energy helped the nation counter fuel shortages. Engineers developed the three-bladed
Rigliter. Wind Energy in America, 139. Despite its merit, policymakers liave yet to implement tlie idea. 
Ibid., 317, note 33; Gipe, Wind Energy Conies o f  Age, 53.
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windmill based on medium-sized turbines designed in the 1950s, known as G edser mills; 
the new look quickly became the flagship o f  the Danish windmill fleet. The m odest size 
converted wind into electricity efficiently, and repairs costs remained affordable. The 
Danish government also spurred private investm ent by offering energy production 
incentives. The approach differed greatly from  that in the US, where most federal 
investment financed huge research and developm ent projects. Denmark funded a paltry 
ten percent o f that amount on R&D in the sam e period . D e s p i t e  its small size and tight 
budget, Denmark could brag o f owning over half o f  the w orld’s wind market share by 
19924*
In the 1940s, American political leaders urged scientists to think big. The fate o f  
the world depended on which nation could unlock the atomic door first. After the bomb 
ended the war, the federal government poured billions o f dollars into peaceful uses for 
nuclear power. Atomic power promised to provide so much energy so cheaply that “‘it 
wouldn’t pay to meter it.’”'*̂  As Congress waited patiently for nuclear power to come o f  
age, the federal government financed another big dream. President Kennedy challenged 
scientists and engineers to land an American on the moon by 1970, a fantastic goal in 
1961, yet the huge financial investment paid o ff in 1969. The lesson for American policy 
makers became clear. Given big enough dreams, with enough cash to chase them, and 
Americans could accomplish anything. Such was the logic in W ashington when the oil 
embargo rocked the nation in 1973.
In response to the OPEC embargo and ensuing energy crisis, the United States
4̂  Gipe, Wind Energy Comes o f  Age, 51. 
4" Ibid., 72.
Ibid., 73.
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rejuvenated its stagnant wind energy program. Federally-funded partnerships enlisted the 
collaboration o f  aerospace and defense industries in a sudden surge o f  research and 
development. Almost immediately the well-established contractors set about spending 
exorbitant amounts o f  money on risky designs. The logic that drove companies like 
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas was to adhere to the economies o f  scale principle: build 
big machines that could generate huge amounts o f  power and profit. Unlike Danish 
designers, who relied upon proven modest success, American researchers scrapped 
earlier, proven designs in favor o f larger projects. At Sandia National Laboratory in New 
Mexico, the Alcoa Corporation tried to replicate the French vertical-axis, Darrieus-type 
wind turbine. Designers hoped the prototype, which resembled a giant egg-beater, would 
make an immediate impact. The best that the well-funded modern Darrieus could 
manage was operation as a water-pumping m achine at the federal research facility in 
Bushland, T e x a s . O t h e r  projects had similar ambitions. Unfortunately, they also had 
similar results.
The highly publicized MOD (modification) program sought to impact American 
wind technology immediately. Begun in 1975, these first generation large turbine, two- 
bladed windmills made legendary performances. NASA designed and built the MOD-0 
(zero) machine, which was rated at 100 kW h -  enough energy to power about 27 homes. 
Engineers sited the million dollar MOD-0 machine near Sandusky, Ohio, where it 
operated for a mere thirty hours in 1976.^* Three years later, federal contractors started 
another project in Boone, North Carolina. Although the MOD-1 used none o f  the
David Lilientlial, first head of the Atomic Energy Commission, quoted in Righter, Wind Energy in 
America, 144.
^  Gipe, Wind Energy Comes o f  Age, 85, 171. The project received $28 million from 1974 to 1985.
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valuable data gathered from the earlier M OD project, problems did not have a chance to 
surface. Noisy blades raised concerns o f  nearby residents who eventually shut the project 
down.^^
By the time MOD-2 appeared, the Am erican wind energy program had achieved 
little success. Despite discouraging data, project managers pushed forward with a similar 
design on a grander scale in what they hoped would be a breakthrough. In 1982, NASA 
and the Department o f  Energy sank millions into turbines twice the size o f  the M OD-1, 
with a capacity o f  2.5 megawatts.^^ The Bureau o f  Reclamation sponsored a plan to 
bring two MOD-2 machines to Medicine Bow , Wyoming. Once in place, the turbines 
almost immediately ran into problems. After running a mere eighteen months, one 
windmill developed a fatal problem when a vital mechanical part, the main bearing, 
burned out. After the Bureau received a repair bill for $1.5 million, it decided to scrap 
the windmill, dumping it to a junkyard for $13,000. The other MOD-2 remained in 
operation for over four years. A bolt eventually came loose, burning up the generator, 
and the Bureau was forced to dump the turbine to a local man for $20,000.^^*
For wind energy experts, the federal investments o f  the 1970s and 1980s leads to 
very different conclusions. For National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) wind 
technology development manager James Thresher, all the failures o f  the period merely 
reflect a growing period for American wind t e c hn o lo g y .R e se a r c h  and development
Ray Reece, The Sun Betrayed: A Report on the Corporate Seizure o f  U.S. Solar Energy Development 
(Boston: South End Press, 1979), 87.
Dodge, “Illustrated History o f Wind Power,” 6 and Gipe, Wind Energy Comes o f  Age, 103-4. Gipe 
reports tliat tlie noise problem made MOD 1 the first wind project to generate national attention.
”  Gipe, Wind Energy Comes o f  Age, 104.
Rigliter, Wind Energy in America, 175-8. The piu-chaser of the larger turbine eventually got it running 
again; in 1994, one of the two blades came loose, sailing a hundred feet above the 250 foot tower.
”  Gipe, Wind Energy Comes o f  Age, 70.
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critic Ray Reece argues that the corporate influence stunted meaningful progress.
The MOD projects illustrate the problem s with American wind energy technology 
in the 1970s and 1980s. Familiar companies suddenly appeared as wind experts. General 
Electric built the 2 megawatt (MW) M O D -1 machine that failed in Boone, North 
Carolina. Boeing got the contract to design and build the enormous 2.5 MW  M OD-2 
windmills, one o f which famously failed at M edicine Bow, Wyoming. United 
Technologies Corporation subsidiary, Ham ilton Standard, bears responsibility for the 
other Wyoming failure. The respective com panies earned most o f  the sixty million 
dollars that taxpayers paid for the M OD-2 program. Yet for all the time and money put 
into the wind program, American companies continued to lag behind their European 
counterparts. While Boeing, United Technologies, and General Electric all benefited 
from federal investment during the energy crisis, none o f  these big companies made 
America the leader in wind technology. Paul Gipe puts a cynical spin on the American 
wind energy experience through the mid-eighties, arguing that American policym akers 
focused on research and development when they should have tried market incentives.
As the United States poured millions into research and development after the 
energy crises o f the seventies, other nations sought to rebound from the shock o f  limits. 
Across the Atlantic, the Danish governm ent turned to native expertise to offset 
Denm ark’s woeful dependence on foreign oil. At the time of the OPEC embargo, 
farming accounted for most o f this Indiana-sized country’s industry, a factor that would 
impact Denm ark’s rise to prominence in wind technology. Danes had a long tradition o f 
using wind energy. Poul LeCour designed an electricity-generating windmill, and the
Reece, The Sun Betrayed^ 87-8.
Gipe, Wind Energy Comes o f  Age, 92.
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world’s first wind power plant came on line by 1920.^* Danish farmers turned to the 
breezes during World War II by constructing windmills based on LeCour’s machines.
In the postwar years, two leaders emerged from Europe. German scientist Ulrich 
Hutter relied on the most modern equipm ent available to power the largest turbines he 
could design. Mutter’s huge, two-bladed m achines topped 100 feet in diameter. The 
German’s success would lead countless other engineers into a futile chase to replicate his 
success half a century later.^^ In Denmark, Johannes Juul created a revolutionary design. 
Stressing a common-sense, empirical approach, Juul first experimented with tw o- then 
four-bladed windmills. Ultimately concluding that three blades would work best, Juul 
built an inexpensive prototype. Juul built the Gedser mill, forerunner o f  virtually every 
successful, three-bladed design in use today. Unlike those nations that sank millions into 
high-tech research, Juul and his compatriots enlisted a bottom-up approach that 
emphasized durability and modesty.
The partnership between Denm ark’s government and industry also explains 
Danish success. Danish agriculture provided a vital market for wind energy technology 
in the late 1970s. Operating through cooperatives, farmers banded together to raise the 
necessary capital for generating wind electricity. By the mid-nineties over a quarter o f  a 
million Danes owned some interest in a windmill co-op.*’® The central government 
played an important role, too, by providing capital subsidies and performance incentives. 
The landmark Windmill Law requires Danish utilities to purchase electricity from
Ibid., 53.
59 Ibid., 77-80. Wlien NASA started its work on the wind twbines in the 1970s, they purchased Mutter’s 
blueprints. Tlie success o f the MOD program indicates Mutter’s complexity and genius: Mutter’s two- 
bladed macliine ran for 12 years for a total of 4,200 hours, far longer than most o f the MOD turbines.
^  Ibid., 59.
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windmills at eighty-five percent o f  the price that consumers pay.^' In this way, the 
Danish government provides an incentive based on energy output, rather than enticing 
consumers to purchase wind-powered equipment. Denmark also provides grants and 
loans tied to projects undertaken in other countries. The Danish International 
Development Agency allows generous payback periods for purchasing Danish equipm ent 
or the cost o f  setting up Danish-owned m anufacturing facilities. Denm ark’s relationship 
with India proves the success o f the program. The export assistance regulations sparked 
interest in India during the 1990s, while sim ultaneously keeping Denm ark’s position as a 
leader in the international wind industry.*^^
American Responses to Crisis
In the US, California took the lead as the biggest promoter o f  wind energy 
technology. Governor Jerry Brown created the Office o f Appropriate Technology (OAT) 
in 1976. W orking with the California Energy Commission (CEC), itself established as a 
result o f  the OPEC oil embargo, OAT set the stage for wind energy’s boom in the 
1980s.^^ Using funds from the Mello Act o f  1978, a California law mandating 
investment in wind energy, the CEC set about mapping the state’s wind potential. W hile 
other states provided tax incentives similar to  California’s, none allocated money to 
provide data for potential wind sites. '̂*
The state also enticed investment by working with federal legislation. The
Louise Guey-Lee, "Wind Energy Developments: Incentives in Selected Countries” (Washington: Energy 
Information Administration, 1999, from website www.eia.gov), 6.
“  Ibid., 6-7. India quickly became the "developing” nation with the most wind capacity in tlie world and 
ranks fourtli among all nations, behind Germany, the US, and Deiunark.
CEC was formed in 1974 as a result of pressure from the anti-nuclear power wing o f tire California 
legislature. See Williams, Energy and the Making o f  Modern California, 311, 322-4.
^  Righter, Wind Energy in America, 204-7.
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National Energy Tax Act o f  1978, one o f five laws in the landmark National Energy Act, 
allowed investors to write o ff one quarter o f  a wind system ’s cost.®^ California allowed 
another twenty-five percent for non-residential systems, clearly hoping to spur 
investment in large-scale wind power plants. Taken together, state and federal tax breaks 
allowed investors to write o ff half a wind system ’s cost. All the encouragement led to a 
transformation o f  California’s landscape. By the mid-eighties, over twelve thousand 
windmills graced California’s golden hillsides, generating over 900 M W  o f  electricity.
At the height o f the wind rush, Danish turbines flourished; in 1985 over half the 
windmills installed in the United States came from Danish companies.^^ California’s 
leadership allowed the state to lead the nation in wind energy production, despite it being 
only the seventeenth best state in terms o f w ind potential .
Despite its tremendous resources, the US has fumbled its advantages away. In 
1997, Germany wrested the lead from America: the Germans had installed a generating 
capacity o f  over six thousand MW, while the US stood at about half that.^^ By October 
14, 2002, Germany had cemented its role as world leader with over 10,500 M W  installed 
c a p a c i t y . T h e  US government released a study in 1998 that shows the breezes that blow 
across the nation could provide 10,777 billion  kWh o f  electricity every year, far 
surpassing the capabilities in Denmark and Germany. In the same year o f the report, the
The National Energy Act, Printed at the Request o f  the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 
(Waslungton, DC; Govenunent Printing Office, January 1979), 540-7.
“  Righter, Wind Energy in America, 215.
Ibid., 218. Tlie CEC reported in 1993 that 43% o f  the turbines in Califoniia were Danish. See Gipe, 
Wind Energy Comes o f  Age, 36.
^  Cluistine Real de Azua, “The Future of Wind Energy,” 14 Tulane Environmental Law Journal, 485 
(2001), 507.
® Ibid., 506.
“Gennan Wind Market up 35 pct/yr,” Reuters News Service, October 14, 2002, from tlie website 
www.planetark.org. Wliile Gennany holds the global lead, Deiunark provides most o f the hardware; tliat 
explains my emphasis on the latter nation in tliis chapter.
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US consumed 3,629 billion kWh o f e l e c t r i c i t y W i t h  all o f  this potential, why has the 
country not pursued cheap, wind-generated power? Since President Carter’s 1978 
National Energy Act, three characteristics have emerged that help explain A m erica’s 
reluctance to embrace wind energy; resistance from utilities; environmentalist opposition 
based on aesthetics and avian mortality; and allegations that wind energy prohibits 
economic stability.
The most significant act o f  the five-part National Energy Act also caused the most 
controversy. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) includes a provision 
that requires utilities to purchase power generated from an independent, “qualifying” 
facilities (QF).^^ Congress intended to break the stranglehold that utilities had over 
energy by allowing diverse sources to contribute to the nation’s energy supply. The 
legislature also knew it had to figure out how  much these qualifying facilities could 
charge utilities, which fought PURPA regulations strenuously. Political compromise 
eventually produced a workable solution. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) established the way utilities interconnected with independent producers as well 
as advise state regulatory commissions on the rates that QFs could charge utilities, known 
as “avoided cost,” the rates equated to the am ount a utility would have paid for energy 
produced elsewhere.^^ Utilities fought these provisions, arguing that such high costs 
would make basic energy unaffordable. W hen power companies were not instigating 
legal action, they were cheating alternative energy producers.
”  Cluistine Real de Azua, “The Future o f Wind Energy,” 493.
The National Energy Act, Printed at the Request o f tlie Coninultee on Energy and Natural Resources 
(Waslungton, DC; Govenunent Printing Office, January 1979), 304 (Public Law 95-617, Title II, 
§210(aX2)). A “qualifying facility” falls luider several categories, the most important for independent 
alternative energy is a “‘small power production facility:’” one in tlie original act could not surpass 80 
megawatts but now exceeds that amount. The largest tmbines in operation today are rated at 1,65 MW.
Ibid., 305.
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Delay tactics worked for utilities. The Supreme Court upheld two separate 
challenges to PURPA by the time the Reagan administration had come to power, while 
many investors withheld much-needed investm ent c a p i t a l . W i t h  R eagan’s pro-utility 
regulators heading FERC, oversight o f  PU R PA ’s m ost progressive provision loosened 
considerably, but President Carter’s last significant energy contribution, the Crude Oil 
Windfall Profits Tax Act o f  1980, boosted residential and business energy tax credits and 
extended those tax breaks through 1985.^^ R eagan’s successor, George H.W. Bush, 
provided a huge boost to wind energy in the Energy Policy Act o f  1992 (EPACT). The 
production tax credit (PTC), extended through 2003, allows qualifying projects to take 
1.5^/kWh tax credit.^^ In some cases utilities used PURPA and the PTC to prevent wind 
energy from coming on-line. In 1996, Southern California Edison convinced FERC that 
the state didn’t need any more energy production, thus voiding contracts with wind 
energy providers.^^ Ironically, blackouts caused by insufficient energy supply plagued 
the state five years later.
Utility opposition to renewable energy sources probably didn’t come as a surprise 
to  most in the alternative energy industry, but wind advocates did find opposition from 
what seemed a staunch ally. Citing concerns for aesthetic diminishment and for undue 
bird deaths, some environmentalists have challenged the spread o f wind power plants.
On Cape Cod, Massachusetts, the issue has grown into a national debate. Cape Wind 
Associates has proposed a $700 million project intended to develop an offshore wind
FERC  V. M ississippi was decided in 1982; the American Paper Institute v. American Electric Power 
Service Corporation decision came a year later.
“Legislation Affecting the Renewable Energy Marketplace,” from website 
www.eia.doe.gov/cneafysolar.renewables/page/legislation/impact.litml, last visited October 6, 2003. 
Ibid.
77 Cluistine de Azua, “The Future of Wind Energy,” 510.
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power plant three miles offshore, but opposition from Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., W alter 
Cronkite, and David McCullough has slowed the project. Along with the A lliance to 
Protect Nantucket Sound and Save Our Sound, Kennedy and his supporters appeal to 
aesthetic sensibilities. Just as people are not allowed to build oil derricks in Yellowstone 
National Park, so those same energy interests should not be permitted to sully Cape Cod 
with futuristic visual pollution.’*
Wind advocates have confronted “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) argum ents 
before. A decade ago, a similar struggle emerged in the desert o f  Southern California. 
Irked by turbines that generated noise and visual pollution. Palm Springs m ayor Sonny 
Bono led an anti-wind campaign in 1989.’  ̂ A year later, encouraged by public opinion 
polls favoring wind energy, Bono switched his position. Less publicized, but perhaps 
more persuasive. M ayor Bono pointed to the enormous financial benefits o f  having the 
wind industry in Palm Springs.*® The fiscal argument has yet to convince Cape Cod 
residents, but planning for the project continues.
The average windmill today stands nearly 250 feet high with blades that span 
nearly 150 feet in diameter.** Grouped together, these mammoth machines deter birds 
and other flying creatures from passing by unharmed, a point often made by anti-wind 
advocates. Referred to as “Cuisinarts o f  the sky,” windmills certainly seem a menacing 
presence to we featherless humans, yet appearances can deceive. A report by the 
National Wind Coordinating Committee (NW CC) indicates that wind generation
Kennedy wrote an op-ed piece in the New York Times tliis past August; Cronkite appeared in a TV ad 
opposing tlie project, and McCullough provided the voice in a radio spot.
Some of these turbines were left over from the boom years of the eighties; many did not work.
Righter, Wind Energy in America, 227-34. Paul Gipe thought Bono should be praised for raising wind
energy as an issue, wliich Gipe thinks invariably helps.
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facilities kill between 10,000-40,000 birds every year, a seemingly significant number. 
The study also analyzes the results o f  other investigations that calculate avian mortality 
rates from vehicles, airplanes, buildings and houses, as well as other bird killers. 
Researchers disagree about exact numbers, but the range o f deaths caused by non­
windmill structures far exceeds that o f  birds killed by turbines. As far as danger to avian 
species go, bird feeders cause more deaths than windmills; the NW CC cites a study that 
found an average death rate o f  0.85 per house in wintertime. M ost species in the study 
were “passerines,” or perching songbirds, commonly seen at bird f e e d e r s . I n  
comparison to other electricity-generating sources, wind power remains safer. A study in 
Citrus County, Florida revealed that two smokestacks killed about 500 birds per year 
between 1982 and 1986.*^ However, the wind energy community remains concerned 
about avian mortality, especially in the Altamont Pass area in Northern California, where 
several endangered California condors roam the skies. A ltam ont's wind turbines kill 
more raptors, about 250 per year, than anywhere else.*“*
Until wind energy technology became a profitable venture in the mid- to late- 
1990s, a major criticism o f  wind power centered on its unprofitability. In February, 2003 
Northwest Economic Associates wrapped up its study o f the wind energy industry . The 
group reported three case studies that offer some insight on the economic impact that
*' National Wind Coordinating Commit lee, “Avian/Wind Turbine Interaction: A Short Summary of 
Research Results and Remaining Questions,” from the website www.nationalwind.org, last visited 
September 25, 2003.
National Wind Coordinating Committee, Avian Collisions with Wind Turbines: A Summary o f  Existing 
Studies and Comparisons o f  Avian Collision M ortality in the United States, 9. From tlie website 
www.nationalwind.org, last visited September 15, 2003.
Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 12-3.
Northwest Economic Associates, Assessing the Economic Development Impacts o f  Wind Power, prepared 
for the National Wind Coordinating Committee, February 12, 2003, Located at website 
www.nationalwind.org.
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recent wind development has had on the local communities. In M innesota, Oregon, and 
Texas the wind industry invested millions o f  dollars in projects designed to  provide grid- 
boosting electricity from the breezes. For M orrow  and Umatilla Counties, Oregon, 
located in the northeastern part o f  the state, the  project represented a boost to  the 
economy. Four people found jobs building the  thirty-eight turbines, and six more stayed 
on with the company, Florida Power & Light, as maintenance workers or operators. For 
the two Oregon counties, the FPL project d idn’t represent a major boost to the economy, 
but the installation and operation o f the new wind park did help fill the counties’ tax 
coffers by nearly $243,000.®*’
The story played out differently on the windswept plains o f  M innesota and Texas. 
In Lincoln County, MN, the new wind plant created thirty-nine jobs, putting over a 
million dollars into workers’ pockets. The county benefited, too, gathering over 
$600,000 in both 2000 and 2001. For the farm ers who feared watching their way o f  life 
slip away, the windmills provided a welcome cash infusion. Local landowners netted a 
total o f more than half a million dollars from the project.®^ Near Guadalupe National 
Park, at Delaware Mountain, Texas, thirty-six people found work building, operating, and 
maintaining forty new windmills. The form er mineral and oil county once had a, with a 
per capita average income at fifty-five percent o f the statewide norm, yet wind farms 
there allowed locals to find work.®®
In the dry country o f West Texas, wind energy contributes more than jobs and 
income. By generating electricity from the breezes, a local power company provides 
local people with energy without using the local comm unity’s most precious resource:
Ibid., ES-3-4. 
Ibid., ES-2-3.
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water. Unlike fossil fuel power plants that use thousands o f  gallons per day keeping 
boilers from overheating, wind energy requires only the breezes and some mechanical 
know-how. Historian Robert Righter thinks this fact might help push wind energy over 
the hump in the trans-Mississippi W est, where water has grown increasingly scarce in the 
last few years.
By 2004, wind energy reemerged on the Great Plains. The perspective differs 
from the view taken by Pawnee leader Yellow-Bird, but certain characteristics endure. 
Once a spiritual guide for grateful hunters, wind now has a new appeal. Using grants 
from the Vermont-based NativeEnergy, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe in South Dakota 
launched a major wind project in 2003. W ith a generating capacity o f  10 MW , the 
“Rosebud Sioux Tribe St. Francis Wind Farm ” generates enough electricity for nearly 
two hundred homes annually.^^ The project replaces earth-warming gases like carbon 
dioxide and sulphur generated when burning fossil fuels with no emissions and dozens o f  
new jobs. By reinvesting in the wind, the Rosebud Sioux also pay homage to  a lasting 
legacy o f  the Great Plains.
Ibid., ES-4-5.
Interview with Robert Righter, September 26, 2003; notes in author’s possession.
90 Http://www.nativeenergy.coin/wind-farms.html, last visited May 11, 2004,
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Chapter 5
Ready for Prime Time? VoteSolaris Role in America's Energy Transition
In the 1970s policy makers faced tough questions about the constant state o f  
energy crisis in the United States. For answers, pundits alluded to metaphorical bridges. 
Using fossil fuels wisely today, the logic ran, w e can buy time for technologies that will 
solve our economic and environmental energy problem s. Solar expert Denis Hayes said 
that “(o)il and natural gas are our principal m eans o f  bridging today with tomorrow, and 
we are burning our bridges.” ' “Soft energy” advocate Amory Lovins asked whether we 
had the time to pursue fossil and renewable sources contemporaneously. “Some people 
think we can use oil and gas to bridge to a coal and fission economy, then use that later, if  
we wish, to bridge to similarly costly technologies in the hazy future.” For Lovins, the 
future could not wait. “W hat if  the bridge we are on now is the last one?”^
In an effort to make the difficult transition from fossils to renewables go more 
smoothly, the Solar Energy Research Institute (forerunner o f  the National Renewable 
Energy Lab) published several informational guides. Among them was a piece by 
attorney Sharon Stanton White, a municipal bond expert who practiced law in San 
Francisco. W hite’s contribution was part o f SE R I’s “Legal Reconnaissance Papers,” a 
series o f publications designed to aid the comm ercialization o f  alternative energy 
technologies. Published in 1979, W hite’s m anual, “Municipal Bond Financing o f Solar
' Ray Reece, The Sun Betrayed: A Report on the Corporate Seizure o f  U.S. Solar Energy Development 
(Boston: South End Press, 1979), 192.
 ̂Amory B. Lovins, “Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 55, no.l (October 
1976), 65-96, 96.
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Energy Facilities,” states that the “long-term  outlook for the future prices and supplies o f  
our traditional energy sources has forced us to begin to consider other potential energy 
sources.”  ̂ White detailed how revenue bonds could finance city renewable energy 
projects. Distinguished from taxpayer-supported financing, payment for revenue bonds 
came from the “users or beneficiaries o f  the improvement, rather than the taxpayer.”'*
At the time her study was published, the United States was in the midst o f  an 
energy crisis. Gasoline filling stations had no fuel, the nuclear reactor core at Three Mile 
Island nearly experienced meltdown, and natural gas and home heating oil prices hit all- 
time highs. Two years before. President C arter announced the “moral equivalent o f  war” 
on energy problems, themselves influenced by spiraling inflation, increased consumer 
prices, and huge national trade deficits.^ Given the context o f  the times, the “hazy future” 
Amory Lovins referred to seems understandable, yet the late 1970s also held promise for 
solar energy. America’s first and only celebration o f  “Sun Day” occurred in 1978, the 
same year that saw passage o f legislation that would shape the alternative energy 
community for decades. The federal budget that year included an allocation o f  over five 
hundred million dollars for, among other things, demonstration projects designed to 
inform and excite the public about solar energy technology.^ With several years o f  
congressional backing and a vocal solar advocate in the White House, the nation’s solar 
energy prospects appeared all but assured.
This chapter explains what happened to the alternative energy dreams o f  the
 ̂ Sharon Stanton Municipal Bond Financing o f  Solar Energy Facilities (Golden, CO; Solar Energy
Research Institute, December 1979), 1.
" Ibid., 12.
* Cranford D. Goodwin, ed.. Energy Policy in Perspective: Today's Problems, Yesterday’s  Solutions 
(Waslungton, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981), 556, and Martin V. Melosi, Coping with Abundance: 
Energy and Environment in Industrial America (New  York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 292.
 ̂Reece, The Sun Betrayed, 197.
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1970s. Beginning with an overview o f  federal policy since the seventies, I argue that 
expectations for solar and wind technology rem ained out o f  balance with actual 
capabilities. Through the 1980s and early 1990s, alternative energy development lagged 
in the United States because it could not com pete with conventional fossil fuels. By the 
late nineties, solar and wind energy gained new  attention. Improved technology, 
continued government incentives, and a grow ing market all helped transform public 
opinion about solar and wind energy.
In the next section, I analyze an energy crisis within a more recent context. The 
California electricity crisis o f  2000-01 brought energy issues back into the national 
debate. While the global market, deregulation, and improved technology helped alleviate 
the energy problems o f  the 1970s and 1980s, new predicaments emerged. For 
Californians, supply-side economics induced state policy makers to deregulate the 
electricity market with disastrous results. The rolling blackouts during the summers o f  
2000 and 2001 presented an opportunity for solar and wind energy advocates. San 
Francisco’s VoteSolar Initiative proposed a city-wide $100 million revenue bond 
initiative that financed alternative energy projects for municipal buildings.
VoteSolar’s success had an impact on energy policy across the country. In the 
final section, I analyze the success o f  the VoteSolar Initiative and what such 
achievements have meant to  energy policy throughout the US. By demonstrating that the 
technology finally balances the expectations, the solar and wind industry has finally 
shown that alternative energy can have a positive impact in the United States.
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American Alternative Energy Policy Overvietv
Even before the watershed 1973 OPEC oil embargo, energy held the attention o f  
national policy makers. President Richard N ixon faced the difficult task o f  balancing 
various concerns. Regulation o f  fossil fuels, grow ing concerns over economic policy, 
and popular environmental reforms all reflected the haphazard nature o f  Am erica’s 
energy strategy. The three major fossil resources each had different regulations 
administered by various agencies. Nuclear energy had its own government overseers, 
and alternative energy technologies had program s in a variety o f government bodies. The 
Clean Air Act o f  1970 and the Environmental Protection Agency, formed in the same 
year, signaled a serious federal effort to control industrial pollution. With pressure from 
the W atergate break-in mounting and threats o f  embargo coming from the M iddle East, 
Nixon announced an ambitious program designed to free the US from its overdependence 
on foreign energy sources. “Project Independence” called on the nation “to meet 
America’s own energy needs from A m erica’s own energy resources” by 1980.^ A key 
part o f N ixon’s plan was streamlining federal energy policy.
Project Independence appeared amid an era when energy policy was anything but 
cohesive, even within specific industries. By 1970 the natural gas industry was in 
disarray. The 1938 Natural Gas Act continued to  place federal regulators in control over 
gas that traveled across state boundaries, yet for gas that remained in-state, a different set 
o f rules applied.* The effect o f federal regulation was to shield gas consumers from the 
market forces, unlike state rules. Gas companies had little incentive to  sell gas across
 ̂ Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Executive Energy Documents, Printed 
at tlie Request o f Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, (Washington. Govenunent Printing Office, July 1978), 86.
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state lines, leading to a serious shortage by the early seventies.
The oil industry likewise suffered from  incohesive federal regulation. The US 
began the Mandatory Oil Import Program (M O IP) in 1959 as a protectionary measure 
designed to bring the high cost o f  dom estic oil into balance with cheaper foreign 
petroleum.^ Regulators limited the am ount o f  imports, which forced consumers to pay 
more for oil in general. Prior to the em bargo. President Nixon planned to modify MOIP 
by increasing import quotas over time. In 1970, the US used petroleum for nearly half o f  
its total energy consumption, and the high dom estic prices led to inflation. N ixon’s 
controlled incoming petroleum as a way to ease the US into global market realities and to 
counter inflation, but the quota system had the opposite effect. “  Cheap oil continued to 
flood the market, leading Nixon to impose his Economic Stabilization Program, a four- 
phase policy that added to federal regulatory inconsistency. In the program ’s fourth 
phase, instituted in 1973, the government se t two different prices for oil, one for “old” 
and a lower price for “new.” Producers had little incentive to produce new petroleum, 
even though a cold winter saw demand for home heating oil rise dramatically.*^
As the federal energy policy came to  a virtual halt during the W atergate crisis, 
American energy consumption did not change dramatically. Between 1972 and 1973, 
national use rose four percent; the next year, consumption fell just two percent.*^ Even 
though the OPEC embargo ended in the spring o f  1974, Americans feared that cheap
* In 1954, tlte Phillips Petroleum Company v. Wisconsin decision by the Supreme Court held tliat federal 
regulators in fact liad authority to set prices on gas that entered “interstate commerce,” or traveling across 
state lines. See Melosi, Coping with Abundance, 262-4 and Goodwin, Energy Policy in Perspective, 261-5.
® M elosi, Coping with Abundance, 260.
Some experts argue tliat tliis policy led to the rise in inflation that occurred in the late sixties and into tlie 
seventies.
" M elosi, Coping with Abundance, 283.
Ibid., 284.
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imported oil was a thing o f  the past. The crisis atmosphere served as a catalyst for 
streamlining federal policy administrative bodies as well as for boosting alternative 
energy research and development budgets.
One effect o f  the 1973 OPEC oil em bargo was to spur an interest in alternative 
energy. When solar energy began attracting attention from W ashington, no single agency 
was in charge o f implementing policy, several were. Nixon first charged the National 
Science Foundation with developing solar technology, a task the NSF undertook until late 
1973. Nixon then placed the Atomic Energy Com m ission’s Dixie Ray in charge o f  the 
solar budget. Ray likened solar energy to a “ flea on the back o f  the nuclear elephant,” 
which alienated many in the research and developm ent community. She quickly fell out 
o f favor and handed control over to the newly created Solar Energy Task Force.
President Ford attempted to consolidate alternative energy policy further still when he 
established both the Energy Research and Developm ent Administration (ERDA, 1975) 
and the Solar Energy Research Institute (SERI, 1975). These agencies eventually folded 
into President Carter’s Department o f  Energy, created in 1978.*^
In terms o f legislation and funding, the post-Nixon era made significant progress 
even without relying on the ambitious Project Independence.*^ The 93̂ ** Congress, which 
served from 1973-4, passed seven bills related to solar energy.'^ Four years later.
Congress worked with America’s first (and only) pro-solar president, Jimmy Carter, to
Department o f Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Energy Consumption by Sector, 1949- 
2002^ Annual Energy Review 2002, accessed at website www.eia.doe.gov.
Donald Beattie, ed.. History and Overx’iew o f  Solar Heat Technology, (Cambridge, MA; Tlie MIT Press,
1996), 31-4.
Ibid., 55-9, 97-100.
Ibid., 138.
Beattie, History and (Overview, 45.
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produce 15 related to the solar industry.** On M ay 3, 1978, the nation celebrated Sun 
Day Demonstration projects flooded the W ashington Mall, and President Carter 
promised to make solar energy “a cornerstone o f  this nation’s energy policy.” *̂
Certainly, the 1970s stands out as a banner decade for federal funding o f  solar energy. 
Throughout the decade, policymakers assum ed that simply pouring money into research 
and development projects would somehow change the way Americans would get their 
energy. The public made the same mistake.
Amid the whirlwind o f  agencies, the path to a solar society was hard to find. The 
hodge-podge nature o f  administering R&D m oney echoes the unclear goals associated 
with such projects. While we can look back to the Carter years with a degree o f 
sentimentality, the record shows that a lot o f  money produced little in the way o f  cheap 
technology. As government insider Donald Beattie points out, though, solar energy met a 
hostile crowd o f  bureaucrats almost from the start. Many foresaw the difficulties o f 
implementing an unready technology into an enthusiastic marketplace.^” In fact, most o f  
the ftmding eventually went to larger corporations that already had relationships with 
other sectors o f  the government, particularly the Defense Department. Arthur Allen 
reports that some familiar names received som e early funding; General Electric won a 
$2.8 million award, and Martin M arietta got $3.5 in the mid-seventies. In a move 
reminiscent o f the auto industry’s post-W W II chicanery, oil companies lined up to buy 
patents on solar panels in order to remove a threat.^’ Because the R&D funding was
Ronald W. Larson and Ronald E. West, eds.. Implementation ofSoiar Thermal Technology (Cambridge, 
MA: Tlie MIT Press, 1996), 96.
Quoted in Ray Reece, The Sun Betrayed: A Report on the Corporate Seizure o f  U.S. Solar Energy 
Development (fiosioiv. South End Press, 1979), 195.
Ibid., 1-2.
Artliur Allen, “Prodigal Sun," Mother Jones, Jime/July 2000.
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never tied to market applications, the ideas that came from the effort never impacted the 
American energy situation.
Solar and wind technology could not deliver on the promises made in the late 
seventies and early eighties by policymakers. In 1978, Congress passed the Solar 
Photovoltaic Energy, Research, Development and Demonstration Act that committed 
$1.2 billion over ten years to help make photovoltaics more efficient and competitive 
with fossil f u e l s .T h e  same year, the federal government began a photovoltaic 
commercialization program that installed PV  units on federal facilities, and in 1980, the 
Crude Oil Profit Windfall Tax increased tax credits for residential PV applications to 
forty percent and extending the credits to the end o f  1985.^^ By 1984, the price per watt 
o f  PV energy fell to less than ten dollars, and efficiency rates increased to nearly ten 
p e rc e n t.A lth o u g h  solar water heaters experienced a boom in the 1980s, the eighty 
thousand units delivered and installed in California between 1980 and 1981 had serious 
p ro b lem s.C o m p an ie s  with no expertise in solar technology suddenly appeared, and 
unsuspecting consumers fell prey to charlatans. The once positive public image o f  solar 
energy suffered due to the criticisms o f  scams. The wind energy industry also benefited 
from state (particularly California) and federal legislation, and by 1985, California 
installed nearly one thousand megawatts.^^ Unfortunately, the technology designed to 
reap the benefits o f the wind also experienced problems, and in 1988 wind energy
Tlie monetary figure is translated to 2002 dollars.
^  Energy Infonnation Administration, Department o f  Energy, "Photovoltaic Milestones,” last modified 
March 7, 2003, accessed at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaiysolar.renewables/renewable energy.ammal/backgmd/cliapl li.htm.
Ibid.
James C. Williams, Energy and the Making o f  Modern California, (Akron: University o f Akron Press,
1997), 337.
Ibid., 336.
’̂Robert Righter, Wind Energy in America: A ///.story (Norman: University o f Oklalioma Press, 1996), 215.
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companies removed a significant number o f  windmills.^* While some new turbines 
replaced the faulty models, the public image o f  wind energy suffered.
The second category that explains the failed policies o f  the 1970s revolves around 
tax incentives, A prominent part o f  President C arter’s declaration o f  the “moral 
equivalent o f  war” was the Energy Tax Act o f  1978, One o f  the five pillars that 
supported the pathbreaking National Energy Act, the ETA allowed taxpayers to write o ff 
up to 50% o f  the cost o f a solar or wind equipm ent purchase. Aside from the accurate 
criticism that such a tax policy mainly benefited the wealthy,^” the incentives fall under 
scrutiny for their goals. Rather than increase national production  o f  solar energy, the tax 
breaks instead rewarded consumption. Expert Donald Beattie astutely points out that the 
credits “created more jobs for door-to-door salesmen than factory j o b s . W h i l e  he 
deems Carter’s presidency largely as a missed opportunity, Beattie figures that ten years 
o f  federal support yielded a total savings o f  1.2 billion barrels o f oil.^^ The market fell 
out from under the solar industry in 1986. Sales o f  solar water heaters, the most widely 
adopted technology, fell by ninety percent the year after the credits expired.^^
The true test for alternative energy cam e during the free market era o f  the 1990s. 
Renewable energy producers managed to use PURPA to gain access to the grid, and the 
1992 Energy Policy Act (EPACT) allowed even more alternative energy producers to 
contribute to energy market. The costs for solar systems reflect their staying power; the
Energy Information Administration, Department o f  Energy, "Wind Power Milestones,” last modified 
January 7, 2004, accessed at http:/Avwvv.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.reiiewables/page/wind/wind.htinl.
^  United States Senate, The Notional Energy Act, Printed at the request of the Conunittee on Energy and 
Natural Resources (Wasliinglon: Govenunent Printing Office, January 1979), Publication 96-1, 521.
^  Larson, Implementation, 89.
Beattie, History and 0\>er\>iew, 232.
Ibid , 169.
Larson, Implementation, 128,
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price o f  solar energy has dropped seventy-one percent in price since 1980/^ Still the free 
market limits individual solar systems to people in developing countries, where the costs 
o f  constructing huge power plants remain prohibitive. The entrenched nature o f  fossil 
and nuclear power effectively squelched any enthusiasm for solar or wind energy in the 
US.
The California Electricity Crisis a n d  the  VoteSolar Initiative  
The direct inspiration for Prop B came in 1996, when California Governor Pete 
W ilson signed Assembly Bill (AB) 1890 into law. Also called “The Electric Utility 
Industry Restructuring Act,” AB 1890 sought to open the electricity market for 
competition by reorganizing the way the governm ent regulated the utility industry in 
California. Prior to AB 1890, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) 
regulated electricity supply by dictating the amount that power companies could generate, 
transmit, and distribute; CPUC also determined retail prices amenable to both producers 
and c o n s u m e r s . T o  balance demand, the California Electricity Commission helped plan 
resource consumption and pushed consum er conservation efforts. The balance o f  these 
and other regulatory bodies produced reliability, which was the hallmark o f  American 
power generation for a half century.
The push towards deregulation cam e incrementally after the energy crises o f  the 
1970s. In the seven previous decades, American policymakers linked economic growth
Tlie Center for a New American Dream, “April 2002 Profile: David Hochschild,” arcliived at website 
www.newdreain.org/bulletiii/liochscliild.html.
I use power companies and utilities interchangeably tliroughout tliis text to mean distributors who deliver 
electricity to customers; I use the term “power producer” to describe entities that make electricity.
See Cliristopher Weare, The California Electricity Crisis: Causes and Policy Options (San Francisco: 
Public Policy Institute of California, 2003), 19.
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with energy consumption, which was thought to  require consistent governm ent 
o v e r s i g h t . F r e e  market advocates continued to  chafe under what they saw as 
unnecessary regulations in the seventies, but lawm akers did widen the scope o f  American 
power suppliers. While the National Energy Act o f  1978 is awash with oversight, the law 
did attempt to expand the circle o f electricity generators to include those that used 
alternative forms o f  energy.^* Later American policy widened the scope still further with 
the Energy Policy Act o f  1992, which allowed exempt wholesale generators access to the 
electricity grid.^^ Opening the market to independent (or, non-utility) power suppliers 
had its intended effect in California, where by the mid-nineties, non-utilities supplied 
almost a quarter o f the state’s energy needs.'*® The market was opening to renewable 
energy sources, but uneven incentive policies and resistance to alternatives by utilities, 
which still controlled over half the state’s pow er plants, kept solar and wind energy on 
the fringes.'"
While legislative efforts pointed California’s electricity ship downstream, high 
prices acted as a powerful current that swept the state towards deregulation. Despite 
California’s exemplary conservation efforts, which made the state efficient economically 
and environmentally, electricity consumers paid higher prices than any neighboring
See Richard Rudolph and Scott Ridley. Power Struggle: The Hundred-Year War over Electricity (New  
York: Harper & Row, 1986) who argue tliat the tension between public and private interests led to 
compromises tliat included government oversight; and M elosi, Coping with Abundance.
^  Tlie Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) forced utilities to buy electricity from qualifying 
facilities.
See CliriStine Real de Azua, “The Futiu’e o f Wind Energy,” 14 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 485 
(2001), 497-507, who points out that the wind industry may not have survived the nineties without EPACT. 
^  California Energy Commission. “Total California Electricity Generation” (from website 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity, last visited October 13, 2003).
Weare, The California Electricity Crisis, 8-10.
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state.'*^ Free market advocates claimed vertical integration was the culprit: utilities 
owned power plants that generated electricity, the transmission lines that criss-crossed the 
state, and the ability to distribute the power to  consumers. Despite this stability, prices 
climbed ever higher.
Pressure on the state’s lawmakers finally succeeded in creating change. When 
Governor Wilson signed AB 1890 in late September 1996, many around the state thought 
the time had finally come for a fair, free market that would produce cheap pow er for all. 
The legislation called for a brief period o f oversight, to allow the three major utilities 
time to adjust, followed by competition based on the free market. Utilities gave up 
control over the transmission lines they owned to ensure fair competition; the 
Independent System Operator, a centralized state agency, would ensure equal access to 
the grid from all producers. The Power Exchange served as the open market for 
electricity, where generators would sell pow er to distributors acting on the orders o f  
presumably informed consumers. The hope was that competition among different power 
producers would drive prices downward.'*^ The reality was that no one in 1996 could 
foresee all that would befall California in 2000 and 2001.
The restructuring law operated without a hitch for its first three years.
Regulations continued to protect distributing utilities and their customers by capping 
wholesale and retail prices, while electricity supplies seemed ample enough to keep up 
with demand. Once the market opened, California would experience a harsh reality o f
Ibid., 7-8. The Department o f Energy’s Distributed Energy Resources (DER) website figures tliat in 
1996, California ranked tenth in the states with the liighest electricity prices. See
www.eere.energy.gov/der. Cliris Weare points out that Californians need only 0.22 kWli for every dollar 
earned, wliile tlie national average is 0.40 kWli/ dollar; Weare also notes that residents use only 6,400 kWli 
per resident per year; the national average is 11,900.
James C. Williams, "Strictly Business: Notes on Deregulating Electricity,” Technology and Culture vol. 
42.3, 2001, 626-30.
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the electricity industry. During times o f increased demand, supplies don’t always keep 
up, no matter how much money power producers could make. Slow lag tim es exist 
between state approval for power plants and actual energy production, and the hostile 
approach that the power industry took toward renewables continued. About the time AB 
1890 became law, a leading utility. Southern California Edison (SCB), convinced a court 
that the state had ample power supplies, thus voiding long-term supply contracts with a 
wind energy producer.'*'* Just as full deregulation was to kick in, three major 
developments caused California’s electricity dem and to reach untenable levels. First, the 
state imported much o f its electricity from neighboring states, but drought again struck 
the region during the winter o f  1999-2000 reducing the capacity o f  vital hydroelectric 
dams. The West also experienced a population boom, which translated into a spike in 
demand for power outside California, and m any states that had previously exported 
power instead re-directed electricity supplies to meet the needs o f  their own burgeoning 
population.'*^ Finally, most o f California’s pow er plants ran on natural gas, but a nation­
wide shortage o f the fuel prevented supplies from getting to generators.'*^
California entered the deregulation w ilderness just as howls for electricity 
reverberated throughout the West. AB 1890 contributed to the energy crisis in two major 
ways. First, the law forced utilities to purchase electricity on the open market. The idea 
was to allow consumers to choose their electricity providers; lawmakers hoped that the 
competition to provide inexpensive (even renewable) power would keep costs low. This
Azua, “The Future o f Wind Energy,” 510. SCE convinced FERC that the low bids from independent 
producers exceeded the utility’s avoided costs, a violation o f PURPA. Azua’s conclusion seems 
appropriate: “Legislation tliat was intended to encourage the use of renewable energy was, ironically, being 
used to throttle...renewables.”
Weare, The California Electricity Crisis, 19-23. Enough time liad passed since utilities trimmed tlieir 
energy conservation programs to add to the demand, as well.
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market approach worked effectively for the first couple years o f  its existence, but in 
2000, wholesale prices unexpectedly skyrocketed by 270% over the previous year.'*’ 
Utility restructuring not only forced utilities to operate in this volatile setting, the 
wholesale market itself came under siege by the power generating industry. Some energy 
experts argue that companies willfully withheld electricity by taking plants off-line by 
shutting them down for maintenance at critical times.'** The shortage often worked to  the 
advantage o f  producing companies because the higher prices benefited all sellers, even 
those that owned relatively few plants. Pow er generators defend the plant shut-downs by 
pointing to the unusually high demand o f the preceding winter, which was drier and 
warmer than was typical.'*^
Faulty oversight also contributed to  energy shortages. An inherent benefit o f  AB 
1890, deregulation, ironically caused confusion among the government agencies charged 
with implementing and overseeing the law. The agency responsible for reducing 
demand, the California Energy Commission, saw many o f  its innovative energy-saving 
programs fade into the background as other state and federal regulators allowed utilities 
to slash their conservation budgets. The Union o f  Concerned Scientists reports that the 
halted programs translated into an increased demand o f nearly 1,800 megawatts (MW) o f 
power at a time when supplies became s c a r c e . T h e  California Public Utilities
Ibid., 28-32. In addition, natural gas prices rose thanks to an explosion at an El Paso Co. pipeline in late 
summer 2000 tliat disrupted supplies by 15% going into the winter.
Energy Infonnation Administration, "The Califoniia Electricity Crisis; Subsequent Events -  California’s 
Energy Crisis” (from the website www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/eIectricity/california/subsequentevents.htinI, last 
accessed October 16, 2003).
P.L. Joskow, California's Electricity Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute o f Tecluiology, 
2001) and P.L. Joskow and E. Kalui, Identifying the Exercise o f  M arket Power: Refining the Estimates 
(Cambridge, MA, 2001).
Weare, The California Electricity Crisis, 33-4.
Union o f Concerned Scientists, "California Energy Crisis: Causes and Solutions,” from tlie website 
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/renewable_cnergy/page.cfm?pagelD=68, last visited July 28, 2003.
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Commission, in charge o f ensuring that utilities competed for power among various 
suppliers, also forced power companies to buy electricity on the wholesale market, rather 
than allow long-term contracts. The CPUC incorrectly assumed that supplies would 
remain constant through deregulation’s first few  years and that projects slated to come 
online in 2002 and after would help meet dem and concerns.^* Unfortunately for 
consumers and utilities, ensuring fair competition overrode concerns for potential 
demand increases; the Commission’s adherence to its long-term contract preclusion 
forced utilities into an unfamiliar and highly volatile market.
While regulators failed to anticipate the major problems o f  demand spikes, 
utilities bear some responsibility for the crisis, too. During the summer o f  2000, power 
companies utilized only half o f  the available long-term supply c o n t r a c t s . A B  1890 
charged the Federal Energy Regulatory Com m ission with overseeing the wholesale 
marketplace. FERC officials had long supported a free market setting, and hesitated to 
act quickly when wholesale prices skyrocketed. Had FERC capped wholesale prices in 
the crisis’s early days, California’s current financial outlook may not look so bleak.^'* 
FER C ’s reluctance to interfere with the open market has certain philosophical merit, but 
in reality, market manipulation was rampant. As prices soared ever higher, generating 
companies like Enron raked in huge profits. One report notes that the scandal-ridden 
corporation made over $20 million in a single day on several occasions.
Government agencies and private companies bear some responsibility for
** Weare, The California Electricity Crisis, 38-9. Supplies actually were stable from 1998-2000.
CPUC figured tliat allowing long-term contracts would contravene the point o f AB 1890, which was 
competition.
Weare, The California Electricity Crisis, 44.
Ibid., 45-6.
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., "Report Voices Suspicion on Energy Crisis,” August 14, 2002 from a Reuters 
News Service report disseminated by www.planetark.org on August 15, 2002.
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exacerbating a crisis situation, but California lawmakers did nothing to salvage this 
difficult situation. Crisis expert James Sweeney argues that Governor Gray D avis had an 
opportunity to  respond to certain market flaws, yet Davis instead blamed the problem on 
market manipulation and unresponsive federal r e g u l a t o r s . T o  an extent, Davis was 
right. State lawmakers had no authority to cap wholesale prices; AB 1890 left wholesale 
market regulation to FERC, a federal agency. Yet the state legislature placed enormous 
pressure on utilities by capping the rates they could charge retail customers. By forcing 
distributors to buy power on the wildly fluctuating wholesale market and capping the 
amount end-users had to pay, lawmakers forced utilities to operate at a potential loss i f  
wholesale prices exceeded retail limits.^^ W hen the crisis reached full-blown, rolling 
blackout status, the state intervened to become a participant in the electricity market.
Davis authorized expensive, long-term contracts that put the state on the road to its 
current financial crisis. In the midst o f an econom ic downturn, California must now 
figure out how to finance its $42 billion contractual obligations.^®
Not all o f  the repercussions from the rolling blackouts were negative. In San 
Francisco, a nonprofit organization, VoteSolar, turned the electricity crisis into an 
opportunity. Solar technology would form the centerpiece o f the group’s agenda, which 
was to organize a ballot measure designed to make San Francisco a leading consumer o f  
solar energy. Proposition B, a $100 million dollar bond initiative, went from idea to the 
ballot box in a matter o f  ten months. The success o f  the vote would spill over into similar
^  James L. Sweeney, The California Electricity Crisis (Stanford, CA; Hoover Institution Press, 2002). 
Sweeney defends utilities, wliich he says were placed in a bind by being forced to buy electricity on tlie 
wholesale market and sell tliat power on a retail level at a loss: Davis’s position, tliat generators willfully 
witlilield supplies, lias gained merit since several lawsuits have revealed a level o f trutli to the former 
governor’s assertion.
Weare, The California Electricity Crisis, 38-40.
Ibid., 55.
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efforts organized elsewhere. At the heart o f  the VoteSolar Initiative lay a dedicated 
group o f  advocates who took advantage o f  an opportunity to implement the latest solar 
technology through democratic means. V oteSolar’s response to the electricity crisis 
began with the campaign to pass Proposition B, and the Initiative’s work continues to 
impact communities around the country. H ere I cover VoteSolar’s campaign for Prop B 
in three phases; the movement to get the initiative on the ballot; the actual campaign; and 
momentum into other work.
David Hochschild came up with the idea for VoteSolar while he was part o f  San 
Francisco’s parks department. As an expert on the city’s parks bond process, Hochschild 
had an intimate knowledge about how this form  o f financing operated, Hochschild ran 
the numbers and discovered that a bond initiative could pay for a massive overhaul o f  
San Francisco’s electricity infrastructure. D ifficulties lay ahead for the new group, but 
VoteSolar figured it could achieve its goal to  place an initiative on the ballot in ten short 
months by dealing with two realities. First, the group learned that a adding a new 
transmission line to the city’s sole line would cost $100 million. Such a project would 
still leave San Francisco at the mercy o f  a distant, volatile m a r k e t . B y  using “fog maps” 
created by the San Francisco Public U tilities Commission, VoteSolar made an important 
discovery. Despite its foggy reputation, San Francisco receives a lot o f sunshine.^® The 
eastern part o f  the city actually gets about ninety percent o f the solar radiation as the sun­
drenched Central Valley.^' This potential translated into a major selling point: people
At least one power plant existed near to San Francisco, called Hunter’s Point Power Plant, but the city 
got tlie majority o f its electricity from elsewhere. In periods o f high demand, customers who sat closer to 
sources tend to get power first, hence San Francisco was at the mercy o f the market.
Tlie fog map is available on the internet at www.soIarcat.com/sfsolar/main.htin.
Kendra Mayfield, ‘“ Fog City’ Catches a Few Rays,” Wired magazine, January 7, 2003 from the website 
www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,57046,00.hlml. See also Karina Garbesi and Emily 
Bartholomew, “The Potential for Solar Electricity Generation in San Francisco; A Report to the
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love solar power. As Hochschild said, “(w)e could position solar energy as a window o f  
opportunity to build San Francisco’s energy independence in a way that fights global 
warming rather than worsens it.”^̂
Proposition B came together as a bond initiative quickly. That such a measure 
took place at all reveals an anomalous quality about San Francisco; whereas most cities 
issue city-improvement bonds through an internal process at city hall, San Francisco 
requires voter approval for such improvements. Getting such an initiative onto the ballot 
can occur in one o f three ways in San Francisco: the mayor make the proposal; advocates 
can gather the requisite number o f  signatures in support; or the Board o f  Supervisors can 
approve a measure.^^ For VoteSolar, the idea for solar power had a strong advocate in 
M ark Leno, a member o f  the Board o f  Supervisors. Leno encouraged Hochschild to 
prove the fiscal soundness o f  the project and eventually introduced the measure to the 
Board
VoteSolar again proved up to the challenge. By requesting a $100 million, the 
group promised to deliver solar energy that could pay for itself. Yet electricity gathered 
from rooftop photovoltaic (PV) panels remained an expensive alternative: San Francisco 
paid between 5.50-90 per kilowatt hour (kW h) o f  natural gas-generated power in 2001, 
compared to 180/kWh for solar.*’'* In terms o f  the costs for installed capacity, solar panels 
cost about $5.50 per watt, a number that continues to  put PV panels out o f reach for most
Environmental Law and Justice Clinic of Golden Gate University Law School,” June 1, 2001, from website 
www.califbmiasolarcenter.org/pdls/SFPV.pdf.
“  David Hoclischild interview with the Center for a New American Dream, 
www.newdream.org/bulletin/liochschild.html, last visited October 20, 2003.
David Hochschild interview with author, Jime 17, 2003. Notes in autlior’s possession. Tlie requisite 
number can be either 10,000 signatures or 5% of voters participating in the most previous election.
^  Jane Kay, ”SF Could be Leader on Solar Energy: Props. B and H being backed by businesses and 
environmentalists alike,” San Francisco Chronicle, Saturday October 27, 2001, found at newspaper 
arcliives at www.sfgate.com.
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c o n su m ers .U n d e te rre d , VoteSolar struck upon the idea o f  “bundling” solar energy 
with cheaper wind power and cost-effective energy efficiency measures; this process 
yields two key benefits. First, cities have the ability to raise the amount o f  money needed 
to make such investments. Next, tying solar electricity to  other economically viable, if 
less sexy, alternatives brings the overall cost o f  the technology down.^^ The budget 
analysis figures presented to the Board in m id-July assumed a very conservative 20 year 
payback period.®^
While the Board o f Supervisors approved the bond initiative for the ballot, the 
campaign for Prop B still had a long way to go. Still VoteSolar had a lot going for it. 
Rolling blackouts hit California hard that summer, making energy a front burner issue 
with voters. The crisis proved critical for raising awareness, but the key to the 
campaign’s success was its ability to offer a viable alternative. Although a mere one 
hundred days stood between the B oard’s approval o f  the bond initiative and the election, 
VoteSolar managed to rally a diverse group o f  San Franciscans to its cause. Opposite 
ends o f the political spectrum endorsed the proposal, prompting Hochschild to wonder 
“where else you would find the Chamber o f  Commerce agreeing with the San Francisco 
Labor Council?” *̂ Help came in other ways, too; VoteSolar’s Charlene Garland points to 
the 200 volunteers who hung signs, knocked on doors, and manned the phone banks, 
which coincidentally helped raise $100,000 for the effort. One volunteer, a well-known
San Francisco Board of Supervisors, "Proposed Solar Bond Initiative: Illustrative Bundle o f Projects: 
$100 Million Revenue Financing,” 1. Hochschild tliinks this number must fall to about $1.50/watt for solar 
to compete witlt fossils.
^  Hochschild interview, June 17, 2tX)3.
“Proposed Solar Bond Initiative,” 1. The proposal sets aside money in an interest-bearing account 
calculated to cover the costs o f debt service tlirough the course o f the bond’s repayment.
®Ibid.
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graphie designer, even came up with the cam paign’s image.
Not everyone embraced VoteSolar’s message. Hochschild took his m essage to 
the Republican County Central Committee, a group o f  16 members charged with charting 
the course taken by the Bay Area GOP. Dressed in his most conservative suit, the 
VoteSolar founder headed o ff to argue his case before the committee. Stressing the fiscal 
soundness o f  the bond, Hochschild m anaged to persuade four members that his idea was 
a good one, a decent showing given the frosty audience.^® Later, Hochschild took his 
message to television. In a debate shown on public access TV, Hochschild sparred with 
former Board Supervisor John Bartis, whose argument centered on the general fiscal risks 
he believed inherent in bond initiatives. W hile television exposure helped V oteSolar’s 
cause, it didn’t compare to what followed. Sensing that their message would resonate 
with the public, VoteSolar’s opponents funded an advertisement arguing against the 
initiative. The ad backfired. San Franciscans reacted with resounding support for the 
measure. Hochschild figures the response to the single opposition ad translated into forty 
to fifty pro-Prop B ads.’ *
While the solar message added a certain allure to Prop B, the campaign itself 
consisted o f four key components. First, the issues that resonated with voters tended to 
center on air quality. Polling data revealed that people in the Bay Area attached more 
importance to local air quality than greenhouse gas emissions generally.”  VoteSolar 
tailored its “Clean Air, Clean Energy” slogan accordingly. Next, the energy crisis raised 
voter awareness. Rather than join the pundits that decried the policy blunders, VoteSolar
® Interview with Charlene Garland, February 14, 2003. Notes in author’s possession. 
’“ Hochschild interview, June 17, 2003,
” Ibid.
Ibid.
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could point to a positive solution. The energy independence theme carried force, as well. 
Hochschild points out that a single transm ission line serves the entire city; to  build 
another one would cost $100 million.^^ VoteSolar offered an energy source that didn’t 
pollute or require a complicated system o f  pow er lines.^'*
The fourth and perhaps the most innovative approach taken by the Prop B 
campaign was the idea o f  “bundling.” W hile the cost o f solar panels had fallen since the 
last solar era o f  the 1970s, PV systems remain out o f  reach for most people. Even big 
cities like San Francisco can’t afford to go solar all by itself. The bundling idea finds a 
way around such a dilemma through large-scale bulk p u r c h a s e s .A n o th e r  key to 
making a project like Prop B affordable is tying expensive solar power to other, cheaper 
alternatives. Prop B allocates $30 million for wind energy, and a mere $2 million on 
energy efficiency measure s . I ron ica l l y ,  cheaper energy efficient technologies “have a 
very short payback period and are key to making projects cost-effective,” according to 
VoteSolar co-founder Adam Browning, who estimates that Prop B will pay for itself in a 
mere six and a half years.
November 6, 2001 found San Franciscans keen on the idea o f going solar. A 
whopping 73% of the voters turned their hopes skyward and sent a message that 
continues to resonate across the nation. The momentum from the victory has spurred 
VoteSolar on to grander projects. The group, which changed its name to the VoteSolar 
Initiative as o f M arch 2002, has set its sights on starting similar bond projects in ten
Ibid. Hochschild referred to a study undertaken by the utility Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), which is 
available at its website, www.pge com.
Hochschild also noted the disadvantages o f nuclear power.
VoteSolar often refers to the “economies o f scale” theory, wlrich holds that large purchases would drive 
up demand, tlms lowering costs o f supplies via competition.
’ San Francisco Board of Supervisors, “Solar Bond Illustrative Bundle o f Projects: Project Assumptions,” 
July 17, 2001 from website www.votesolar.org.
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American cities over the next two years/^  By most accounts, things are going well. A 
bond initiative has gathered momentum in Oakland and San Diego, while other cities 
may soon join the list. New York and Hawai i are also considering statewide solar bond 
projects, a coup for the Initiative’s public im age and a testament to the group’s ability to 
mend fences. The two governors pushing fo r solar bonds are both Republicans.
Solar and W ind Energy in  A m erica
It is clear to us tlmt tlie leaderslup for promoting renewable 
energy is not going to come from the Wlute House or Congress.
Tlie action really is at the local level
The VoteSolar Initiative splashed onto the energy scene with an electrifying 
message that generated enthusiastic support. Prop B presented a fresh approach to a 
stagnating problem, but solar energy is nothing new in the US. Since the OPEC embargo 
in 1973, the federal government has poured billions into solar research and development 
projects. Tax incentives have cost the US even more. The efforts have not averted 
America’s taste for fossil fuels, and solar continues to  play a limited role in the American 
energy supply.
Thirty years ago, enthusiasm for solar energy swept across the United States. 
Everyone from politicians to off-the-grid hippies basked in the warm glow o f the sun’s 
potential. Time managed to temper hopes and leave the people with several issues to 
ponder. Uneven federal support for solar and wind energy ultimately deterred growth, 
but many still see a role for Washington. Solar advocate Tor Allen thinks W ashington 
can provide leadership in the way o f nationwide interconnection and net metering rules,
”  Quote from Kendra Mayfield, ‘“ Fog Cily’ Catches a Few Rays.”
Tlie VoteSolar Initiative, "The VoteSolar Initiative; A Clean Energy Movement Led by Cities,” original 
publication in author’s possession.
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which would allow more people to profit from  independent energy production.*® As for 
funding, Allen likes VoteSolar’s approach. “The more local control the better.”** 
However the experts choose to view the past 30 years, one thing is certain. The 
momentum created by the VoteSolar Initiative gives us reason to hope. For me, that’s a 
welcome change.
David Hochschild, quoted in Dean E. Murphy, “For Solar Power, Foggy City Maps Its Bright Spots,” 
New York Times, 24 November 2002, Section A, page 18.
Net metering refers to a two-way system of measuring electricity flow, which would track contributions 
to tlie grid; today most meters simply track the amoiuit o f  electricity taken from the grid.
*' Email message from Tor Allen, July 10, 2003; original in auUior’s possession.
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Conclusion
In 1998, the US Department o f  Energy celebrated a landmark occasion by doing 
what federal agencies have a knack for doing. It published a study. Entitled “The 25‘*’ 
Anniversary o f the 1973 Oil Embargo; Energy Trends Since the First M ajor Energy 
Crisis,” the Energy Information Adm inistration (EIA) presented evidence o f  how 
American energy consumption and production reacted to what remains the most 
significant energy challenge to date. Little data supports the argument that US energy 
policy changed significantly since the OPEC embargo, yet hidden among the charts and 
graphs lay two important pieces o f information.
The publication reveals that there rem ains a difference between national wants 
and national needs. First, American consum ption o f  OPEC petroleum fell by twenty-five 
percent between 1973 and 1985, showing that the United States can survive, even thrive, 
without oil from the Persian G ulf region. * In the twelve years after the first energy crisis, 
the nation raised domestic resource production, cut its dependence on foreign sources, 
and vastly improved energy efficiency.^ Such evidence points to Am erica’s ability to 
adapt to the realities o f resource scarcity, although the changes hardly signal a complete 
shift away from what are now traditional energy sources.
The study also shows that Americans can easily fall back into old patterns. US 
petroleum  consumption peaked in 1978 at nearly nineteen million barrels o f  oil per day.
' Department o f Energy, Energy Information Administration, “The 25“' Anniversary o f the 1973 Oil 
Embargo; Energy Trends Since the First Major Energy Crisis,” (Washington DC: US Dept o f Energy,
1998), 2, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov.
 ̂ Ibid., 1-2.
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Five years later, the nation trimmed about four million barrels from its consumption 
(even as the population grew at a steady rate) by building more efficient cars, by heating 
homes with natural gas instead o f oil, and through general energy conservation measures. 
As the global market and domestic production filled American demand for oil, though, 
the nation began consuming at pre-1978 levels.^ The binge continued through the 
twenty-fifth anniversary, so much so that by July 2002, the US consumed forty percent 
more energy than it had since 1970.'*
According to the National Energy Act o f  1978, the Department o f Energy must 
produce an annual energy review. Four years after its assessment o f federal policies 
since the OPEC embargo, the EIA published an overview that included detailed data not 
included in the twenty-five year review. According to several figures, much had changed 
since the trying days o f  the 1970s, but for the better.^ The rate at which Americans 
consumed energy per dollar o f the gross domestic product fell significantly. In 1970, 
Americans spent nearly nineteen dollars (in 1996 terms) per every thousand B tu’s 
consumed, while in 2002, that number neared ten dollars.^ Other indicators show that 
Am erica’s fossil consumption has increased to over eighty quadrillion B tu’s, up from just 
near seventy quadrillion in 1978.^ Another important figure shows that energy 
consumption per person approached the all t ime high in 1978 and 1979, when energy use 
per person stood at 360 million B tu’s; in 2002, that figure approached 338 million B tu ’s.* 
Lost among the evidence that the US continues to consume fossil energy at a
 ̂ Ibid., 4.
Anders Hove, /t Brief Guide to US Energy Policy  (Cambridge, MA: MIT, July 2002), 2,
* Whetlier tliis rosy picture relates to tlie different administrations remains to be seen.
® Department o f Energy, Energy Information Administration, /Inm W  Energy Review 2002, Figure 3,
“Energy Use per Dollar of Gross Domestic Product,” .wii. 
’ Ibid, Figure 4, “Energy Consumption by Source,” xvii.
® Ibid., Figure 2, “Energy Consumption per Person,” .wii.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
128
rapacious rate stands encouraging figures for alternative energy. The American Wind 
Energy Association reports that global installations o f  wind energy generating capacity 
grew by twenty-eight percent in 2002.^ Shipm ents o f  photovoltaic cells have also risen in 
recent years as prices have fallen. In 1982, total shipments o f  PV cells was nearly seven 
thousand kilowatts, while in 2001, that number rose to nearly 98,000 kilowatts.
Groups like the VoteSolar Initiative should take pride in their accomplishments. 
Thanks to pressure from alternative energy advocates, over a dozen states have adopted 
renewable energy portfolio standards (RPS), which set statutory requirements for the 
amount o f  alternative energy a state must use by a set date.** Several cities have also 
committed to solar and wind energy. According to VoteSolar’s David Hochschild, San 
Diego has agreed to get 35 MW o f power from photovoltaics by 2013, while the city has 
agreed to give PV projects accelerated permitting and inspections.*^
As these and other efforts demonstrate, humanity can change its view o f  sunshine 
and the breezes. Even within the past thirty years, the shape and function o f  solar and 
wind technology has gone from loud disappointment to quiet success. Past experiences 
have a tendency to mute grand proclamations o f  an energy future powered by the two 
renewable resources, yet optimists can take heart. I f  the VoteSolar Initiative is any 
indication, technology, economics, and policies all hint at a brighter future for solar and 
wind energy.
® American Wind Energy Association, “Global Wind Energy Market Report,” published at www.awea.org, 
last visited October 15, 2003.
'“ Department o f Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Photovoltaic Cell & Module Shipments by 
Type, Trade, and Prices, 1982-2001,” available at http://www.eia.doe.gov, last visited May 27, 2004.
" See www.irecusa.org for a complete list.
David Hochschild presentation to the Solar Forum, Anaheim, CA, November 20, 2003; notes in author’s 
possession.
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